Introduction
Theories of distributive justice often ask what social goods should be distributed, according to which principles, and through which institutions, while presupposing the boundaries of the political community and the identity of those entitled to participate. Michael Walzer challenges this assumption by treating membership as the first social good: before a community distributes education, welfare, offices, or other goods, it must determine who belongs to the community of distributors. Membership therefore has a constitutive role in the structure of distributive justice. Yet the authority to regulate admission raises a normative question: how can political self-determination be reconciled with equality and non-domination when migrants and refugees are subject to state power without full membership? Debates address this issue through arguments about open borders, freedom of association, democratic self-determination, and migrants’ moral claims. Critics such as Abizadeh and Goodin question whether border decisions can be justified solely by the preferences of current members. At the same time, Walzer’s account of guest workers and resident aliens condemns their indefinite subordination. The challenge is to bring these arguments together without denying the community’s authority to regulate membership or legitimising lasting domination over non-members.
Research Objective
This article critically reconstructs Walzer’s account of membership and the right to exclude to identify the normative limits of state authority over admission, residence, and access to political membership. It asks whether membership’s constitutive status in Walzer’s theory of complex equality can be reconciled with justice, equality, and non-domination. The article argues that political self-determination and the rejection of tyranny are not inherently incompatible. Nevertheless, Walzer’s account remains normatively incomplete unless institutional principles connect the initial regulation of entry with the later status of persons who reside and work within the political community. The article proposes “meta-good” as an analytical term for membership’s constitutive effect on the boundaries of the distributive community, access to multiple social spheres, and participation in defining their rules. It neither identifies a new social good nor attributes absolute moral priority to membership.
Research Method
The study uses a qualitative philosophical and analytical approach combining conceptual analysis, normative reconstruction, and immanent critique. It reconstructs Walzer’s arguments on membership, admission, citizenship, resident aliens, and guest workers; distinguishes social goods, membership as the first good, dominant goods, and the meta-good; and examines the difference between monopoly and domination. A community’s collective monopoly over determining membership does not, by itself, establish domination. Domination occurs when the advantage associated with membership is converted into disproportionate control over other spheres, such as employment, welfare, legal security, and civic participation. It tests Walzer’s position against his commitment to preventing tyranny and engages with Rawls, Arendt, Carens, Wellman, Benhabib, Abizadeh, Goodin, and other political theorists. The study relies on philosophical and documentary sources and does not present original empirical data. The situation of Afghan migrants and refugees in Iran is considered a contextual case through which the normative implications of differentiated residence and documentation statuses can be illustrated.
Findings and Discussion
The analysis yields four findings. First, membership is more than an ordinary distributive good because it determines who is included in the community of distribution and who can effectively claim rights and participate in shaping public rules. The meta-good captures this cross-sphere effect without assigning membership absolute priority. Second, monopoly and domination must be kept analytically distinct. Political communities may retain authority to regulate admission as an aspect of collective self-determination; however, this authority becomes objectionable when it enables the state to exploit the labour or obedience of long-term residents while indefinitely denying them political voice, legal security, or a meaningful route to citizenship. Walzer’s criticism of guest-worker arrangements provides an immanent basis for rejecting such lasting alienage. Third, the article distinguishes border membership from civic membership. Permission to enter or reside does not automatically amount to equal political membership. If the state admits individuals, regulates their lives, and benefits from their social and economic participation, it must also address the foreseeable consequences of admission for their future membership status. The distinction is especially important where temporary residence becomes prolonged in practice.
Fourth, the tension within Walzer’s theory is best understood not as an inherent contradiction between self-determination and non-domination, but as a structural tension arising from the absence of sufficiently developed institutional rules. The article therefore proposes six principles for a normative reconstruction of membership: (1) prohibition of permanent alienage and indefinite subordination of non-citizens; (2) prior consideration of the foreseeable membership consequences of admission decisions; (3) special duties toward persons facing urgent danger or severe need; (4) proportionality and non-discrimination in exclusion; (5) public justification of border decisions to those significantly affected by them; and (6) democratic revisability of membership rules. These principles do not all have the same theoretical status. The prohibition of permanent alienage is grounded in Walzer’s criticism of guest-worker domination. The second principle is an institutional development of that argument, while the third is consistent with his account of duties of assistance and refuge. The fourth and sixth principles are institutional extensions compatible with self-determination and non-domination. The fifth principle, by contrast, draws primarily on external arguments concerning border coercion and affected interests, particularly those developed by Abizadeh and Goodin; it should therefore be understood as a complementary addition rather than a principle directly attributable to Walzer.
The case of Afghan migrants and refugees in Iran illustrates why membership cannot be reduced to a formal citizen–foreigner distinction. Afghan nationals in Iran do not constitute a single legal or social category. Different documentation and residence arrangements may generate different levels of legal security and access to employment, education, services, and freedom of movement. This case is not equated with Walzer’s guest-worker model; it illustrates how administrative status can affect access across social spheres. From this perspective, the central normative issue is not whether all border controls should be abolished, but whether state authority is exercised through clear, proportionate, non-discriminatory, and reviewable rules that prevent the institutionalization of permanent alienage.
Conclusion
Walzer’s theory offers an important starting point for understanding the political conditions of distributive justice, since membership defines who may distribute and claim social goods. However, the right to exclude is not an unlimited proprietary power of existing members; it is a public authority constrained by non-domination, proportionality, and accountability. The proposed concept of the meta-good clarifies why membership decisions can affect several domains of social life, while the distinction between monopoly and domination prevents the argument from collapsing into a rejection of all border regulation. A defensible account must preserve collective self-determination while preventing the exploitation and indefinite subordination of non-citizens. Justice therefore concerns not only distribution within an established community, but also the procedures that determine membership, regulate residence, and enable civic inclusion.