Introduction
The Iranian automotive industry presents a compelling paradox. five decades of sustained state patronage, substantial resource allocation, and periodic reform initiatives have failed to produce a globally competitive, technologically dynamic, or qualitatively acceptable sector. Accounting for approximately 3.5% of GDP and 10% of manufacturing value-added, this industry epitomizes the broader structural ailments afflicting Iran's industrial policy regime namely, the predominance of rentier mentalities, the subordination of economic rationality to political expediency, and the systematic marginalization of societal participation. The industry's evolution from pre-revolutionary assembly operations through post-1979 nationalization, uneven privatization attempts, and contemporary sanctions-induced isolation offers a longitudinal laboratory for understanding how "fetishized" state presence in policymaking becomes an obstacle rather than an enabler of industrial transformation. This article critically interrogates the government's policymaking apparatus governing Iran's automobile sector, arguing that the industry's chronic malaise stems not from managerial deficiencies or exogenous shocks alone, but from a deeper institutional pathology: the idolization of state authority in policy formulation, execution, and evaluation, which systematically excludes societal actors, stifles competitive dynamics, and perpetuates a self-serving equilibrium among bureaucratic, military, and para-governmental stakeholders.
Research Aim
The primary objective of this research is to conduct a systematic examination of the government's policy cycle governing Iran's automotive industry, diagnosing the root causes of persistent inefficiency and proposing actionable reform pathways. The central research question is: What are the fundamental factors underlying the Iranian automotive industry's developmental stagnation, and how can a transition toward a more efficient, competitive, and value-generating configuration be achieved? This objective is operationalized through three interconnected tasks: mapping the historical trajectory of automotive policymaking across successive developmental plans; scrutinizing the interplay between formal policy instruments and informal networks of rent-seeking; and evaluating performance outcomes across production volume, quality, technological sophistication, environmental sustainability, and financial viability. The underlying assumption is that by identifying deficiencies within each stage of the policy cycle—design, execution, output, and assessment targeted interventions can address structural bottlenecks rather than merely treating symptoms. (De Oliveira, 2002; Rothstein, 2005; Yülek et al., 2020).
Literature Review
The scholarly literature on Iran's automotive industry reveals considerable diversity in analytical approaches yet exhibits notable methodological and conceptual gaps. Dara and Rezaeian (2022), in their comparative study on the role of the state in industrial development, juxtaposed Iran's automotive sector with that of South Korea but failed to employ up-to-date empirical data from either country, limiting the robustness of their conclusions. Similarly, Hosseinigoli and Saei (2017) adopted a comparative policy framework to examine Iran and South Korea's automotive strategies; however, their analysis remained largely descriptive, lacking the institutional depth necessary to explain divergent developmental trajectories. Fartoukzadeh and Tahmasebi (2020) addressed what they termed the "missing link" in Iran's industrial policymaking, offering a macro-level policy perspective that nonetheless overlooked the micro-institutional and implementation-level dynamics critical to understanding policy failure. Monem et al. (2021) investigated the dominant patterns of capital structure in the automotive and parts manufacturing sectors, but their financial focus neglected the structural, regulatory, and quality-related challenges that constitute the industry's core dysfunctions. In a more comparative vein, Torkamani et al. (2020) applied a developmental state lens to evaluate the divergent performances of Iran, China, and Mexico's automotive industries, effectively underscoring the salience of industrial policy in advanced manufacturing contexts; yet their study remained primarily concerned with cross-national macro-level outcomes, offering limited engagement with Iran's internal institutional pathologies and processual failures.
Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative, analytically driven approach situated within the institutionalist tradition. The methodological framework integrates three complementary strategies. First, process tracing within the systemic policy cycle model disaggregates policymaking into sequential phases agenda-setting, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation enabling identification of breakdown points where policy intent diverges from outcomes. Second, institutional mapping delineates the constellation of state and non-state actors involved in automotive governance, including formal institutions. By mapping their mandates, resources, and interaction patterns, the analysis reveals how jurisdictional overlaps and competitive rivalry produce policy incoherence. Third, historical-institutional comparison both diachronically across Iran's post-revolutionary administrations and synchronically with developmental states such as South Korea isolates factors specific to Iran's political economy. Data sources include primary policy documents, parliamentary legislation, government decrees, and secondary literature comprising academic journal articles and industry white papers, with statistical indicators triangulated across official and independent sources.
Results and Discussion
The empirical findings substantiate the thesis that state fetishism operates through five reinforcing mechanisms constituting a developmental trap. First, policy ambiguity and doctrinal absence pervade the industry's strategic orientation. Despite fifty years of state involvement, no coherent production doctrine clarifies whether the sector aspires to brand development, technology acquisition, or regional export orientation. The industry operates as a "fifty-year-old infant perpetually dependent on governmental support yet never maturing into autonomous competitiveness. Second, institutional fragmentation among the three branches of government, extra-constitutional bodies, and military-affiliated entities paralyzes coherent decision-making. The Competition Council's price mandates conflict with the Industry Ministry's production incentives, creating an environment characterized by ad holism and the absence of credible commitment. Third, the unresolved privatization paradox epitomizes institutional schizophrenia: while formal laws envision reducing state ownership, actual control remains concentrated through golden shares, board appointments, and captive financing. The 2019 Automotive Industry Reform Act nominally emphasizes competition, yet implementation has reinforced centralization. Fourth, the systematic exclusion of the public sphere consumers, civil society, professional associations—deprives the industry of crucial feedback mechanisms. Consumers are treated as passive recipients rather than rights-bearing stakeholders, reflected in alarmingly high traffic fatalities 10,720 deaths in the first half of 2022 alone. Fifth, short-termism and political business cycles have systematically undermined strategic planning. The industry has experienced alternating waves of expansion and contraction correlated with oil revenue volatility and sanctions intensity rather than industrial fundamentals. Quantitatively, value-added contribution has declined from 13% of manufacturing (2009) to under 9.5%, while foreign exchange leakage exceeds $4,500 per unit for Iran Khodro's 207 platform, underscoring the failure of localization rhetoric.
Conclusion
The Iranian automotive industry exemplifies developmental pathologies arising from the idolization of state authority in policymaking. The fetishized state presence manifested through monopolistic control, regulatory capture, institutional fragmentation, public sphere exclusion, and short-term political expediency has produced an industrial configuration misaligned with the imperatives of technological upgrading and global integration. The findings challenge conventional narratives attributing the industry's problems solely to sanctions, demonstrating that these operate within and are exacerbated by a deeper institutional architecture that systematically rewards rent-seeking over productivity. A sustainable transition requires fundamental reconfiguration of the state-industry relationship, moving from fetishized domination to an enabling, regulatory role.