نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشیار علوم سیاسی دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران
2 کارشناسی ارشد دانشگاه پیام نور، واحد قزوین، قزوین، ایران
چکیده
شوک استراتژیک ناشی از فروپاشی ناگهانی نظم مورد حمایت غرب در افغانستان، نشان‌دهنده شکست تلاش‌های دولت سازی غربی در قالب نظریه «صلح لیبرال» یا «صلح آمریکایی» است. در چند دهه اخیر، مهندسی اجتماعی غرب جهت ایجاد نوعی حکمرانی باثبات در دولتهای شکنندهای مانند افغانستان، نه تنها نتایج مطلوب را به همراه نداشت، بلکه روند آشتی ملی و گذار سیاسی را در این کشورها پیچیدهتر و با محدودیتهای جدی روبرو ساخته است. با این وصف، پژوهش پیشرو میکوشد از منظری آسیب‌شناسانه و با بهرهگیری از چارچوب نظری ترکیبی (دولت‌سازی و تحلیل ثبات سیاسی) به این پرسش اصلی پاسخ دهد که علت ناکامی فرایند آشتی سیاسی و در پی آن، قدرتیابی دوباره طالبان در اوت 2021 در افغانستان چه بود؟ یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که این ناکامی سیاسی، عمدتاً ناشی از ماهیت پروژه دولت سازی بینالمللی در این کشور است. لذا، روند حلوفصل سیاسی و پیشبرد موفقیتآمیز پروژه دولت سازی، (به مثابه سنگ بنای گذار سیاسی) برآیند دو عامل زیر است: 1) ثبات افقی؛(توافق سیاسی و احترام دولتمردان به تعهدات خود و پایبندی به قواعد بازی سیاسی) 2) ثبات عمودی؛ یا تعامل سازنده و متقابل دولت و جامعه (مشروعیت داخلی دولت و عدم‌مداخله نیروهای خارجی). روش پژوهش، کیفی از نوع تبیین علی و روش گردآوری داده‌ها بهرهگیری از منابع کتابخانه‌ای و فضای مجازی است.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
International State-Building and the Crisis of Political Transition in Afghanistan (2014-2021)
نویسندگان [English]
- Alireza Samiee Esfahani 1
- Sara Farahmand 2
1 Associate Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
2 M.A, Department of Political Sciences, Payam-e Noor University, Qazvin, Iran
چکیده [English]
Introduction
On August 15, 2021, in a strategic shock, the Taliban entered Kabul to seize power after a cascading crisis triggered by the Western military withdrawal and the reluctance of the Afghan government and its national security forces to engage in military conflict. The question arises as to where the roots of this unexpected political event lie. At the beginning of the 21st century, the September 11 attacks and the American government’s decisive analysis of the Taliban’s role set the stage for a military invasion led by an international coalition. Under U.S. leadership, Afghanistan became the frontline for implementing the strategy of war against terrorism. However, America’s sustained involvement in Afghanistan cannot be understood simply as an effort to eliminate Al-Qaeda terrorist groups. This objective appeared to be of secondary importance to the coalition forces, particularly the United States. The primary focus of their policies was the establishment of political and social stability within Afghan society. American security theorists believed that terrorism was a consequence of bankrupt governments and the social environment, which they saw as manifestations of chaos that had persisted for years. As a result, state-building in Afghanistan became a key focus of U.S. security policy. With the support of other nations and various international organizations, the United States pursued a policy aimed at forming a powerful government and a stable society in Afghanistan. This effort involved several steps, including drafting the constitution, holding presidential and parliamentary elections, building political institutions, and granting political and social freedoms to civil society institutions and political activists. The Karzai administration even invited the Taliban to join the government and renounce violence in hopes of establishing political stability and forming an inclusive government. The 2014 presidential election was therefore expected to be an important opportunity for the institutionalizing of a democratic government and the peaceful transfer of power in Afghanistan. However, many successive crises in Afghanistan seem to stem from the limitations and obstacles of the international state-building project. The governments have struggled to incorporate all political factions and effectively manage conflicts. Both the Karzai and Ghani administrations faced growing political and social instability and significant crises (e.g., crises of authority, influence, and legitimacy), ultimately losing the support of the Afghan people.
After nearly two decades of democratization rhetoric supporting the international state-building initiative in Afghanistan, the modern state and democracy, with their inherent positive attributes, have yet to take root among the Afghan people. Moreover, political security and stability has remained elusive, becoming a rare and expensive commodity for both the elites and the general populace. In this respect, the present study aims to address the central question of what led to the failure of the political reconciliation process and the subsequent re-establishment of Taliban control in Afghanistan in August 2021. The research is based on the hypothesis that this political failure primarily stemmed from the unique nature of the international state-building project in Afghanistan. For the process of political settlement and the successful advancement of the state-building project to be effective, stability must be achieved on two levels: 1) horizontal stability and 2) vertical stability. To address the research question, the article first examined the political settlement among the elite and statesmen (horizontal stability), and then explored the legitimacy of the new political order within various segments of Afghan society (vertical stability).
Materials and Methods
The current study relied on a qualitative, causal-explanatory approach, as well as the data collected from library and internet sources. Following a pathological perspective, the research used a theoretical framework based on state-building and political stability to examine the Western efforts in state-building and political reconciliation in Afghanistan. It also sought to identify the reasons behind the failure of these policies, which ultimately led to the Taliban’s return to power within Afghanistan’s complex sociopolitical landscape during the period of 2014–2021.
Results and Discussion
According to the theoretical framework of state-building and political stability, Afghanistan’s National Unity Government can be considered a point of weakness in the country’s state-building process. The National Unity Government consistently failed to control power centers, both directly and indirectly and was unable to establish its authority and legitimacy in dealing with these centrifugal forces. Formed with external support through a political agreement brokered by the United States, the government was a temporary solution intended to address the crisis through a short-term coalition. However, it faced numerous challenges, including internal political divisions, increasing financial dependence on foreign countries (particularly the U.S.), failed peace talks with the Taliban, a rise in suicide operations, the Afghan National Army’s inability to counter the Taliban and establish security, administrative corruption, and political and economic crises. These issues severely undermined the legitimacy and authority of Ashraf Ghani’s administration, making it increasingly fragile and unable to provide the necessary political stability during the transition period. According to the theoretical model, for the process of political settlement and the successful advancement of the state-building project to be effective, stability must be achieved on two levels: 1) horizontal stability characterized by political agreements, officials’ respect for their obligations, and adherence to the rules of the political game; and 2) vertical stability referring to the constructive and mutual interaction between the government and society, including the domestic legitimacy of the government and non-interference of external forces. In Afghanistan, however, the international state-building efforts led by the Western alliance failed to establish the necessary consensus at both the horizontal and vertical levels.
Conclusion
The current study aimed to address the central question of what led to the failure of the political reconciliation process and the subsequent re-establishment of Taliban control in Afghanistan in August 2021. In the international war against terrorism, fragile states like Afghanistan became the focus of Western security discourse, leading to the proposal of international state-building through the theory of liberal peace as a solution to create political stability and a powerful central government in the country. This approach shaped the Western agenda in Afghanistan. However, nearly two decades later, the international state-building project failed to deliver the expected outcomes for both Afghan society and the international community. This article argued that the failure of national reconciliation and the peaceful political transition over the past two decades—especially after 2014—stems largely from the nature of the international state-building project. This project imposed a linear, mechanical, supranational–subordinate approach to state-building and political stability, failing to account for the internal dynamics and unique logic of intervened societies like Afghanistan. Therefore, the international state-building project struggled, as the liberal values of the West would contradict the traditional sociopolitical context of Afghan society. This fueled corruption, inefficiency, and the weakness of the quasi-government, which was heavily reliant on foreign support. Ultimately, the Taliban unexpectedly capitalized on anti-American sentiment among Afghans and regained power, plunging Afghanistan’s peaceful political transition into deep uncertainty.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
- Afghanistan
- State-building
- Fragile state؛ Taliban؛ Political settlement
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