نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

• روح اله علیدادزاده ¹
• مهدی رضایی ²

¹ دکتری حقوق عمومی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران

² دانشیار حقوق عمومی دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

با توجه به اهمیت نهاد دادرس اساسی و نقشی که این نهاد در تداوم نظام سیاسی و نگهبانی از متون قانون اساسی دارد، بخصوص با توجه به نقش دادرس اساسی در ارتقای حقوق و آزادی­ها، استقلال این نهاد از اهمیت دو چندانی در نظام­های سیاسی و حقوقی معاصر برخوردار است. تضمین و تأمین استقلال نهاد شورای نگهبان همواره از موضوعات مهم و البته چالش‌برانگیز حقوقدانان و سیاسیون بوده است. جهت دستیابی به نگاهی دقیق­تر در خصوص استقلال شورای نگهبان، به بررسی تطبیقی این نهاد با نهادهای مشابه در کشورهای آلمان و مصر که به ترتیب از موفق­ترین نهادهای دادرس اساسی در نظام دادرسی اساسی در جهان و کشورهای اسلامی و الجزایر به‌عنوان نمونه­ای که تشابه ساختاری با شورای نگهبان ایران دارد، می­پردازیم تا با تکیه بر این مطالعه و با روشی توصیفی- تحلیلی و با استفاده از منابع کتابخانه­ای و اینترنتی، بتوانیم به این پرسش پاسخ دهیم که میزان و درجه استقلال شورا نسبت به کشورهای موردپژوهش چگونه است؟ یافته­های پژوهش نشان می‌­دهد که شورای نگهبان نسبت به دو نهاد مشابه در آلمان و مصر از استقلال کمتری برخوردار است و در خصوص الجزایر در وضعیت نسبتاً مشابهی قرار دارد. بر اساس یافته­های پژوهش، شورا ضعف­ها و کاستی­های دارد که در دستیابی به یک سطح از استقلال که رضایت عموم و به‌ویژه رضایت جامعه حقوقی و سیاسی کشور را به‌صورت یک کلیت تأمین کند، ناتوان بوده است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

• استقلال
• دادرس اساسی
• شورای نگهبان
• پیشنهاد
• دادگاه قانون اساسی

موضوعات

• حقوق عمومی و بین الملل

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Independence of the Guardian Council in Iran: A Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Justice Institutions in Germany, Egypt, and Algeria

نویسندگان [English]

• Rohola Alidadzadeh ¹
• Mehdi Rezaie ²

¹ Ph.D. in Public Law, University of Allameh Tabataba’i, Tehran, Iran

² Associate Professor, Department of Public Law, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

Introduction
The degree of independence of the Guardian Council is one of the most critical issues in Iran’s legal and political system. The more independent the Guardian Council, the higher the quality and effectiveness of its decisions concerning other institutions. Therefore, the governance of the Guardian Council is a vital aspect of its decision-making process. A key issue for institutions tasked with protecting the constitution is their independence and immunity from the pressures of political bodies and government forces. Furthermore, the independence of the court directly impacts its legitimacy. Effectively safeguarding the nation’s constitutional rights requires that citizens trust the capability of the constitutional court to carry out its duties impartially and independently. This trust fosters the legitimacy and acceptability of court rulings. Moreover, the principles of independence and impartiality of judicial authorities (constitutional courts) are fundamental to achieving fair trials and ensuring the rights of citizens during proceedings. Only through such independence can we hope for the judiciary and judges who exercise justice and professionalism in their rulings. In this respect, the current research aimed to assess the level and degree of independence of the Guardian Council, as the constitutional judicial body in Iran, especially about the institutions that appoint or select its members. According to the existing studies, the Guardian Council demonstrates a weak level of independence compared to what is expected of a judicial institution. Against this backdrop, the present study conducted a comparative analysis of the institutional, administrative, and financial independence of the Guardian Council, examining its structure alongside similar institutions in Germany, Egypt, and Algeria.
Materials and Methods
This study employed a descriptive–analytical approach and relied on library and internet sources to examine the independence of the Guardian Council in Iran. The analysis took a comparative perspective, assessing the Council’s independence by comparing it with similar institutions in Germany, Egypt, and Algeria.
Results and Discussion
 Considering the institutional independence, the Guardian Council is by no means in an ideal legal position, compared to the three countries under study. According to the principles in Iran’s constitution, the Council is considered part of the legislature. Notably, the constitution does not explicitly specify the Council’s independence, with only Article 57 emphasizing the separation of powers and their respective independence. This suggests that the Council, as a pillar of the legislative branch, could be considered independent. However, in practice, the Guardian Council holds a higher position than the Islamic Consultative Assembly (or the Iranian Parliament). While the parliament drafts laws, the Guardian Council exercises a higher degree of independence in reviewing and approving them. In addition, the fact that the Council is placed under the legislature reflects the founder’s original vision regarding the nature of this institution. In other words, the Council’s political and Sharia dimensions are superior to its legal and judicial dimensions. This has influenced the approach of its members to overseeing the legality of laws and supervising elections. As such, the Council lacks the institutional and individual independence typically associated with a constitutional judicial body. The constitution, as the authority for the establishment of the Guardian Council, can play a crucial role in securing its administrative and financial independence. However, the principles of Iran’s constitution, particularly in the case of institutional independence, do not explicitly mention the independence of the Council. This has created a legal vacuum, leading to challenges for the Guardian Council in achieving administrative and financial independence. To address this gap, the parliament passed 1983 Law on Financial Regulations of the Guardian Council, granting the Council control over the preparation of its own budget. The law uses the term exactly to indicate that the Council’s regulatory budget should be submitted directly to the government, without needing to be included in the annual budget bill. This approach aligns better with the realities of the government budget regulation. The Guardian Council has followed a similar process concerning other institutions, such as the parliament and the Expediency Council, and requiring the inclusion of its budget in the government budget bill could be seen as violating Article 52 of the constitution. Regarding administrative matters, the Council has asserted its independence by exercising its interpretive authority, preventing the parliament from interfering in it.
Conclusion
The present study assessed the degree of independence of the Guardian Council by comparing it with similar judicial institutions in Germany, Egypt, and Algeria. The Guardian Council, as the constitutional and Sharia-based judicial institution within Iran’s political-legal system, plays a crucial role in ensuring the proper implementation of the constitution. This is particularly true in safeguarding the rights and freedoms of citizens and upholding the rule of a lawful government. The weight of this responsibility highlights the important position of the Guardian Council. The Council’s independence is considered one of the most essential tools for fulfilling its responsibility. Independence enables the Guardian Council to exercise its powers, duties, and authority effectively, free from political pressures exerted by appointing or electing bodies, as well as from political and security groups or authorities. Fundamental reforms are necessary to improve the Council’s performance, strengthen its position, and ensure its independence. Such reforms would require constitutional amendments.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

• Independence
• Constitutional justice
• Guardian Council
• Proposal
• Constitutional court