نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار مطالعات منطقه‌ای و بین‌الملل دانشگاه جامع امام حسین (ع)، تهران، ایران

چکیده

پس از تهاجم گسترده داعش به عراق، موجودیت دولت و ملت عراق و مقدسات مسلمانان در معرض تهدید جدی قرار گرفت. درحالی‌که داعش به دروازه‌های بغداد نزدیک می‌شد و ارتش و نیروهای امنیتی عراق قادر به مقابله با آن نبودند با فتوای آیت‌الله سیستانی مبنی بر جهاد کفایی برای مقابله با داعش و دفع این خطر بالفعل، یک سازمان دفاعی-امنیتی به نام حشدالشعبی متشکل از داوطلبان مردمی و گروه‌های شبه‌نظامی که بازوی نظامی احزاب و جریان‌های سیاسی عراقی محسوب می‌شوند تشکیل شد. دولت عراق که در شرایط اضطرار قرارگرفته بود از تشکیل این سازمان دفاعی-امنیتی جدید حمایت و از آن پشتیبانی مالی، لجستیکی و تسلیحاتی کرد. با دفع خطر داعش و پایان شرایط اضطراری، وجود چنین سازمانی که عمدتاً تحت کنترل گروه‌های شبه‌نظامی قرار دارد برای دولت عراق که به دنبال کسب انحصار اعمال زور مشروع است به یک چالش مهم تبدیل‌شده است. ازاین‌رو، همه رؤسای دولت عراق پس از 2014 تلاش کرده‌اند از طریق اتخاذ راهبردهای مختلف مانع از شکل‌‌گیری یک‌نهاد دفاعی-امنیتی موازی خارج از کنترل دولت شوند. این مقاله که در آن، داده‌ها با مراجعه به منابع کتابخانه‌ای و برخط گردآوری‌شده و با روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی مورد تبیین و تحلیل قرارگرفته‌اند. به دنبال یافتن پاسخی معتبر به این سؤال است: رابطه دولت عراق با حشدالشعبی و گروه‌های شبه‌نظامی تشکیل‌دهنده آن چگونه بوده است؟ یافته‌های مقاله نشان می‌دهد رابطه دولت عراق با گروه‌های شبه‌نظامی تابعی از مقتضیات زمانی بوده است به‌گونه‌ای که در شرایط اضطراری و تهدیدآمیز، دولت از ظرفیت این گروه‌ها استفاده کرده و در فقدان این شرایط، این گروه‌ها از سوی دولت‌ همچون عنصری مزاحم، نامطلوب و تهدید زا تلقی شده و طیفی از سیاست‌ها و راهبردهای کنترلی از سوی دولت‌ عراق در مورد آن‌ها اعمال‌شده است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Relationship Between the Iraqi State and The Militia Groups After 2014 (Case Study of Hashd Al-Shaabi)

نویسنده [English]

  • Ahmad Zarean

Assistant Professor, Department of Regional Studies and International Relations, Imam Hussein University, Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

After the massive and sudden attack of ISIS on Iraq, the existence of the Iraqi state and nation and the sanctities of Muslims were under serious threat. While ISIS was approaching gates of Baghdad and the Iraqi army and security forces were not able to deal with it, with Ayatollah Sistani's fatwa regarding jihad to confront ISIS and ward off this real danger, a defense-security organization called Hashd al-Shaabi, consisting of volunteers People and militia groups, which are considered the military arm of Iraqi political parties and currents, were formed. The Iraqi state, which was in a state of emergency, supported the formation of this new defense-security organization and provided it with financial, logistical and weapons support. With the threat of ISISremoval and the end of state of emergency, the existence of such an organization, which is mainly controlled by militia groups, has become a significant challenge for Iraqi state, which seeks to obtain a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. Therefore, after 2014, all heads of the Iraqi government have tried to prevent the formation of a parallel defense-security institution outside the government's control by adopting different strategies. This article, in which the data has been collected by referring to library and online sources and explained and analyzed with a descriptive-analytical method, seeks to find an authentic answer to this question: "The relationship between the Iraqi government and Hashd al-Shaabi and its constituent militia groups. How has it been?" The findings of the article show that the relationship between the Iraqi government and the militia groups was subject to the requirements of the time in such a way that in emergency and threatening situations, the government used the capacity of these groups and in the absence of these conditions, these groups were considered by the government as a disturbing, undesirable and threatening element, a range of control policies and strategies have been applied to them by the Iraqi government. In the post-crisis era, the Iraqi government, as a system actor that considers itself committed and accountable to the existing rules, norms and order, cannot support the anti-systemic actions of the militia groups that it cooperated with and supported during the ISIS crisis in the form of Hashd al-Shaabi. to bear Therefore, since 2014, the governments of Haider al-Abadi, Adel Abdul Mahdi and Mostafa Al-Kazemi have tried to control these groups as much as possible through adopting a series of strategies and measures. Among the four strategies of repression, containment, collusion and integration, these governments have put two strategies of collusion and integration on their agenda. The reason for choosing these two strategies is that, firstly, Hashd al-Shaabi and its constituent groups are still considered strategic allies of the government, and the political currents of which these groups are considered as their military arm participate in the political process and in the formation of the government. Secondly, even if these groups strongly deviate from the government's criteria and the relationship between the militia groups turns from reconciliation to conflict, the Iraqi government does not have the ability to restrain or suppress these groups. In the collusion strategy, the Iraqi government tries to relatively control the actions of Hashd al-Shaabi groups by granting some concessions and through financial and logistical support tools. As well, in the integration strategy, the Iraqi government has put the recruitment of the Hashd al-Shaabi and its integration in the official Iraqi defense-security structures on its agenda, and the heads of the Iraqi government have issued orders and adopted measures in this regard. Collusion and integration strategies have not been able to be fully and effectively implemented due to the resistance and opposition of the commanders of the militia groups and their insistence on their organizational independence and ideological and identity foundations, and these two strategies have only been implemented superficially and formally.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Hashd Al-Shaabi
  • Iraq
  • ISIS
  • Militia Groups
  • Modern State
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