انقلاب، رویدادی است توأم با تغییرات بنیادین و معمولاً خشونتآمیز که روند جاری امور را بر هم زده و درصدد درانداختن طرحی نو و تأسیس نظامی جدید برمیآید. از تبعات انقلابها، نفی ساختارهای سیاسی موجود است و انقلابیون پس از فرونشستن شور و حال انقلابی معمولاً نهادهای مطلوب خویش را تأسیس میکنند. بااینحال، تقابل ایدئولوژی انقلابی با ساختار اداری و اجرایی برآمده از انقلاب، جزو مسائل چالشبرانگیز انقلابیون است. مدعای نوشتار حاضر آن است که فراتر از تعارضها و اختلافات موردی و خاص، ریشه این قضیه در مسئله «دولتسازی» است. درواقع انقلابیون به سبب حساسیت به ارزشهای انقلاب، از پذیرش ماهیت دولت و اقتضائات ناگزیر آن ازجمله تمرکز قدرت اجرایی در اختیار دولت و نیز اصالت داشتن منطق مصلحت عمومی در آن ابا دارند و ازاینرو اغلب نگرشی تقلیل گرایانه به دولت دارند که سبب میشود حتی دولتهای انقلابی هم در این وضعیت بغرنج بهتدریج بخش مهمی از مشروعیت و مقبولیت خود را از دست بدهند. بدین منظور و برای آنکه اهمیت این قضیه بهمثابه امری ساختاری و نهفقط شخص و دولتی خاص نشان داده شود، بر دو دولت «محمود احمدینژاد» تمرکز میگردد؛ چراکه گفتمان این دولت و حامیان آن حداقل در بدو روی کار آمدن آن، دولتی انقلابی تصویر میشد اما مشکل مذکور در خصوص ناسازگاری انقلابی گری و منطق عملکرد در قالب دولت در این دولتها نیز خود را به شکل ملموسی نشان داد.
عنوان مقاله [English]
Duality of Revolutionary and State-Building in the Islamic Republic; with Emphasis on the Ninth and Tenth States
Revolution is an event with fundamental and usually violent changes that disrupt the current course of affairs and seek to launch a new plan and establish a new system. One of the consequences of revolutions is the negation of existing political structures and revolutionaries usually establish their desired institutions after the revolutionary fervor has subsided. However, over time, the confrontation between revolutionary ideology and the administrative and executive structure resulting from the revolution has become one of the most challenging issues for revolutionaries. The present article argues that beyond case-specific conflicts, the root of this issue lies in the issue of "state-building." In fact, due to their sensitivity to the values of the revolution, revolutionaries are reluctant to accept the nature of the state in its true sense and with its inevitable requirements including the concentration of executive power in the government and the originality of the logic of public interest. They have a reductionist view of government, which causes even revolutionary governments to gradually lose an important part of their legitimacy and acceptance in this difficult situation. To this end and to show the importance of this issue as a structural matter and not just a specific person and government, we focus on the two governments of "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad" because the discourse of this government and its supporters, at least initially the coming of that revolutionary state was depicted, but the problem of the incompatibility of revolutionary act and the logic of action in the form of government in these states also manifested itself in a tangible way.
The issue emphasized in this article, i.e. duality in revolutionary institutions and the established political structure, is an issue whose its history and background even goes back to the threshold of the Islamic Revolution; As with the transfer of executive power from the Shah to "Bakhtiar", dual sovereignty was keyed in the country and Imam Khomeini first formed the Revolutionary Council from exile and immediately after returning to Iran, the interim government headed by Bazargan was specified in the Imam's message that the installation Bazargan, while paying attention to their faith in the "Holy School of Islam" and also based on their fighting records, and at the same time "without considering party relations and depending on a particular group". Such an interpretation implicitly indicated the difference between the revolutionaries and the professional technocrats of politics, such as the national-religious forces, and also introduced some dualism in the post-revolution period. This dual situation is understandable in terms of the confrontation between the revolutionary regime and the political system before the revolution (Bakhtiar's government) and perhaps its existence at the beginning of the revolution is also justified, but the issue here is that such dual confrontation has continued in the post-revolution era for some reasons. Discourse disputes are usually made from floating signs at the level of society, but all of them immediately tend to reach the political power and have the upper hand in the government. Therefore, the gap and opposition between the revolutionary discourses and those who are on the opposite spectrum and are referred to by various titles such as moderate, moderate and sometimes harsh terms such as compromiser and even traitor, in its obvious form. shows at the government level. Of course, tension occurs not only in the institution of the government, but also in everything that leads to the government, for example, skepticism towards party activity or at least caution about it is a clear manifestation of this issue, and revolutionaries, including in Iran Due to the concern of the unity of the different classes and spectrums of the people, they have been worried about the multiplicity caused by the activities of the parties even among the aligned currents. This situation has intensified with the appearance of external threats and everything that is classified as coups, conspiracies, internal unrest and protests, etc. Ahmadinejad's coming to power was the result of the rise of fundamentalist, revolutionary and of course populist discourse. In particular, the important beginning of this movement was the victory of fundamentalists on the 28th of February 2003 in the second term of the Tehran City Council elections, which they achieved a decisive victory by organizing in the form of a coalition of Islamic Iran settlers. They were the result of an organization known as the "Coordinating Council of the Islamic Revolution Forces" which was influenced by two fundamentalist organizations "The Party of Islamic Revolution Martyrs" and "Islamic Society of Engineers" and finally Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as one of the activists of these two currents as the mayor of Tehran Selected. During the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa around 2011 onwards, Ahmadinejad used the term "human awakening" instead of the term "Islamic awakening" and tried to explain this phenomenon beyond a mere issue related to Muslims and Islam. This issue showed a non-ideological implication for describing such movements. Such themes in the philosophical literature and human sciences are not so unfamiliar interpretations, but the revolutionaries could not accept that such interpretations emanate from the speech of the government attributed to them, especially with all the costs they had paid materially and non-materially for the establishment of this government. In fact, just as once upon a time the rational explanation and interpretation of Islamic teachings by streams such as religious intellectuals were interpreted by neglecting some religious foundations, the belief of the spring ring in the reinterpretation of contemporary developments also meant ignoring a part of the revolutionary speech. The justification of the mentioned statesmen regarding the need to emphasize the commonalities between religions or to go beyond the appearances of the Sharia to reach its innermost meaning, because it required ignoring the authority of the revolutionaries, especially the clergy, as the intellectual and administrative authority of the discourse of the revolution, and at the same time, the specific and special dimensions of the discourse of the revolution could not be accepted by this group of supporters of the revolution.