Abstract The constitutionalism movement in 1285 AH. With a coalition of clerics and intellectuals, along with the mass of people, he put an end to the traditional and authoritarian structure of Iran after centuries. for the first time; Iran's political structure underwent fundamental and fundamental changes, which resulted in the creation of western-style parliaments and cabinets. But due to Iran's specific political culture, governments and parliaments could not get along with each other and there were always many challenges between them. The political culture that had influenced all the political agents and institutions such as parties and the press, caused the governments and the National Council assemblies to not have the necessary efficiency and effectiveness. Based on this, the current research seeks to answer the main question: What role and place has political culture played in the challenge between Iranian governments and parliaments? In answer to this question, it should be said: it seems that political culture in all dimensions has played an important role in the challenges between the governments and parliaments of Iran and somehow in the successive collapse of the cabinets and the inefficiency of emerging institutions such as the parliament, parties and the press. It has been influential. The present article seeks to investigate the role of political culture in the challenge between Iranian governments and parliaments in the period from 1285 to 1304 AH with a historical-analytical approach. It will be written with a descriptive-analytical method based on archival and library sources. Findings: After the constitution, with the establishment of the governments and the formation of the National Council from 1285 to 1304 AH. The political culture played an important role and somehow influenced all aspects of the actions and behavior of the political agents of Iran at this time. The factors of political culture, which were manifested in authoritarianism, slander and cynicism, profiteering, exaggeration and superficiality of laws, were effective in the challenge and divergence between the relations between governments and parliaments. One of the most important results and consequences of the political culture was the successive collapse of the cabinets to the point where 60 cabinets were formed in 20 years and each one was in power for an average of 3 months.
Result: According to the documents and the testimony of historians, the political parties and groups that were formed under the influence of the political culture of Iran as an emerging institution in the constitutional era, lacked any kind of organization and their work was basically not similar to the party and constantly aroused suspicion and cynicism. They created among the politicians. The main activity of the parties during the elections was through fighting and not through party politics. They mostly tried their opponents in parliament and government; They tried to take down power and their cooperation with the parliament and the government was temporary and unstable. It should be noted that political parties and groups used to spend most of the time of the parliament accusing and stigmatizing each other, so the presence of parties in the political arena causes conflict and differences between the different factions or factions in the parliament and a factor. It was in the divergence of governments and assemblies. The existence of many ambiguities in the constitution and disregard for the established laws was one of the cases that the representatives and statesmen tried to have different and different interpretations of it in their own favor because of the political culture ruling the country, and this affected the process of challenge. between governments and parliaments intensified. In addition, the press, which used all the harmful factors of Iran's political culture to make the atmosphere of the country tense, had an important and influential role in the challenge between governments and parliaments. Therefore, the causes and effects of these challenges provided the ground for the rise and rise of Reza Khan at a time when the country was at the height of political, social and economic chaos. He at the right time during a four-year process from 1300 to 1304 AH. He was able to make the most of the discursive space of excesses and excesses among the existing institutions in the country, and as a result, by gaining knowledge of Iran's political culture and controlling the challenging factors between the governments and assemblies of the Qajar dynasty, he overthrew it.

Abstract 1. مقدمه
آن دسته از رجال فکری-سیاسی که در گام اول، نهضت مشروطه و نظام پارلمانی برآمده از آن، و در گام دوم دولت متمرکز مدرن رضاشاهی را مستقیم و غیرمستقیم تغذیه فکری کردند، این فرصت را داشتند که ‌با تأکید بر مفهوم فرد به‌عنوان مبنای مشروعیت سیاسی جدید و نیز فردیت –به‌عنوان ارزشمندترین بنیان مدرنیته- و مفاهیم پیش‌شرط آن یعنی آزادیِ برابر و برابری اخلاقی زمینه ظهور مدرنیته سیاسی (تفکیک عرصه عمومی از عرصه خصوصی) ‌را در ایران فراهم کنند و به‌عنوان مژده‌رسانان مدرنیته سیاسی ‌عمل نمایند.
اما در دوره پسامشروطه، اندیشه آنها به سمت بی‌التفاتی به اهمیت فرد و طرح مفاهیم جمع‌گرایانه نظیر «روح ملی ایرانی» متمایل شد. لذا، نقش بسزایی در استقرار ‌دولت متمرکزی داشتند ‌‌که بدون توجه به فردیت و خواست جامعه و فارغ از تفکیک پهنه عمومی از خصوصی، سعی داشت جامعه ایران را به‌طور آمرانه پیش برده و مدرن و متمدن نماید.
بر این اساس، پژوهش پیش‌رو با هدف پاسخگویی به این پرسش اصلی شکل گرفته است که فروغی درباره مدرنیته سیاسی (نسبت و جدایی دولت و جامعه مدنی) چگونه می‌اندیشید؟ زیرا وی از مهم‌ترین روشنفکران عملگرای پسامشروطه و کارگزار سیاسی این دوره بود و نسبت به نخبگان معاصر خویش، هم نظریه‎ منسجم‌تر و سنجیده‌تری درباره شکل مناسب دولت در کالبد سیاسی ایران داشت، هم فرصت یافت که این نظریات را در کسوت یک سیاست‌مدار به کنش سیاسی پیوند زند.

2- روش
جستار حاضر با روش تحلیلی و توصیفی و در چارچوب نظریه و خوانش موریس باربیه از مفهوم مدرنیته سیاسی به واکاوی جایگاه مدرنیته سیاسی در اندیشه سیاسی محمدعلی فروغی پرداخته است.

3. نتیجه‌گیری
نتایج این پژوهش نشان داد افکار فروغی را در این باب می‌توان به دو برهه قبل و پس از شکست مشروطیت دسته‌بندی نمود. به این ترتیب که در دوره قبل از شکست مشروطیت و به‌ویژه در اثر تألیفی (حقوق اساسی) خویش به درستی بر لزوم ایجاد یک دولت حداقلی و رعایت حقوق افراد ناس در قالب دو اصل آزادی و مساوات به‌عنوان غایت مدرنیته سیاسی تأکید می‌کند و معتقد است «با امنیت و عدالتی که دولت برقرار می‌کند خود مردم دنبال اقتصادیات هم می‌روند و مثل سایر ملل ثروت و قدرت و شرافت مملکت خویش را ترقی می‌دهند». اما‎، با شکست مشروطیت و وضعیت بحرانی پس از آن، اندیشه فروغی به سمت اولویت‌بخشی به ایجاد «دولت مطلقه» با هدف تربیت مردم و ایجاد «ملت» با تأکید بر امر ملی و ایرانی‌گری متمایل می‌شود. زیرا وی وضعیت بحرانی پسامشروطه را ناشی از فقدان درک منافع ملی توسط نخبگان و آحاد مردم و به تعبیر خود او نبود افکار عامه می‌دانست. البته، این تغییر اولویت را نمی‌توان به‌معنای عدم باور وی به اصل رعایت حقوق فردی و تفکیک پهنه عمومی از خصوصی دانست. زیرا وی به‌لحاظ نظری اصل تمدن را در تربیت ملت می‌دانست و بهترین علامت تربیت داشتن ملت را نیز در رعایت قانون توسط دولت و ملت می‌دید. به‌لحاظ عملی نیز موضع مستقل او در واقعه مسجد گوهرشاد و عدم تأیید کشتار مردم حتی به قیمت مغضوب شدن نزد رضاشاه و همچنین، بازپس‌گیری اموال و املاک به زور غصب شده از رضاشاه هنگام خروج از کشور و برگردانیدن آنها به صاحبان اصلی را می‌توان گواهی بر اعتقاد وی به لزوم رعایت حقوق فردی آحاد مردم توسط دولت تلقی کرد.
بنابراین، می‌توان ااشاره کرد که واقعیات سیاسی اجتماعی جامعه ایران در دوره پسامشروطه، فروغی را به‌عنوان یک نقش‌آفرین در فضای بین دولت و ملت و نیز اندیشمند سیاسی آگاه به بنیان‌های معرفتی و الزامات مدرنیته سیاسی به این نتیجه رساند «تفکیک پهنه خصوصی از پهنه عمومی» و رعایت حقوق فرد به ما هو فرد که از مجرای ایجاد توازن بین قدرت دولت و جامعه مدنی میسر می‌شود در جامعه‌ای با مختصات ایران پسامشروطه که اغلب آحاد آن از سواد خواندن و نوشتن محروم بودند و قادر به تشخیص منافع ملی و فردی خود نبودند، امری ناممکن است و نیاز اسباب و لوازمی دارد. از این‌‌رو، با دولت مطلقه رضاشاه هم‌رأی و همراه شد تا ابتدا نظم و امنیت در کشور برقرار شود و تمامیت ارضی کشور حفظ گردد. سپس، از مجرای ایده تربیت مردم و دمیدن روح ملی‌گرایی در آنها، جامعه متمدن و پهنه عمومی نحفیفِ وقت، مقتدر شود و گرایش و امکان مداخله دولت در ناحیه‌ های مختلف جامعه (احزاب، اصناف، گروه‌های اجتماعی و ... ) به‌ مرور کمینه گردد.

Abstract The central aims of this study encompass the identification and analysis of the elements that affect the emergence and escalation of political dichotomy between the state and society in Iran, the investigation of societal strategies employed in reaction to this phenomenon, the assessment of its social and political ramifications, and the provision of recommendations to address and alleviate its detrimental impacts. This research employs a qualitative methodology, grounded in the Strauss and Corbin framework, which entails conducting comprehensive and semi-structured interviews.
The data for this study were obtained through in-depth and semi-structured interviews that were carried out with 24 experts, comprising mostly academic scholars with doctoral degrees. These interviews aimed to gather from them their experiences, perspectives, and methods regarding political bifurcation. For further data validation, relevant reports and documents dealing with political bifurcation were also used.
Qualitative content analysis was carried out on the data. First, open coding was done in order to identify key concepts. Then, using focused coding, these key concepts were systematically compared and analyzed to discover the connections between them. Finally, selective coding was used in order to identify the central code and to detect meaningful patterns. This methodology allowed for a deep and comprehensive analysis of the origins, approaches, and implications of political dichotomy, which improved our understanding of the elements that contribute to this phenomenon.
Validity and reliability of the data were critical components of this study. In addition to credibility, precision was ensured through the internal validation strategies of cross-checking and recoding. Furthermore, the preliminary analytical findings were continuously checked and confirmed through the involvement of experts and stakeholders, thus assuring the data reliability and accuracy of the analysis.
The study suggests that "structural and cultural divides" come into being as the leading code, stemming from the complex interaction of causal, contextual, and intervening variables, which have deepened the political rift in Iran. The causal variables include social and economic inequality as well as ideological conflicts, which serve as the critical structure for this gap. These challenges arise out of unequal power relations and the uneven distribution of resources, resulting in a great deal of dissatisfaction among various groups in society. Situational factors that increase this division relate to the political and social culture within society, which, through institutions like the family and the education system, passes on conflicting political ideologies. This culture, instead of bridging the gaps, strengthens and reinforces them. Finally, intervening factors such as media and social networks further fuel political polarization by creating echo chambers and spreading misinformation. Moreover, ineffective political decisions and changes in legislation have often inflamed these tensions rather than reduced them, thus contributing to the crystallization of this divide.
The theoretical framework developed in this study reveals that the political cleavage existing in society has caused the development of two basic strategies among the people: acceptance and resistance. Acceptance, as one of the responses to the political rift between the state and society in Iran, reflects a part of the population's willingness to adapt to the existing conditions and accept the hegemonic order. This strategy is generally adopted by groups that lack the motivation either to change the status quo or, because of conservatism, inability to access power, or uncertainty about what might result from change, opt for the maintenance of the status quo. Acceptance can either be passive, without open protest or resistance, or active, through attempts to use the existing conditions for the betterment of oneself or one's group. In this approach, both individuals and collectives strive to adjust to the prevailing conditions while maximizing the opportunities available in the system to assert their place. While acceptance may provide temporary relief from social tensions and bring about political stability, it can also work to reinforce inequalities and further entrench political polarization, as the social and economic disparities continue to exist and can even exacerbate.
On the other hand, resistance is an alternative strategy characterized by the actions of part of society to challenge the status quo and bridge the gap between the state and society. This type of resistance may be carried out in different ways: public protest, oppositional political activities, acts of civil disobedience, and so on. People who apply this strategy usually are not satisfied with current conditions and would like to make significant changes in political, social, or economic structures. The notion of resistance often arises from perceptions of injustice, inequality, and discrimination within political and social ideologies. In contrast to acceptance, which tends to consolidate the prevailing order, resistance seeks to challenge and change the system for the betterment of disadvantaged and disenfranchised people. However, resistance can increase tensions and sharpen political polarization, particularly when it hits the wall or otherwise fails to gain support across the board. Ultimately, resistance lies at the very core of the formation of political and social dynamics and can serve as a catalyst for broader changes.
The theoretical framework demonstrates that such a political dichotomy between society and the state is a complex and multifarious phenomenon with huge implications for Iran's social, political, and economic frameworks. An exploration of these implications reveals that such political dichotomy has deepened social and political cleavages, practically bifurcating society into two often hostile and rival camps. These divisions have fueled a rise in polarization and growing social and political unrest, which, in turn, further amplifies the sense of inequality and discrimination among some quarters. From such an environment, political and economic instability has emerged as the most likely outcome. Severe market volatility, lower investment, capital flight, and continued political unrest are just some of the results of this bifurcation and the failure to achieve national cohesion. Furthermore, rising public discontent is another major consequence, as clearly seen in widespread protests, growing feelings of injustice, and increased pessimism about the future. These complaints have fostered an atmosphere of increased violence and social unrest, driving society into street confrontations, political instability, and cyber attacks on social media platforms.
Concomitant with these developments, a major issue that has emerged is the marked decline in trust in government institutions. Citizens have gradually lost confidence in democratic processes and state institutions; hence, there is a growing sense of powerlessness and political apathy. This precarious situation has posed a direct threat to national cohesion, evidenced by the weakening of social bonds, deepening ethnic and religious divides, and a decrease in participation in national affairs. Lastly, political polarization has also contributed much to the aggravation of emigration and brain drain. Part of the intellectual and cultural elite of the country, disillusioned by the local situation and dissatisfied with the prevalent conditions, are leaving the country, which may further weaken Iran's human capital and undermine its development potential. This only goes to prove that the political divide between state and society tends to jeopardize stability and progress in a society, which eventually leads to further crises due to increased divides and growing unrest among the citizens of such society.

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Abstract One of the most important attentions to international affairs as well as the category of power and order is giving importance to ideas, values and concepts. The importance of ideas, values and concepts in formulating and presenting the best options for order creation in the international arena is always considered. In this context, values, concepts and intellectual ideals act as raw materials for building the international order. With Deng Xiaopeng coming to power and adopting a different foreign policy, China's economic growth dazzled the eyes. As a result of economic growth, China's military growth accelerated. In recent years, these two fields have attracted so much attention of international relations researchers that the third field, namely Chinese culture, is on the sidelines of international attention and is paid less attention to it. Considering the increasing power of this country and also being among the great international powers, the importance of the ideas, thoughts and ideals of this country in building order is taken into consideration.
According to what was said, what are China's ideals and ideals for the desired order of this country? Paying attention to ancient history and thought in this country is one of the basic requirements to answer this question. When China's long and deep history turns its pages, one of the most important and basic ideas of Chinese human life is the category of "harmony". This issue is so broad and deep that it is not far from reality if I say that the central signifier of social discourse in China is the concept of "harmony". Accordingly, the main research question is what is the nature of Chinese international order under the concept of coordination? In other words, how does the concept of coordination shape the Chinese international order? This article, relying on the descriptive-analytical method and using intellectual propositions in the context of Chinese history, asserts that the Chinese order does not seek uniformity and pursues a balance achieved through recognizing differences. Therefore, the Chinese international order reflects this meaning in the international system.
Chinese worldview is a unique and exceptional worldview among the attitudes of different people in today's world. Apart from the five thousand years of historical continuity of China, in the philosophical perspective of this country, there is no existence of a creator that is outside of world creation. This feature makes this worldview completely naturalistic, self-sufficient and self-generating. Accordingly, good and evil do not exist in the mental geometry of Chinese people, and instead there is balance and harmony in contrast to disharmony. Balance has been the guiding light of man and Chinese society throughout the history of this society, and this harmony has emerged as the central sign of various thoughts in China. One of the most important of these ideas is Confucius and Taoism, which is several thousand years old.
According to Confucius, the main goal of government is to create harmony, and the last step in achieving this goal is to achieve harmony at the global level. The three basic principles of moral force, empathic understanding and harmony with differences were recognized as the foundations of creating harmony in the international arena. Taoism, like Confucius, pays special attention to the concept of harmony and order. However, Taoism has a different view on the category of harmony and interprets it as cosmic. In this view, the category of order has a place to organize order in the cosmic system. The important and common Taoist principles are isolation, simplicity and harmony with nature.
The emphasis of Chinese culture is on fostering harmony not only between different people, but also between people and the fundamental world. The four basic characteristics of harmony are balance in the whole, harmony in difference, order in complexity, and unity in diversity. It was on this basis that certain viewpoints were created to explain and describe the category of harmony in Chinese philosophy, which had a special application in the field of domestic and foreign politics, and therefore are highly contextual and historical. Based on this, the representation of the concept of harmony and social balance in the political sphere of China can be seen in the creation of political constructions such as the Son of Heaven, a strong family system and orderly social hierarchies. These structures, which have always declined and risen for many years, are not the only representations of the concept of harmony emanating from Confucian and Taoist thoughts in China's domestic political sphere. The history of China's political history makes it clear that China has been characterized by the growth and expansion of the hierarchical structure and the formation of the Confucian bureaucracy and, as a result, a powerful political system. In general, the ontology of Chinese man and all aspects of his social and individual life cannot be imagined outside of the concept of under the sky. Accordingly, the inclusion of the concept of harmony includes all areas of Chinese human life.
In the Chinese intellectual geometry and the concept of harmony arising from mutual recognition and deepening it is not to meet needs but to create harmony and prevent distance from a balanced world. Based on this, it can be said that order based on demand from the concept of hegemony and geometry in Chinese thought is fundamentally different from Western order in terms of ontology and epistemology, and its nature and essence does not seek to create uniformity and equalization; Rather, it seeks to recognize diversity and at the same time build a world based on mutual understanding. Based on this, it can be concluded that from the point of view of the geometry of Chinese thought and harmony, the role of China is benign. In this way, according to the aforementioned, this country seeks to create a balance at the world level with an emphasis on harmony.
Based on the Chinese point of view, order should be based on the deep expansion of China's relations with all countries of the world. In such a way that the final result of these relations should lead to the improvement of the level of world peace and prosperity. Another characteristic of this type of international relations is that it leads to the production of power relations for each side of these relations. The most important examples of promoting coordination and balance in China's international order in the fields of institutions, security and international economy are the Belt and Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asian Development and Infrastructure Bank. In terms of rules and regulations and the degree of China's presence and authority in them, each of them reflects the category of international coordination and the resulting order in the international arena.

Abstract Problem and Background
Technological advancements require a deeper understanding of the most effective methods and policies for governance at various levels of government. This paradigm shifts underscores the necessity for active and effective governance policies to facilitate optimal integration and further pave the development path. The nature of governance is fundamentally influenced by these policies, which go beyond merely changing the perspective or approach of an organization or government. They alter the very nature of government as well. As such, the challenge lies in new crafting governance and government functions that not only adapt to rapid technological changes but also proactively shape the mechanisms of governance to enhance their relevance and efficiency in the digital era. This change must be forward-looking and inclusive, ensuring that technological benefits are equitably shared while safeguarding against potential disruptions that could undermine societal and political stability.
Research Objective
This study examines the various aspects of governance policies considering the Fourth Industrial Revolution's transformative indices and the significance of its revolutionary concepts on development models, emphasizing how these concepts transform the nature of governments. This research focuses on a collection of policy and governance systems at the national and international levels in the United States of America. The purpose of this selection is to analyze and identify governance patterns and policy systems that can effectively respond to the challenges and opportunities arising from the advancements of Industry 4.0 technologies.
Research Method
This examination includes a detailed study of federal policy systems, industrial development strategies, and educational programs related to emerging technologies. It also endeavors to analyze, through the study of over eighteen governmental documents in the United States, using advanced tools of text analysis and natural language processing, the subtleties of technological advancements and the governance aspects present in forthcoming sectors. This method enables deep analysis of texts and documents and encompasses various sections of public, specialized, and international policy systems in the United States in the path of modern governance transformation and transition to Industry 4.0 technologies. It includes an analysis of the nature of state governance, federal policy system strategies, and executive governance models, all of which examine different aspects of the impacts of Industry 4.0 technologies on modern governance. This research focuses on examining how policies and governance models respond to the challenges and opportunities arising from digital transformation in documents presented in various sectors. Using this method, the researcher can identify patterns, important themes, and indicators presented in the context of modern governance practices and the functioning of the government in complex texts.
Research Findings
This investigation will demonstrate how such policymaking gradually alters government functions and governance interaction methods, ultimately leading to a transformation in governance approaches. The primary goal of this research is to explore the complex dynamics governing the coexistence of effective governance policy interventions in the processes of adopting Fourth Industrial technologies, with a focus on multifaceted challenges and highlighting gaps in skills, resource limitations, and access to technology, which recurrently emerge as themes. The results show a close connection between governance policies that emphasize promoting government-industry collaboration and the development of advanced technologies. This integration has not only led to increased innovation and improved technological infrastructure but has also moved governance practices more towards data-driven and technology-dependent methods. Data analysis indicates that challenges such as resource limitations, unequal access to technology, and skill gaps are among the most significant limitations in governance and regulation in this sector. These challenges require more effective governance measures that seriously focus on strengthening technological infrastructure, providing practical education, and fostering international cooperation to broadly create development opportunities.
Conclusion
Therefore, it is essential to enhance policy systems and accountability, and design innovative governance methods that are flexible and capable of quickly responding to changing needs. The models and findings in this research clearly indicate that effective governance in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution requires a multidimensional and comprehensive understanding that encompasses all aspects of technology, economy, and society for proper rule-setting, as governance transformation fundamentally changes government function and introduces a different mode of action. Indeed, only through flexible, innovative, and responsible governance approaches and understanding the substantive transformation of governmental action can sustainable successes be achieved in this transition. These changes can be clearly observed in the changes in policymaking styles and the transformation in the nature of the state in the United States.

Abstract The contemporary understanding of social justice is to ensure that resources are distributed throughout society in such a way that everyone enjoys a certain level of facilities, and therefore most discussions of social justice are based on two basic questions; first, how much facilities should be guaranteed, and second, how much government intervention is needed to distribute these facilities. Notwithstanding the differences that can be observed between different theories of social justice, these theories agree that the realization of justice requires some degree of state intervention in the basic rights and freedoms of citizens - especially property rights. Thus, state intervention in the management of the market and the establishment of anti-monopoly mechanisms, as well as the ownership of the means of production, are among the issues examined under the theme of social justice.
Justice-oriented policies, however, are linked to basic rights and freedoms, including property rights; that is, they either completely negate or limit private ownership of the means of production, or they leave ownership free and instead confiscate the individual's profit and levy taxes to reduce inequalities and provide a minimum for the less fortunate. The staircases use redistributive policies. On the other hand, not accepting government intervention in property with the aim of redistributing resources leads to the denial of social justice. On this basis, the discussion assumes that social justice can conflict with the application of legitimate rights and freedoms.
On the one hand, a cursory glance at the Constitution shows that social justice is widely emphasized in its principles as one of the main objectives of the legal system. On the other hand, this fundamental document observes a broad protection of legitimate fundamental rights and freedoms, to the extent that their deprivation is even prohibited by law. Thus, the maximum guarantee of social justice and the application of fundamental rights and freedoms are in conflict with each other, and this conflict is the problem of the present research. Therefore, the main issue in the agenda of this article is the answer to this question: Can the government limit the fundamental and legitimate rights and freedoms of citizens in order to achieve social justice? The authors have tried to find the answer to the aforementioned problem by referring to the constitution and its foundations in Islamic jurisprudence and thought.
The results of the research show that the principle that "the government can intervene in the legitimate rights and freedoms of citizens for the sake of social justice" is one of the basic principles of the theory of social justice in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On this basis, preparations were made to resolve this conflict.
Firstly, in order to resolve the conflict, it should be noted that the reduction of public law relations to private law is normative reductionism and therefore the government is not a person among other natural and legal persons. It is therefore not justified by the norms of private law on which relations between persons are organized. Rather, the legal personality of the government and its obligations to the citizens require that it have its own rules, which are not derived from the development of private rights in the public sphere.
Based on Islamic thought and also on the rational-jurisprudential rule of "Negation of loss and damage", public rights and freedoms, especially property rights, cannot lead to harm to others. The collective good and the public interest precede and limit the conflict between personal interest and profit. The legitimate government, as the representative of the public good, has the right to recognize the position of this conflict and also to resolve it by prioritizing the collective good and public benefit.
Based on the constitution, Velayat-e-Faqih can be formulated as a plan to move from an unjust situation to a just society. Therefore, it can be said that the legitimizing element in the constitutional system of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the government's intervention in favor of social justice is the theory of the absolute authority of the jurist. Therefore, Velayat al-Faqih is not only the implementation of Islamic rules, but also the authority of temporary legislation with the aim of achieving the main objectives of the Sharia. Therefore, it should be said that whenever a ruling temporarily shuts down the Islamic system and society, the jurist has the authority to resolve the conflict on the basis of absolute authority. Of course, this conflict resolution is not without criteria; rather, its rule is expediency. However, expediency is not a matter of transition to secularism and formalization of laws; rather, expediency also has a function within jurisprudence.
Finally, the final aim of the current research is to explain the relationship between the public interest and social justice. The public interest has a common rule with the public good; that is, whatever the public good requires is also the public good. On the other hand, in determining expediency, the purposes of the legal system act as rules. That is, the expediency that the ruler recognizes must necessarily lead to the achievement of the purposes of the legal system. On the other hand, social justice is one of the main objectives of the Sharia and the Constitution. Therefore, social justice, expediency and public interest are mutually exclusive. Therefore, the need for justice is the same as the need for the collective good, public interest and ultimately the expediency of the Muslim social system. Therefore, justice cannot conflict with the efficiency, development and maintenance of the system. As a result, justice plays a key role in determining expediency, and the expediency that the ruler recognizes cannot be in conflict with social justice, and its closure is the result.
Based on the previous principles, it can be briefly stated that "since justice is the goal of the legal system provided for in the Constitution, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran can prefer it to the personal interests of individuals".

Abstract پروسه مدرنیته سیاسی به‌موازات تحول در ایده‌های بنیادی دولت وسیاست (عدالت، آزادی، برابری و...) منجر به اهمیت تجلی اراده عمومی در سازوکار سیاسی گردید و چالش مشروعیت بخشی منجر به برجسته‌شدن نقش هژمونی اخلاقی سیاسی و اقناع عمومی گردید. سازوکار ایدئولوژیک دولت با فراخوانی هیجانات و عواطف جامعه و هم‌ارز کردن معانی مدنظر با دال‌های متعالی و اسطوره ای، موقعیت‌های سوژگانی را تثبیت گرداند؛ لذا تألیف موقعیت‌های سوژگانی و دلالت مندی میل در پرتو گفتمان و سیطره بخشی آن در بستر ایدئولوژی امری اجتناب‌ناپذیر برای قدرت تلقی می‌شود. . سیال بودن انگاره عدالت سبب شده که بسیاری از پژوهش‌گران از تعمق و اندیشیدن در خصوص ماهیت آن امتناع ورزند و به دنبال ابداع دسته‌بندی‌های مختلف و شاخص‌سازی باشند. همین امر سبب تقلیل‌گرایی، انسداد شناختی ایده عدالت، انقطاع هستی اجتماعی مفهوم و دسته‌بندی‌های تحلیلی(اونتیک) می‌گردد. عدالت مفهومی اونتولوژیک هست و مانع تعین بخشی سوژگی در هژمونی اخلاقی جامعه می‌شود و با توجه به ابهامات روزافزون در حوزه‌ی بسامد و تحولات معنایی ایده عدالت، ضرورت نگاه هستی‌شناختی به عدالت به‌عنوان بنیاد تجربه اخلاقی و سیاسی موردتوجه کمی قرار گرفته و همین امر سبب شده که انگاره عدالت درنهایت به منطقی کلیشه‌ای و محدود به ارزیابی سیاست‌گذاری‌ها فروکاسته شود. عدالت آرمان همزیستی مسالمت‌آمیز و تحقق کامل ظرفیت‌های انسانی را به‌واسطه‌ی تکثر امر سیاسی به پیش می‌راند، لذا سلب عدالت از انسان سلب انسانیت اوست. در این مقاله تلاش شد به واسازی عدالت در تناظر با هستی‌شناسی سوبژکتویته سیاسی پرداخته شود. تصور عدالت به‌مثابه امری اونتلوژیک که اساس سوژه اجتماعی را برساخت می‌کند و به افق سوژگی سیطره می‌بخشد طوری که حدود سوژه همواره در امر سیاسی تلالو بیابد. شرط امکان سوژگی، حوزة اخلاقی است و دولت نیز تلاش می‌نماید به‌واسطه استحاله زنجیره دلالتی عدالت، حقیقت اخلاقی را برساخت نماید که آگاهی اخلاقی و عاطفی سوژه به‌نوعی استیضاح ‌شود که انگیزه‌های کنش نتواند به حس تعهد اخلاقی اجتماعی تجهیز شود. کثرت‌گرایی پست‌مدرن با تجسد آرمان‌های انسانی و اخلاقی همواره ایده عدالت را بازسازی می‌کند و در مقابل روند توتالیتاریسم مقاومت دائمی را تألیف می‌کند. در این مقاله تلاش شد که هویت مسئله‌دار و تأسیسی سوژه را به‌موازات ایده عدالت در پرتو هستی‌شناسی سیاسی و لنز مفهومی لاکلائو و موفه مورد موشکافی قرار گیرد تا امکان پیکربندی سوژه را به مناسبات تحولات معنایی سیاست واکاوی شود. هدف اصلی از این مقاله نیز تفسیر و برررسی اهمیت مطالعات هستی شناختی در ارتباط با عدالت می باشد. در همین راستا نقش دولت در معنایابی عدالت و تاثیر آن بر آگاهی اخلاقی سوژگی جمعی مورد تفسیر و باز خوانی قرار گرفت. محور این مقاله بررسی امکان رهایی بخشی عدالت با توسل به لنز مفهومی لاکلائو و موفه و بهره‌مندی از هستی‌شناسی سیاسی است.
پیرو همین امر روش مطالعات کتابخانه ای و قیاسی را مناسب یافتیم و تا حد ممکن تلاش شد از تسلیم شدن به کلیشه های مضاف برای تعریف عدالت خوددداری شود و یا استفاده از حساسیت معطوف در رویکرد لاکلائو و موفه میدان وضعی عدالت فراخ گردد. به این ترتیب برای بازخوانی سوژگی جمعی ، حالات روانی اخلاقی و عاطفی سوژه را نیز با مفاهیم روانکاوی لکانی مورد خوانش قرار دادیم. در نهایت به این نتیجه رسیدیم که مفصل بندی معنایی عدالت میتواند ماهیت اخلاقی و عاطفی و روانی سوژه را مورد تاثیر قرار دهد. و می توان به امکان مقاومت، رهایی بخشی انبساط عدالت، تقویت تعهدات اخلاقی در راستای آگاهی جمعی .اشاره کرد، که همین امر کنشگری سیاسی را ممکن می کند.درنهایت به این نتیجه رسیدیم که با اندیشیدن بین سوبژکتیویته و امر سیاسی، می‌توان این رابطه را از انبوهی از دیدگاه‌ها، جهت‌ها و متفکران بررسی کرد تا ناهمگونی، گشودگی و ماهیت منازعه‌آمیز آن وضوح یابد. تسلط سیاست بر مراجع معنا سازی اجتماعی زمینه‌ساز توتالیتاریسم می‌شود به‌طوری‌که مراجع ایدئولوژیک با القای وعده‌های توخالی، مطالبه گری عدالت را به سمت کلیتی هژمونیک هدایت می‌کنند. عدالت به‌عنوان یک هستی‌شناسی که امکان تغییر درونی بنیادی را فراهم کند. پست مارکس گرایان پسا آلتوسری در جستجوی یک اصل استعلایی هستند که ممکن است امید های اجتماعی را دوباره فعال کند. .در نتیجه با توجه به فرض انشقاق سوژگی در زمان، و انتاگونیسم ذاتی سوبژکتویته، ایده عدالت به‌عنوان روزنه همیشگی در امر سیاسی مانع از تثبیت هژمونی و توهم تمامیت‌گرایی می‌شود و همواره بدیل‌های خویش را فرامی‌خواند و عدالت بستر سوبژکتویشن جمعی خواهد بود. فرض ما در این مقاله این بود که عدالت به‌عنوان یک هستی‌شناسی است که امکان تغییر درونی بنیادی را فراهم کند. نویسندگان این مقاله مدعی نیستند که توانسته‌اند راه‌حلی برای این مسئله بیایند بلکه این مقاله صرفاً تلاش و تمرینی بود برای اندیشیدن به حوزه هنجاری در نظریه سیاسی، بر اساس هستی‌شناسی موجود در نظریه گفتمان لاکانی.

Abstract 1. Introduction
The religious policy of the Seljuk state, particularly during the reign of Malik-Shah, constitutes one of the most significant and contested dimensions of political history in fifth-century AH Islamic Iran. During this period, the Seljuk government faced not only the challenge of consolidating political authority and organizing a vast bureaucratic apparatus, but also the necessity of managing profound religious and sectarian diversity. This pluralism was rooted in earlier historical experiences—most notably the Buyid period—as well as in the legal, theological, and intra-sectarian conflicts of the fourth and fifth centuries AH. In this context, the relationship between politics and religion was not peripheral but fundamental to the Seljuk state-building project, and any interpretation of elite political action that neglects this relationship risks oversimplification.
Among Seljuk political actors, Niẓām al-Mulk Ṭūsī occupies a uniquely central position. His nearly three-decade-long vizierate under Alp Arslan and Malik-Shah, his role in establishing durable administrative and educational institutions, and his contribution to the ideological formation of the Seljuk state have led many historians to associate the religious policies of the period—rightly or wrongly—primarily with his person. Yet prevailing portrayals of Niẓām al-Mulk tend to oscillate between two reductive extremes. On the one hand, he is depicted as a sectarian and anti-Shiʿi vizier pursuing a deliberate project of eliminating Shiʿism, particularly Twelver Shiʿism; on the other hand, the continued presence of Shiʿis within Seljuk bureaucratic and social structures is taken as evidence of his religious tolerance or neutrality. Although both interpretations draw on historical evidence, neither adequately explains the internal logic of his political action or the relationship between language, thought, and practice in his policies.
Research Question(s)
This article addresses this interpretive gap by posing the following research questions: How did Niẓām al-Mulk conceptualize and enact his policies toward Twelver Shiʿism and Ismailism? On what political and intellectual grounds did he distinguish between these two Shiʿi currents, and what function did this distinction serve in the Seljuk state-building project? To answer these questions, the study employs Quentin Skinner’s methodology in the history of political thought, which conceptualizes political texts as context-bound speech acts rather than expressions of timeless beliefs. From this perspective, Niẓām al-Mulk’s writings—especially the Siyāsat-nāma—are read as strategic political interventions aimed at ordering power, managing threats, and redefining the relationship between religion and kingship within the Seljuk political imagination.

3. Methodology
This study adopts Quentin Skinner’s methodology in the history of political thought as its analytical framework. The theoretical foundation of Skinner’s approach rests on the principle that understanding a text requires reconstructing the author’s intentions at the moment of writing. As Skinner famously argues, the central question is not merely what an author said, but what the author was doing in saying it. From this perspective, political texts are not neutral repositories of abstract propositions but forms of linguistic and political action produced in response to specific historical problems, conflicts, and circumstances.
Skinner emphasizes that a genuinely historical study of political thought must situate texts within the intellectual conventions and discursive contexts that made particular forms of political action intelligible. Accordingly, texts possess an illocutionary or performative dimension and should be analyzed intertextually, without claiming direct access to the inner mental states of past thinkers. The objective is to reconstruct the concepts, distinctions, and argumentative strategies available to authors by employing conventional methods of historical inquiry.
In this research, particular attention is given to one of the core components of Skinner’s methodology: the analysis of political thought through prevailing norms and conventions. Skinner maintains that the meaning of a text can only be grasped by identifying the dominant norms governing social and political action in a given historical context. On this basis, the study first reconstructs the key political and religious norms preceding the Seljuk period, as well as those shaping the Abbasid caliphate and the Seljuk state. It then examines how Niẓām al-Mulk’s political language and religious policy engaged with these norms—either reinforcing or transforming them—in order to articulate a coherent strategy of governance.

4. Results
This study applied Quentin Skinner’s methodology to the analysis of Niẓām al-Mulk’s approach to Twelver Shiʿism and Ismailism through a three-stage analytical process. First, it reconstructed the prior political and intellectual norms governing the relationship between state and religion in Niẓām al-Mulk’s political thought. Second, it reread the Siyāsat-nāma within the conventional discursive and institutional frameworks of the Seljuk period. Third, it analyzed Niẓām al-Mulk’s treatment of Twelver Shiʿism and Ismailism in order to identify the specific political actions he sought to perform through the language of religion and governance. This methodological framework made it possible to interpret his policies not as reflections of personal intolerance or tolerance, but as rational and situational political acts embedded in Seljuk political thought.
The findings demonstrate that Niẓām al-Mulk drew a fundamental distinction between Twelver Shiʿism and Ismailism, rooted in his differentiated assessment of the political threat posed by each group. Despite its doctrinal divergence from official Sunnism, Twelver Shiʿism was not perceived as an immediate or organized political challenge to Seljuk authority. Lacking a centralized political structure and direct action against the state, the Twelvers were subjected to a policy of institutional containment and epistemic exclusion. On the one hand, their marginalization from official institutions of knowledge and legitimacy—most notably the Niẓāmiyya madrasas—served to reinforce the Sunni identity of the Seljuk state. On the other hand, the avoidance of systematic repression allowed for a minimal level of coexistence necessary for effective governance. As a result, Twelver Shiʿism was displaced to the institutional margins rather than eliminated, prompting a reconfiguration of its intellectual and social strategies in non-official spheres.
In contrast, Ismailism was constructed within Niẓām al-Mulk’s political discourse not as a religious deviation but as an existential political enemy. Analysis of the language of the Siyāsat-nāma reveals that terms such as “Bāṭiniyya,” “corruption,” and “disruption of the realm” functioned as securitizing speech acts that rendered coercive elimination both rational and legitimate. In this framework, violence was not exceptional but integral to the logic of politics aimed at preserving state order against an organized and active threat. Accordingly, the disparity in the intensity and form of Niẓām al-Mulk’s response to these two Shiʿi currents stemmed not from theological disagreement, but from political rationality and situational judgment.
Ultimately, this article argues that Niẓām al-Mulk’s religious policy should be understood as a constellation of linguistic, institutional, and practical actions that acquire meaning only within the specific historical context of the fifth century AH. By employing Skinner’s approach, the study moves beyond moralistic and reductionist readings and reconstructs Niẓām al-Mulk’s thought as a political response to religious pluralism, legitimacy crises, and security threats facing the Seljuk state. From this perspective, Niẓām al-Mulk emerges neither as a symbol of religious tolerance nor merely as a sectarian zealot, but as a political actor who consciously differentiated between accommodation, containment, and coercion according to the nature of the perceived threat, thereby playing a decisive role in shaping Seljuk religious policy.

Abstract Political participation is one of the main challenges facing every politician today. In the new democratic system, political participation and institutionalization are two main tools for building trust (Radaddi, 2011: 184). Trust that every political system needs to maintain its structure. Political marketing, as an interdisciplinary approach based on a participatory political space, tries to determine and represent the place of political participation in the political market and to maximize and continuously achieve the goals of political stakeholders.
Placing political participation in political marketing in Iran requires that a specific time frame be considered in order to control variables and have an appropriate historical depth. In this way, the Constitutional Revolution, as a specific historical phenomenon, can be considered. In this movement, the religious and political spheres, in confrontation with each other, have come together to fight for the rights of the people. On the other hand, until this historical event, there had never been such a wide effort by the general public to infiltrate power.
This research attempts to use the theoretical framework of political marketing to provide a detailed analysis of the first political arena of contemporary Iran, in which we witness the widespread participation of various components of Iranian society. In this way, a complete picture of the political participation achieved in this period is presented. Undoubtedly, achieving such a goal by using interdisciplinary studies such as political marketing can be the beginning of a deep understanding of the developments in the field of political participation of Iranians in the contemporary period.
As time passes and modern societies become more complex, the concept of (political) participation has found different dimensions and aspects, and consequently, its place and dimensions in various fields of study, including political marketing, have undergone changes and developments. Without considering these developments, no prescription will be possible. Therefore, in this paper, using the qualitative method and case study research strategy, the question is answered that "How is the political participation of Iranians during the Constitutional Revolution, from the perspective of political marketing?"
To achieve an analytical answer, the framework of political marketing studies is used to explain the political market, and using the model of political stakeholders Philip Kotler and Neil Kotler (1999), five stakeholders (1) clergy, (2) press, (3) foreigners, (4) rulers and (5) people are identified. Accordingly, it becomes clear that the rulers have a traditional and product-oriented approach, the press has a traditional and product-oriented approach and generally a sales-oriented approach, foreigners have a sales-oriented approach, the people also have a sales-oriented approach, and the clergy who are supporters of Ayatollah Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri had a traditional and product-oriented approach, and the other part of the clergy under the influence of intellectuals had a sales-oriented approach. Also, participation in the Constitutional era was the interaction of the efforts of various stakeholders in the market, and certainly the level of participation of each of them was affected by their understanding of the performance and actions of other stakeholders.
In the Constitutional era, the government adopted a traditional and product-oriented approach, making no effort to change its views or products. The press of this era sought to present its product to the people by changing their views. Therefore, intellectuals published a large part of the press, and some of them printed and prepared their works abroad. Foreigners also had a sales-oriented approach and were willing to change people's minds to present their product, although they had a traditional and product-oriented approach to the government. However, they were generally sales-oriented. The people, who were seeking to overthrow despotism, also preferred to present their ideals with a sales-oriented approach. In this regard, they tried to influence other actors, including foreigners. Finally, some of the clergy, in support of Sheikh Fazlollah Nori, followed a traditional and product-oriented approach, while others adopted a sales-oriented approach, following the example of intellectuals and the people. Of course, the product offered by each of these two groups was fundamentally different and sometimes contradictory.
Participation in the Constitutional era was the interaction of the efforts of various stakeholders in the market, and certainly the level of participation of each of them was affected by their understanding of the performance and actions of other stakeholders. For example, the role of foreigners and the understanding of this role by the clergy added to the activism of some of them (led by Sheikh Fazlollah Nori) and they preferred to prevent the weakening of the government under these conditions. In any case, the phenomenon of constitutionalism was not the effect of the activism of a single stakeholder, and the political market was composed of all the stakeholders mentioned. Similarly, the products of this movement, including elections, are also a joint product, and its guild nature, following the role of merchants or the consideration of the principle of high-ranking scholars based on the activism of the clergy, was only part of the effects of the activism of the stakeholders in this era. But in any case, elections are also the product of the political market of the Constitutional era with all the requirements listed.
Political participation in the Constitutional era had important religious roots, although constitutionalism cannot be considered the product of the clergy in this era, and some of them opposed constitutionalism. However, the political participation of different stakeholders was the product of the active activism of the clergy. An activism that had not been manifested to this extent before. Although constitutionalism did not have a good end, and the presence of some stakeholders prevented it from being maximized and prevented the adoption of correct and rational positions. But it was the beginning of the dynamism of the clergy in directing political participation. In a way that after the activism of Sheikh Fazlollah Nori and his decisive role in representing constitutionalism and the role of various stakeholders, including foreigners and those affiliated with foreigners, Ayatollah Madani was present as a representative of the Majlis and he had such effective activism that the court, out of fear of his position and positions, first exiled him and then martyred him, just as Sheikh Fazlollah Nori was martyred. However, the success of this movement was achieved with the influence of Ayatollah Kashani during the Pahlavi era and the nationalization of the oil industry and the cutting off of the hands of foreigners, and finally, the clergy led a revolution under the leadership of Imam Khomeini (RA) to permanently eliminate despotism and foreigners. And he was able to lay the foundation for national political participation in a way that national interest was taken into account.

Abstract Introduction
Scholarship on the Pahlavi state has predominantly framed it either as an authoritarian modernizing regime imposing transformation from above or as a paradigmatic rentier state shaped by oil revenues. While these perspectives have generated valuable insights, they share a foundational analytical limitation: the state is treated either as an exogenous agent acting upon society or as an epiphenomenon of economic structures. Such approaches obscure the historical processes through which the state itself becomes socially constituted through economic transformation and class restructuring.
This article challenges this dichotomy by conceptualizing the state as a historically situated social formation whose economic interventions actively participate in the reorganization of social stratification. Rather than asking how the economy affected the state in a linear manner, the study interrogates how economic transformation reconfigured the field of state action and gradually altered the social foundations of state power. The core problem addressed here is thus the absence of a processual explanation linking economic change, class formation, and the transformation of state nature in modern Iran.


Research Question, Hypothesis, and Objective
The central research question is: How did transformations in Iran’s economic structure during the Pahlavi period reshape social stratification, and through what mechanisms did this restructuring contribute to the transformation of the social nature of the state?
The main hypothesis argues that the transition from a land-based political economy to a state-centered, oil-fueled economic structure generated new, institutionally mediated social strata whose reproduction depended on proximity to the state. This transformation weakened traditional social coalitions while simultaneously preventing the emergence of an autonomous bourgeois or popular base, thereby producing a bureaucratic and state-centered polity with limited social embeddedness.
The objective of the study is to reconstruct the causal mechanisms through which economic change altered class configurations and, in turn, transformed the state from a coalition-dependent entity into a structurally autonomous yet socially fragile institution.
Literature Review
Existing scholarship on the Pahlavi state has primarily examined state transformation through either authoritarian modernization frameworks or rentier state theories, emphasizing oil revenues and political centralization. While these studies have provided valuable insights into institutional change and state autonomy, they often treat social stratification as a secondary or derivative outcome. More recent works in political economy and historical sociology have highlighted the importance of class formation and bureaucratic expansion, yet they rarely reconstruct the causal processes linking economic transformation, social stratification, and the evolving social nature of the state. This study addresses this gap by offering a processual and mechanism-based analysis of state transformation in Iran.
Theoretical Framework and Research Method
The analysis draws on a theoretically integrated framework combining Erik Olin Wright’s relational class analysis with Anthony Giddens’s theory of structuration. Wright’s conceptualization of class as a relational and organizational phenomenon allows for the identification of contradictory class locations produced by bureaucratic expansion, state employment, and administrative control over resources. These positions cannot be captured by classical dichotomies of capital and labor but are crucial for understanding state-centered social formations.
Giddens’s structuration theory provides the complementary insight that state institutions are both constrained by existing social structures and simultaneously reproduce or transform those structures through routinized practices. This duality enables an analysis of the state not merely as a reflection of class relations but as an arena in which economic power, administrative capacity, and social positioning are continuously reconstituted.
Methodologically, the study employs process tracing as a within-case, qualitative strategy. By reconstructing temporally ordered sequences of economic reforms, institutional changes, and social outcomes, the research identifies the causal pathways linking shifts in economic structure to transformations in social stratification and state character. This approach allows for opening the “black box” between economic change and political outcomes, avoiding both economic determinism and institutional reductionism.
Research Findings and Conclusions
The findings indicate that during the early Pahlavi period, state-led economic interventions—operating within a predominantly agrarian economy—gradually eroded the material and political bases of landed and tribal elites while expanding bureaucratic and administrative apparatuses. These processes altered the criteria of social status and access to power, even before the consolidation of an oil-based economy.
In the later Pahlavi period, the institutionalization of oil revenues qualitatively transformed this trajectory. Oil income enabled the state to bypass traditional mechanisms of social mediation and to redistribute resources through land reform, public employment, educational expansion, and bureaucratic growth. These mechanisms produced state-dependent social strata whose social mobility and material reproduction were structurally tied to state institutions rather than autonomous economic activity.
The study concludes that the transformation of the Pahlavi state was not a direct outcome of oil wealth per se, nor merely the result of authoritarian modernization. Rather, it was the cumulative product of a process in which economic transformation restructured social stratification, and this restructured social landscape, in turn, reshaped the nature of the state. By foregrounding causal mechanisms and historical sequencing, the article contributes to broader debates on state formation, political economy, and state–society relations beyond the Iranian case.

Abstract Between 2010 and 2013, during what was called the Arab Spring, the Arab world witnessed a wave of popular uprisings that led to the overthrow of four governments (in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen), serious difficulties for three states (in Bahrain, Jordan and to some extent, Saudi Arabia), and a civil war (in Syria). Other Arab states have seemed to be stable. These different outcomes raise the question of what were the causes of those uprisings, and why were some of them successful, but not others. In order to answer these questions, by employing the systemic model and the historical sociology method the involved factors are explored in six segments, namely, political, economic, social, cultural, military and external. These uprisings show that popular dissent is deep-rooted in the Arab countries, and can come to surface unexpectedly. However, what played the determining role in the collapse of some regimes and survival of the others was the specific composition of short-run factors in each country. Those events show those governments that by their political management attracted the allegiance of a considerable part of their population (even an important minority) and maintained the loyalty of the body of their army survived. When the shock of Bin Ali’s demise subsided, the Arab governments gradually learned from each other how to deal with the crisis caused by the Arab Spring, using various tactics to control their own population and to avoid the formation of an international consensus against them.

Abstract n the case of the relationship between government and environmental obligations there are different views in public law theory. At least three approaches can be mentioned in the context of general task to which principle 50 of constitution refers. The first approach is based on the centrality of the state in protecting the environment and ensuring the right to a healthy environment (State-centric approach). This approach assumes that the market and the private sector are incapable of protecting the environment. So it is only the state that  has the primary responsibility for protection of the environment as a general task.
 The second approach relates to the absence of the state in protecting the environment (Approach without government). In fact the emergence of this approach is because of the inability of the government to protect the environment. According to this approach the government cannot protect the environment propperly and experience has shown that some governments have become one of the violators of environmental law.
And at last the participation approach is based on the idea of cooperation between the state and non-state actors and the citizens in the area of environmental protection and implementation of the related policies. In this paper, different aspects of this issue in the context of public law are analyzed. The basic assumption of this article is based on the belief that the environmental protection requires the government’s cooperation with citizens.

Abstract Gender policy in contemporary Iran has experienced many fluctuations, but it has generally brought about significant changes in the status of women. The question of this article is focused on political factors, especially the role of state, in these changes. Using a historical–comparative method, the present research shows that gender policy in contemporary Iran was influenced by three variables: the strength of the women’s movement, the state’s tendencies, and other positions of social forces. Moreover, gender policy has emerged under three distinct paradigms. First, the conservative paradigm, which stemmed from the weakness of the women’s movement concomitant with the traditionalist state as well as the resistance of conservative forces, has not succeeded to make considerable changes to the status of women. This paradigm can be seen in the years preceding the constitutional movement (1891–1905), during 1941–1951 (the 1320s Solar Hijri), and in some periods following the Islamic Revolution (1981–1988). The second paradigm, called authoritarian reform, resulted from the weakness of the women’s movement concomitant with the authoritarian state as well as the diminished resistance of conservative forces. This paradigm, seen in the years 1921–1941 and 1963–1978, caused significant changes in the legal status of women. Not accompanied by the participation of women, these changes could not firmly entrench themselves and at times relapsed into the previous stage. Third, the paradigm of democratic reform resulted from the women’s movement concomitant with the reformist state as well as the balance between modern and traditional social forces. This paradigm emerged in the early years following the constitutional movement and in the two post-Revolutionary periods known as construction and reformist, introducing relatively profound and lasting changes to the status of women.

Abstract For a long time, the only solution to ending disputes between countries was war on the battlefield and military option. In the midst of these wars, the most important military strategies were born and often used in other battles. But over time, states have found that warfare is a very costly activity, with massive casualties and financial losses. Therefore, conversation and peaceful solutions in form of Diplomacy was seriously placed in state's agenda. However, none of these ways (Strategy and Diplomacy) could alone bring lasting peace to the world. Therefore, the necessity of the emergence and importance of Military Diplomacy was more determined. The present paper seeks to examine the implications of military diplomacy as a new approach in explaining the strategic issues and to deal the role of this approach in foreign policy of the countries". The main hypothesis is that "military diplomacy is a new way for providing the military power to achieve peaceful purposes, avoid the military violence and increase deterrence," which has become a tool for achieving foreign policy goals, especially for the great powers. The studies have shown that "the adoption of such an approach will increase the ability of countries to pursue foreign policy goals and, consequently, increase their power and their role in international developments.
 

Abstract Various governments around the world have put tough restrictive measures on the agenda to combat the outbreak of the Covid-19 virus. Actions that are unbearable for people under normal circumstances. These restrictive measures and extraordinary means have so far been accepted by the public (despite popular protests in some countries). This study seeks to answer the main question: "Which of theories can best explain or understand the restrictive actions of different states in the face of coronavirus?" It hypothesizes that "use extraordinary means such as the closure of universities, mosques, religious shrines, discos and nightclubs, etc. "Different governments use them in the face of the coronavirus, due to the “securitization' of public health from the risk of a viral pandemic by different governments." The theory of "securitization" is therefore used, because in "securitization", the a securitising actor defines a security issue as a threat to the survival of a referent object which is claimed to has a right to survive. Since a question of survival necessarily involves a point of no return at which it will be too late to act, it is not defensible to leave this issue to normal politics. The securitising actor therefore claims a right to use extraordinary means or break normal rules, for reasons of security; Tools that are normally unjustifiable and not tolerated. At the same time, the actions of a transnational actor such as the World Health Organization(WHO) in "securitization" the coronavirus are examined using the concept of " Macrosecuritization ".

Abstract In 1978, the Islamic Revolution achieved victory with the aim of fighting injustice, oppression, tyranny, establishing security, freedom, independence, and most importantly, forming a single nation. After the victory of the revolution, the first Shiite democratic system was established under the title of Islamic Republic based on the principle of divine sovereignty (Islamism) and people's sovereignty (Republic). Undoubtedly, the establishment of an Islamic state is one of the ultimate goals of the Islamic revolution, so that the laws and rulings of the Islamic religion are implemented, which, in addition to regulating the current affairs of the people, also guides the direction of the society towards perfection and nearness to God. But until today, the actions and efforts taken were not enough and the Islamic state has not yet been realized in the real sense. Therefore, the explanation of Ayatollah Khamenei's point of view as the great leader of Iranian society and also as the most important Shiite thinker in the Islamic world regarding the foundations and indicators of the Islamic state is very effective and can be a guide for the formation and theoretical and practical activity of the Islamic state. Because during his leadership period, he explained the five stages of the objectives of the Islamic revolution (Islamic revolution, political system, Islamic state, Islamic society and Islamic civilization) and drew the Islamic state as the most important and third stage of this process and repeatedly They have emphasized the importance and necessity of forming an Islamic state as an important factor in the realization of Islamic civilization. Therefore, it is requisite and necessary to explain his point of view regarding the foundations and indicators of the Islamic state.
Question: This research seeks to answer the question that, from the perspective of Ayatollah Khamenei, how are the foundations and indicators of the Islamic state drawn?
Methodology: The method of this research is based on the qualitative content analysis method, in order to benefit from this method, attention was paid to the hidden themes of Ayatollah Khamenei's statements from 1981 to 2022 and inference and extraction of meaning was made from it. Thematic search of the word (Islamic State) among the statements of Ayatollah Khamenei was obtained with the help of MAXQDA software, and the search results of his statements were prepared in the form of a slip, which is about the topic of the foundations and indicators of the Islamic State.  The next step after collecting the slips is the analysis procedure in three ways: purification, explanation and which is the structure analysis procedure of this research. The next step is to specify the units of analysis, which are divided into word (symbol), theme, character (personality), paragraph and title (item), and in this research, the unit of analysis is paragraph. The next step is coding to determine the categories. The next step is coding to determine the categories, which in this research was done in an open and inductive approach, because the qualitative view prevails in it. Therefore, for this coding, it is necessary to read and review the text of the statements 2-3 times, line by line, and then convert it into the smallest possible component, where similar codes are merged and categories are extracted from these codes. And finally, each of these categories is analyzed and interpreted.
Result and Discussion: Using qualitative content analysis method, three categories were determined regarding the foundations of the Islamic state and ten categories were determined regarding the indicators of the Islamic state, and each of these categories was analyzed and examined, and several points can be made from the findings. He deduced the basic:

From the point of view of Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islamic state is the most important and the third stage of the five-fold process of the ideal of the Islamic Revolution, and if it is not fully realized, the Islamic society will not be formed.
What distinguishes the Islamic state from other states; Its Islamic foundations and orientation are rooted in the connection between religion and politics in Islam, the necessity of social life and the necessity of realizing a virtuous life for the Muslim community in material and spiritual dimensions.
From his point of view, the model of the Islamic State is the prophetic and Alawite state, which has indicators for the formation of the Islamic state at present, the most important of which are justice-oriented, adherence to the standards of religious democracy (importance of people's vote and opinion)., anti-tyranny, law-oriented, value-religious orientation, preservation of Islamic identity, service, science-oriented, wisdom-oriented, fight against corruption, etc.

 

Abstract Abstract
Purpose: Contemporary international law has faced many new challenges. The expansion of modern objects as State-terrorism and the growth of new subjects such as new actors could be considered as some recent aspects of this evolution. In this framework the event of non-state actors because of some problems has changed the allocation of rights and duties and the balance of power between different actors in international community. Although in this environment, the states are still the most significant component of international law and international relations, the modern phenomena could cause new conceptions. The most widely accepted source for definition of statehood is the Montevideo Convention of 1933, which includes the traditional preconditions. According to this convention there are four criteria for States such as a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and the capacity to enter into relations with other entities. The purpose of this article is to focus on the different elements of a State and to answer the question whether DAESH could be considered as a State in international law? And Whether DAESH could expand its legal personality in order to be considered as a State?
 
Design: To answer the main challenges of this essay, it will break up into sections; first, after examining the elements of states in accordance to existing documents and recent practices of various actors, we will consider DAESH, the foundations and the structural basis of creation and its practice in international law. In this section, we will also examine the capabilities by which DAESH may obtain a modern position in international relations. Second, we will consider the characteristic features of DAESH including violation of some fundamental principles of international law such as human rights and humanitarian law. Third, we will scrutinize the role and the responsibility of others before DAESH. In this section, the situations by which international community could overcome the challenges of this new actor in the best manner may also be examined. Finally we will explain the resolutions and the documents issued by some competent organizations such as some human rights organs and also the United Nations and especially those of the Security Council in condemnation of international and domestic practices of this group.
 
Finding: Many international rules and principles have been violated by DAESH in Syria and Iraq. Some reports and comments by human rights commissions and non-governmental organizations show that DAESH has committed many heinous acts such as murder, extermination, slavery, deportation or forcible transfer, torture, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other rules of international humanitarian law. Many of the crimes could be considered as those criminalized by International criminal court as the crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. Taking a look at some recent resolutions of the Security Council and paying enough attention to the international and domestic practice of DAESH are some legal facts to prove the premise of this query.

Abstract The author formulates "Hydrocarbonism" (as an alternative to the rentierism and rentier state theories) and proposes a set of new concepts such as "Hydrocarbon Man, Hydrocarbon Society, Hydrocarbon Mode of Production, Quasi-Market, Middle Eastern State of Nature, Middle Eastern Social Contract, Middle Eastern Social State, Welfare Technocracy, Rent Wishing Syndrome, Social-X-Factor, and Tax Leviathan". By proposing this new framework in the political economy and political sociology of the Middle East, he intends to answer the fundamental question of "How should we understand the nature and procedure (or modus operandi) of Middle East petro-societies and the elementary forms of life inside them?" The author has five interrelated arguments:
First: "Tradition, oil and quasi-market" are a coherent whole and the main source of transition in the Middle East petro-societies from a "hydraulic mode of production" in the pre-capitalist era to a "hydrocarbon mode of production" in the 20th century. These three inseparable sources, more than any other factor, have influenced the life of the mind and living experience of man in the Middle East petro-societies and have given these societies a special content, with special values and special internal dynamics.
Second: The endless unity of "tradition, oil and quasi-market" can be assumed as a "Middle Eastern State of Nature" which underlies establishment of a "Welfare Technocracy" (bold or pale) in these hydrocarbon societies. The power elites continuously utilize this welfare technocracy to purchase political goods from social markets and, as a result, constantly manipulate and distort "income, consumption and political life" in these societies.
Third: The result of this "Middle Eastern State of Nature" is the passivity of hydrocarbon man and the reproduction of established paradigms of power in these societies. Therefore, the power elites consistently strive to preserve and perpetuate this special state of nature by using welfare technocracy.
Fourth: However, welfare technocracy is not able to continuously produce the "Social-X-Factor" (or hope, respect, and trust in these hydrocarbon societies) and, consequently, leads to the expansion of alienation, the gradual decline of all forms of capital, and finally, the impossibility of "economic growth at the same time as deep-rooted political development" in the Middle East hydrocarbon societies.
Fifth: Moving towards a "New Middle Eastern Social Contract" and establishing a "Tax Leviathan" is a prerequisite for the slow, difficult, and complex transition of these hydrocarbon societies from their specific state of nature to their special social state.
Based on these five arguments, the author focuses on the Middle East hydrocarbon societies in their distinct historical existence and their social context. In this framework, he reconstructs the life of the mind and living experience of hydrocarbon man through empathetic experience with him.
Accordingly, in the first section, while criticizing the reductionist nature of rentierism and rentier state theories, the author formulates "Hydrocarbonism" as an alternative theory. In the second section, he defines the hydrocarbon man and society and hydrocarbon mode of production and explains the historical process of constructing Hydrocarbonism in the Middle East petro-societies. In the third section, the author focuses on the nature and causes of permanent unity and alloy-type mixture of "tradition, oil and quasi-market" and describes how to turn it to a "state of nature" in the Middle East hydrocarbon societies. In the fourth section, he explains the internal logic of establishing welfare technocracy and its instrumental nature in the Middle East hydrocarbon societies. In the fifth section, the author elaborates on the passivity of hydrocarbon man due to his simultaneous weaknesses and benefits. In the sixth section, he describes the life of mind and living experience of man in the Middle East hydrocarbon societies. In the seventh section, the author highlights the inherent contradictions of these societies and finally, he emphasizes the necessity of moving towards a "new Middle Eastern social contract" and establishing a "tax Leviathan" in the Middle East hydrocarbon societies.