State Studies

Abstract Introduction and Research Problem
Theories of state neutrality and perfectionism are frequently presented in contemporary political philosophy as competing and mutually exclusive approaches to the relationship between political authority and the good life. Advocates of neutrality typically regard governmental restraint among competing conceptions of the good as a requirement of respect for individual autonomy, equality, and democratic legitimacy, whereas defenders of perfectionism argue that the preservation of liberal and democratic institutions themselves depends upon the promotion of certain substantive values and virtues. This article challenges the widespread assumption that neutrality and perfectionism are fundamentally opposed traditions. It argues instead that they are better understood as convergent philosophical approaches whose differences concern primarily the extent and limits of legitimate state intervention.
From this perspective, only the two extremes—strict neutrality and comprehensive perfectionism—are genuinely incompatible. Most contemporary political theories occupy positions somewhere between these poles. The central question addressed in this article is therefore whether a political order can remain committed to state neutrality while simultaneously supporting the cultivation of virtue within society. To address this question, the article develops the idea of the capability-fostering state as a virtue-based impartial state. The proposed model seeks to move beyond both the strictly neutral state and comprehensive perfectionism by distinguishing between the virtue of the state and the virtue of society. The argument proceeds from the premise that the primary function of political authority is to expand the conditions under which citizens’ capabilities can flourish and their agency can be exercised. In this framework, neutrality is understood not as indifference toward the good but as a political virtue that constrains the manner in which the state pursues public purposes.
Findings and Discussion
The findings of this study are organized around three interrelated dimensions that constitute the normative architecture of the capability-fostering state. First, it examines the institutional virtue of the state. Second, it distinguishes the virtue of the state from the virtue of society. Third, it analyzes the non-coercive means through which the state may promote virtue and foster citizens’ capabilities. Together, these three dimensions demonstrate how limited neutrality and moderate perfectionism can coexist within a coherent model of political order.

The Institutional Virtue of the State

The article argues that the institutional virtue of the state is best understood as a form of limited neutrality. Unlike strict theories of neutrality, this conception does not require a complete separation between the right and the good, nor does it demand governmental indifference toward all values. The normative foundations of limited neutrality are identified through four interconnected principles. First, equality of opportunity is required as a condition for the expansion of citizens’ capabilities. Second, toleration is understood as recognition of the right to be wrong and as a commitment to respecting reasonable disagreement. Third, autonomy is regarded as a prerequisite for meaningful choice and moral agency. Fourth, republican freedom, understood as freedom from domination and dependence upon the arbitrary will of others, provides the political conditions necessary for the flourishing of human capabilities. Taken together, these principles constitute limited neutrality as an institutional virtue of the state.
The article further argues that the appropriate motivation of the state as a virtuous political institution is reflected in its commitment to neutrality of justification. Political authority should justify laws and policies through publicly accessible reasons articulated in a language available to all citizens. Accordingly, neutrality is located primarily at the level of justification and procedure rather than at the level of outcomes or consequences.

The Virtue of Society and Moderate Perfectionism

Having established the institutional virtue of the state, the article turns to the question of virtue within society. It argues that a distinction must be maintained between the state’s obligation to remain impartially structured and society’s need for moral and civic virtues. The cultivation of virtue therefore becomes a matter of moderate and indirect perfectionism rather than coercive moral enforcement.
Within this framework, the common good is understood as incorporating a minimal set of shared goods and virtues that emerge through public deliberation, social interaction, and intersubjective exchange of reasons. These values derive their legitimacy not from a comprehensive doctrine but from an overlapping consensus among citizens. The role of the state is to identify these broadly shared goods and to employ them as a basis for public policy.
The article emphasizes that moderate perfectionism differs fundamentally from comprehensive perfectionism. It is non-coercive, pluralistic, democratic, and society-centered. Rather than imposing a single conception of the good, it permits the civic promotion of moral ideals rooted in the shared historical and cultural traditions of a political community. Because it relies upon a minimal and relatively thin conception of the common good, it remains compatible with a significant degree of state neutrality.

Non-Coercive Promotion and Capability Expansion

A central claim of the article is that the promotion of virtue need not take coercive forms. Promotion, recommendation, encouragement, education, and persuasion differ fundamentally from threats, legal compulsion, and punitive enforcement. The most important criterion for evaluating autonomy is whether available and possible options remain open to choice. Since persuasive measures do not remove alternatives or make decisions on behalf of citizens, they need not undermine autonomy.
The article argues that the state may legitimately undertake positive measures aimed at removing obstacles to human flourishing and expanding citizens’ capabilities. Such measures are justified insofar as they create the social and institutional conditions necessary for agency, autonomy, and expansion of capability. The article further argues that republican political theory reinforces this position. While republicanism rejects strict state neutrality and emphasizes the relationship between political institutions and civic virtue, it does not require coercive moral regulation. The proposed model therefore rejects punitive and compulsory approaches to virtue promotion. Instead, state intervention should be limited to those minimal, thin, shared, and broadly accepted virtues that command public agreement.
Conclusion
The article concludes that neutrality and perfectionism need not be regarded as mutually exclusive ideals of political order. Its central contribution lies in the distinction between the virtue of state and the virtue of society, which makes it possible to reconcile limited neutrality with moderate perfectionism. The former is expressed through limited neutrality as an institutional virtue, grounded in equality of opportunity, toleration, autonomy, republican freedom, and neutrality of justification. The latter may be advanced through a moderate and indirect form of perfectionism that relies on persuasion, encouragement, and civic promotion rather than coercion.
The capability-fostering state, conceived as a virtue-based impartial state, provides a framework within which citizens’ capabilities can flourish while preserving respect for pluralism and individual agency. Such a state need not remain indifferent to virtue, yet it confines itself to the persuasive promotion of a minimal set of shared goods capable of commanding overlapping consensus. Intervention is restricted to the least costly and least intrusive means necessary to achieve legitimate public objectives, while any expansion of state burdens requires political justification and democratic support.
The coexistence of limited neutrality and moderate perfectionism therefore offers a theoretically coherent alternative to both strict neutrality and comprehensive perfectionism. By refining the concepts of neutrality and virtue and assigning each its proper sphere, the proposed model seeks to preserve the strengths of both approaches while mitigating the limitations associated with their independent forms.

Abstract Introduction and Objectives In social and historical analysis, researchers draw on a range of methods to understand causal relationships between phenomena, and process tracing has become one of the more prominent of these tools. Unlike approaches that rely mainly on quantitative models and statistical inference, process tracing examines the particularities of each case in detail, tracing causal relationships through a close reading of within-case evidence rather than through cross-case correlation. Researchers working in this tradition draw on precise, qualitative evidence to reconstruct complex causal relationships across fields as different as history, political science, and economics. A central feature of the method is that it can weigh several competing hypotheses at once, testing the validity of each against the same body of evidence through structured empirical tests. This study examines how such tests are applied in analyzing causal relationships, with particular attention to complex processes as they play out in case studies such as the 1898 Fashoda crisis and the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. Its aim is to clarify how process tracing operates and what its distinctive features look like in practice, so that researchers can identify the mechanisms underlying the phenomena they study with greater precision and avoid some of the more common analytical errors. The paper also considers the methodological challenges that process tracing raises in the social sciences, particularly in historical and single-case research, and works toward a more careful account of how the method should be applied there. Method This paper treats process tracing as a method for analyzing causal relationships in social and historical inquiry, one developed and refined since Alexander George first applied it to historical case evidence in 1979. In contrast to quantitative approaches built around statistical models, it works instead through detailed, qualitative analysis of historical and social evidence within a single case or a small number of cases. Rather than fitting cases to a general model, the method proceeds by breaking a causal claim into a sequence of smaller steps and searching for evidence relevant to each one, an approach that yields finer-grained mechanisms within social, historical, or political processes. Three variants of process tracing are distinguished here: theory-testing, which asks whether a hypothesized mechanism actually operates in a given case; theory-building, which works inductively from case evidence toward a new causal account, as Janis did in identifying the mechanism of "groupthink" from the Bay of Pigs decision; and outcome-explaining, which aims not at generalizable theory but at a full account of one particular result, of the kind Schimmelfennig offers for the eastward enlargement of the European Union. In each variant, several competing hypotheses are held up against the evidence at once through Van Evera's four empirical tests, which lets the analysis distinguish stronger explanations from weaker ones with more confidence than a single narrative account would allow. Particular attention falls on the sequence and timing of events, since the credibility of any causal claim rests on showing not just that one thing followed another, but how and why it did. Results Having examined the different variants of process tracing and their distinguishing features, the study turns to how the four Van Evera tests function in practice. Each test carries a different evidentiary weight. Hoop tests rely on evidence that is certain but not unique, and so they serve mainly to rule hypotheses out rather than to confirm them: in Schultz's analysis of the Fashoda crisis, for instance, both the neorealist and the normative explanations fail this test, since neither can account for why the crisis dragged on for two months or why the two sides came to the brink of war. Smoking-gun tests, by contrast, rest on evidence that is unique but not certain, and passing one can strongly confirm an explanation even though its absence cannot rule the explanation out; the collapse of the official justifications for the 2003 Iraq war, together with the failure of neoconservative predictions about "bandwagoning," functions in this study as evidence of exactly that kind. Doubly-decisive tests demand evidence that is both unique and certain, sufficient on its own to confirm or refute a hypothesis outright, though such evidence proved unavailable for either of the two cases examined here. Straw-in-the-wind tests, finally, offer only indirect support: no single piece is decisive, but several together can shift confidence toward one explanation and away from its rivals, as with the pre-existing interest in regime change among American neoconservatives well before 2003. Taken together, these tests give researchers a basis for comparing rival explanations against the same evidence, rather than simply accumulating support for a single preferred account. Discussion and Conclusions The case studies examined here point to a broader pattern in how process tracing gets used. Researchers tend to lean more heavily on confirming evidence, of the kind smoking-gun and straw-in-the-wind tests supply, than on the disconfirming evidence hoop tests are built to provide; Schultz's own analysis of Fashoda, for example, rules out two rival hypotheses through the hoop test before turning to a smoking gun to confirm his preferred account, but stops short of the doubly-decisive standard, since he is not trying to eliminate every competing explanation outright. This asymmetry is less a flaw in the method than a reflection of how demanding doubly-decisive evidence is to come by in historical and social material, where competing explanations rarely admit of a clean, simultaneous refutation. The study's central conclusion is that using all four tests in a deliberate, balanced way, rather than favoring confirmation over disconfirmation, sharpens the internal validity of causal claims and gives a more realistic picture of how governance decisions and political outcomes actually come about. Process tracing, on this account, is not merely a supplement to correlational methods; it is what allows a researcher to move from observing that X and Y are related to showing how X produced Y, case by case, evidence by evidence. Table (1) - Van Evera's Tests Test Characteristics Application Hoop The evidence in this test is certain but not unique. Passing it can offer supporting evidence for the hypothesis, but it is not sufficient on its own to confirm it. Used to rule out hypotheses and eliminate rival explanations. Failing it can lead to the rejection of a hypothesis. Smoking gun The evidence in this test is unique, but not sufficient on its own to establish the result with certainty. Passing it, however, can provide strong confirmation of an explanation. Used to strengthen confidence in a hypothesis, though the absence of such evidence does not necessarily lead to its rejection. Doubly decisive The evidence is both unique and certain, and is regarded as necessary and sufficient for confirming or rejecting hypotheses. Used to confirm or reject hypotheses with certainty, since its evidence is both necessary and sufficient. Straw in the wind The evidence is indirect, neither unique nor certain, and not sufficient on its own for a definitive conclusion. Used to strengthen the probability of a particular explanation through indirect evidence, though this evidence alone is not enough for a conclusive judgment.

Abstract Problem and Research Background
Modern state theory was built around a geography of power. Territory, population, institutions and enforceable law gave public authority a place from which it could be recognized, limited and challenged. This territorial grammar has not disappeared. States still legislate, tax, educate, register, police and adjudicate within borders. However, it no longer explains the whole field of public power. A growing part of authority now moves through data systems, digital infrastructures, platform design, cross-border cloud services, identity frameworks and algorithmic decision-making. The state may still make law in a territorial setting, while governance effects are produced in digital spaces that do not neatly correspond to territorial jurisdiction.
This transformation creates a difficulty for Public Law. Classical accounts of Sovereignty usually linked authority to a politically organized space. The state was imagined as the place where law, coercion, legitimacy and accountability came together. Digital Governance unsettles this image. Code, interfaces, databases, automated classifications and platform rules may shape the citizen's legal position before any court, ministry or official appears. The problem is therefore not merely technological. It concerns the legal meaning of statehood, the changing relationship between authority and place, and the position of the citizen in a world where Digital Space and physical territory coexist. Existing discussions of network governance, platform power and algorithmic regulation have identified parts of this transformation. However, they have not always offered a theory of the state capable of explaining how Sovereignty continues, weakens and reappears under these conditions.
Research Objective
The article develops the concept of Dislocated Sovereignty as a public-law vocabulary for this evolving condition. The argument is not that territorial Sovereignty has ended, nor that private platforms have replaced the state. Those claims are too broad to capture legal reality. The stronger and more precise claim is that the state now works under a double condition. It remains territorial in form, jurisdiction, and constitutional imagination, but many of the mechanisms through which it governs data flows, platform architecture, algorithmic classification, digital identity systems, and infrastructural control operate across, beneath, or beyond territorial borders. Dislocated Sovereignty names this tension between the state's continuing territorial presence and the increasingly non-territorial settings in which public power is exercised.
Incorporate specific policy challenges and opportunities arising from 'Dislocated Sovereignty,' illustrating how this concept informs legal reforms and governance strategies, thereby engaging policymakers more directly.
Research Method
The research is analytical, conceptual and comparative. Its conceptual frame draws on Public Law theory, political sociology and selected debates in the philosophy of Sovereignty. Historical and conceptual accounts of the modern state are used to reconstruct the classical relation between territory and authority. Institutional and network theories help explain how power is distributed among public bodies, private actors, technical systems and human-machine arrangements. Genealogical and spatial approaches are also used to show why authority cannot be understood only by locating formal institutions. The comparative part of the article is selective rather than exhaustive. France, the European Union and Iran are not treated as equivalent cases. They are examined because each reveals a different legal response to the same underlying problem. France represents a republican effort to bring platform power back under public authority, especially through dignity-based regulation and child protection. The European Union shows how a non-classical legal order can construct a form of digital Sovereignty through data protection, fundamental rights and risk-based regulation of artificial intelligence. Iran illustrates a more difficult sovereignty gap: inherited territorial authority remains strong, but Digital Governance is still marked by coercive platform control, fragmented administrative systems and the absence of a fully developed theory of digital Public Law.
Research Findings
The article reaches five main findings. First, territory still matters, but it no longer exhausts the meaning of state authority. Borders continue to organize jurisdiction, institutional responsibility and political membership. At the same time, the actual routes of governance increasingly pass through technical, transnational infrastructures that are often privately designed or owned. This creates a gap between the legal locus of decision-making and the locus of its effects.
Second, law is losing part of its older visibility as the public language of authority. In digital environments, code, default settings, terms of service, access rules and automated classifications may influence behavior more directly than statutes or administrative regulations. This does not mean that law disappears. It means that Public Law must follow public power into databases, interfaces, portals, protocols and algorithmic systems.
Third, legitimacy is being displaced. In the classical model, legitimacy depended on constitutional authorization, representation, public reason and accountability. In platform environments, obedience often appears as user consent, interface dependence or infrastructural necessity. The user may seem to agree, but usually lacks any real capacity to negotiate the conditions of Digital Governance. This weak form of consent cannot replace public accountability.
Fourth, the citizen is increasingly positioned not only as a rights-holder, but also as a data subject, a platform user, and a digital addressee of public authority. This can improve access to services, but it can also lead to exclusion, opacity, and silent administrative harm when systems lack notice, human review, correction procedures, and effective remedies. Digital Citizenship therefore requires more than access to portals. It requires contestability, explanation, alternative routes and legal protection against system-based errors.
Fifth, comparative experience shows that Dislocated Sovereignty can be managed in different ways. France uses republican authority and dignity-based regulation to extend public values into platform environments. The European Union uses data protection, fundamental rights and market access to build a rights-based model of digital Sovereignty. Iran, by contrast, faces the unresolved task of transforming territorial command into accountable digital state capacity. Without such a transformation, the state risks being strong in formal authority but weak in trust, legitimacy and digital public law.
Conclusion
Dislocated Sovereignty is not a technological slogan. It is a public-law problem. It does not ask us to abandon the territorial state. It asks us to rethink the legal imagination of the state so that authority, accountability and dignity can survive when public power operates through Digital Space, data systems and algorithmic infrastructures. The state in the digital age cannot be only a machine of command, filtering or surveillance. It must be able to explain algorithmic decisions, protect the dignity of citizens' data, supervise platform power, provide remedies for digital exclusion, and preserve public reason in environments built for speed, prediction, and extraction.
For Iran, this problem is especially urgent. A state that lacks a coherent theory of digital Public Law may move between ineffective coercion and passive dependence on platforms. Dislocated Sovereignty offers a way out of that false choice. It invites a reconstruction of statehood around trust, legality, transparency, accountability, and Digital Citizenship. In this sense, the future of the state will not be secured by repeating inherited formulas of Sovereignty, but by building public-law institutions capable of governing non-territorial spaces without losing the public character of authority.
 

Abstract Problem Statement and Background Since the success and effectiveness of social and economic policies depend on the capabilities and capacities of governments, improving governance and strategizing government effectiveness are crucial keys to sustainable development, poverty reduction, and increased welfare. The concept of good governance emerged at the end of the 1990s, emphasizing a facilitative government model focused on enhancing public administration and delivering efficient and effective public services as the cornerstone of development. This research aims to explore comparative monitoring and evaluation systems, focusing on the good governance approach that emphasizes efficiency, responsiveness, and participation. It seeks to investigate how these systems enhance the capacity of policies and public institutions in selected countries. Monitoring and evaluation systems encompass organizational structures, management processes, standards, strategies, programs, indicators, information systems, and accountability mechanisms, enabling organizations to effectively implement performance monitoring and evaluation. These systems serve as valuable tools for policymakers to provide detailed evidence of policy efficiency or inefficiency and its underlying reasons, thereby equipping policymakers with feedback mechanisms to support evidence-based decision-making. Research Aim    This research aims to explore the political and economic context, institutional structures, and processes of establishing strategic monitoring and evaluation systems in countries with experience in creating and institutionalizing such systems, and those which are similar to Iran in terms of their welfare system. By studying the experiences of each country, the goal is to identify the underlying factors contributing to the growth and success of institutionalizing monitoring and evaluation systems in the governance of these countries. Methodology Using a qualitative approach and a comparative method, this research analyzes documents related to monitoring and evaluation systems in five countries: Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Vietnam, and Rwanda, including their indicators and characteristics. The research utilizes published documents related to monitoring and evaluation systems in different countries. The focus of the document analysis in this research is on countries that share more similarities with Iran in terms of their welfare typology. The data were analyzed using content analysis method. Findings The findings of the research indicate that since none of the systems have developed in a linear process and these systems are inherently complex and context-dependent, it is not possible to recommend a model for institutionalizing these systems in successful countries to other countries. Therefore, common factors contributing to the success of these systems in selected countries were extracted in five main themes: origin context, mission, legal framework, configuration, and application. Origin: the origin itself includes two sub-themes: 1- historical, political, and economic background, 2- turning points (turning points refer to specific events or key milestones that can play a prominent role in shaping the path of transformations). By reviewing the political background of countries that have a history of establishing and implementing monitoring and evaluation systems, it can be understood that one of the most frequent factors has been the regime change to democracy and thus the tendency to implement a series of reform actions after this change.  For example, the development root of monitoring and evaluation tools in Chile, Mexico, and Colombia was linked to the political transition of these countries to democracy. Additionally, issues related to political economy in countries such as Rwanda and Vietnam have shaped the formation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Furthermore, the turning point in establishing the monitoring and evaluation system in Colombia was the approval of a new constitution in 1991. Also, the first impact assessment related to the Oportunidades/Progresa Program was introduced as one of the most influential assessments in the world development and as a successful model, it has become an important turning point for the development of the Mexican system. Mission: Countries focused on several prominent goals such as improving resource allocation and efficient budgeting, performance management (of programs and organizations), policy effectiveness, transparency and accountability, reporting to donors, and poverty reduction when establishing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in their public administration processes. Legal framework The establishment of some of these systems was based on specific laws or detailed legal frameworks. Colombia is a good example of such systems. On the other hand, some monitoring and evaluation systems were implemented based on relatively flexible legal documents such as agreements, inter-institutional protocols, or mechanisms prescribed by annual budget laws, as seen in Chile and Mexico. System configuration: This research focuses on government-based systems (essentially aimed at improving program effectiveness and resource allocation). Document review indicates that in three countries - Chile, Mexico, and Rwanda - government monitoring and evaluation systems are centralized under the auspices of budgetary organizations (the Ministry of Finance of these countries). This theme encompasses five sub-themes: approach to monitoring and evaluation, organizational structure, leadership, stakeholders, and tools. Application: The experience of these countries shows that monitoring and evaluation help decision-making in one or two areas: firstly, decision-making regarding performance-based budgeting, improvement of resource allocation or government priorities for national or sectoral development plans; secondly, for managing the performance of programs, activities, and organizations; thirdly, for transparency, accountability, and social control. To extract a pattern from the monitoring and evaluation systems in the studied countries, six of the most fundamental success factors of these systems are summarized and presented in this research: The first point is that the implementation and establishment of systems should gradually and over time become ingrained within the government and governmental organizations. Initially, the cultural persuasion of the value of evaluation is more important than creating executive and operational mechanisms. The second point is that the path of creating, growing, and developing these systems has not been easy without challenges, and during that, encountering numerous unavoidable obstacles and difficulties is inevitable. Therefore, a strong determination, strong motivation, and high goals of leaders and statesmen, as well as the demand of civil society and the people, play a significant and unparalleled role. The third point is that the more diverse actors at different levels are involved in government monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, the more legitimate the system becomes, and its results become more valuable, acceptable, and effective. In fact, the value of evaluation knowledge depends on the quality of engagement of actors. The fourth point emphasizes that the effectiveness and sustainability of these systems depend on their ability to provide monitoring over the relationship between the allocated funds for each program and the results achieved from implementing that program through precise, comprehensive, and preventive performance indicators. Although this significantly depends on governments' approach to budgeting. The fifth point is the existence of support organizations that continuously produce systematic data for monitoring and evaluation systems by providing social and economic statistical information for the system and organizations based on scientific and reputable methods. The presence of these organizations alongside the system leads to the creation of a unified national database of valuable social, economic, and archival statistical information on changes in data and statistics in the country. Lastly, the sixth point emphasizes that if the findings of monitoring and evaluation systems create a field for governments to adopt evidence-based policymaking, provide effective public services, and allocate efficient resources, while promoting justice and social welfare, we will see a reduction in poverty rates and the population below the poverty line in countries. Because if we consider the fight against poverty as the most important political priority and ultimate goal of governments in policymaking, the presence of poverty in society is a sign of social policy failure and failure in achieving justice, and therefore reducing or increasing poverty can be considered as one of the most important indicators of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of government policies. Therefore, considering the above six points, and also considering that in countries that are almost similar to the welfare regime of Iran and relied on monitoring and evaluation systems, firstly, the quality of governance indicators has improved, and secondly, the poverty headcount ratio in these countries has decreased, it can be concluded that establishing continuous and regular monitoring and evaluation systems is the key solution to overcoming policy inefficiency or failure, public budget wastage, and raising hope and social trust in the country. Conclusion The study concludes that strategic monitoring and evaluation systems are essential instruments for strengthening good governance and improving public sector performance. However, their effectiveness depends on context-specific institutional arrangements rather than the adoption of a universal model. Political commitment, sound legal frameworks, organizational coordination, and integration with planning and budgeting processes support successful systems. The comparative analysis demonstrates that while countries differ in institutional design, effective M&E systems share common governance principles, including accountability, evidence-based decision-making, and continuous organizational learning. These findings provide practical insights for policymakers seeking to strengthen national governance systems and contribute to the comparative literature on monitoring and evaluation in public administration.

Abstract 1. Introduction
The failure of the idea of a minimal state, which had been considered since the early 1970s and whose inefficiency had become more apparent than ever, especially for developing countries, at the beginning of the 1980s, led to the idea of an efficient state once again attracting the attention of theorists and the concept of "state capacity" being considered, which focuses solely on the capability and efficiency of the state and is defined as the ability of the state to achieve its goals. Studying state capacity in Iran is necessary in this respect because, in addition to the dependence of development processes on state capacity, Iran's historical experience shows that the state has always faced structural challenges such as dependence on oil revenues, weakness in the tax system, institutional fragility, etc. Given these conditions, a systematic analysis of state capacity can help clarify the strengths and weaknesses of Iran's governance structure. Accordingly, the trend of state capacity in Iran will be examined to answer two questions:
Research Question(s)
What has been the trend of state capacity in Iran?
Which of the Iranian states has performed better in terms of state capacity?

2. Literature Review
Hanson and Sigman (2021), reviewing various definitions, defined state capacity as the ability of a state to perform the main functions that are usually considered essential for modern states: protection against external threats, maintaining internal order, and administering and providing the basic infrastructure necessary to maintain economic activity and extract revenue. They also focused on two conditions to introduce indicators for measuring state capacity: 1) they are necessary for carrying out the tasks of contemporary states and 2) they are reasonably distinct from each other. Emphasizing these two conditions, they introduced three dimensions for measuring state capacity: extractive capacity, coercive capacity, and administrative capacity.
Accordingly, the conceptual model of the present study was designed based on Hanson and Sigman's theoretical framework, which considers state capacity as a composite indicator consisting of the three extractive, coercive, and administrative dimensions. In this model, each dimension is measured with a set of quantitative indicators, and finally a composite index of state capacity is calculated. This model, by considering the overlap and interaction between the three dimensions, allows for a comprehensive and multidimensional analysis of state capacity in Iran. It is expected that improving each of these dimensions will lead to improving the overall state capacity and that the relationship between these dimensions will be synergistic, such that high levels of extractive and coercive capacity will pave the way for the development of administrative capacity and vice versa.
3. Methodology
The time series technique has been used to examine the trend of state capacity in Iran in the period 1989-2024; Time series are of great importance in political science and policy-making, because they establish a link between the past and the future and, using patterns and sequences of past events, provide a picture of the longitudinal trends of the issues under study. This process includes continuous or discrete quantitative data that are related to specific moments in time and are examined in statistical studies of their distribution.
To determine the best performance among the states in the period of interest, which includes five states, the technique of comparing means has been used; the test used is the comparison of means of independent groups. In this test, the difference between variables can be generalized and compared if it has a state of similarity with its own group and distinction with other groups.
4. Results
The composite index of state capacity, affected by the downward trend of its three constituent indicators, has had a cyclical and downward trend: the improvement in the initial part encountered the unfavorable situation in 1991 and then reached its best state with an upward trend; but the downward trend continued continuously after 1998, causing the index to be downward in the time series to appear. It is necessary to also consider the fluctuation caused by the Corona pandemic in 2020, which has caused an increase in the downward trend in the end of the time series.
In summary, the answer to the first research question regarding the trend of state capacity in Iran (1989 to 2024) is that state capacity in Iran has had a cyclical downward trend, meaning that there have been numerous ups and downs in the time series of state capacity in Iran, but the downward trends have been more than the upward trends, and for this reason, state capacity in Iran has been declining during the period studied.
Also, based on the average composite index of state capacity, which is the result of the performance of the states under review during their presidential terms, the Eslahat state had the best performance with an average of 58 and was ranked first alone. The two Mehr and Sazandegi states were ranked second with similar averages and their performance was similar to each other. The Etidal state was ranked third, and the Mardomi state was ranked last, which recorded the lowest performance in state capacity.
5. Discussion
According to the theoretical framework of the research, the capacity of the state in Iran has been challenged simultaneously from three aspects: insufficient financial resources (extractive capacity) that have been affected by sanctions, the decline in coercive capacity, which means a decrease in the state's ability to manage social conflicts and prevent hostilities among citizens, and finally, weakness in professional bureaucracy and policy implementation (administrative capacity). This situation shows that the main problem is not simply a lack of revenue or administrative inefficiency, but rather a vicious cycle is forming that has weakened the three dimensions simultaneously. The continuation of this trend could lead to a decrease in the state's ability to achieve development goals, increased social dissatisfaction, and a greater fragility of the governance system.
6. Conclusion
The results of the study confirm that state capacity is a multidimensional and dynamic phenomenon whose dimensions interact and reinforce each other. Extractive capacity is a prerequisite for strengthening coercive and administrative capacity, and without sufficient financial resources, it is not possible to maintain security, effectively manage the territory, and provide public services. Appropriate administrative capacity can also increase the legitimacy of the state and increase the efficiency of using extracted resources.
These results have important implications for policymaking. It seems that the main priority for improving state capacity in Iran should focus on reforming the tax structure, reducing dependence on oil, strengthening professional bureaucratic institutions, and creating accountability and transparency mechanisms. In addition, improving coercive capacity requires combining the effectiveness of security tools with mechanisms of persuasion and social participation in order to maintain political order and stability at the lowest social cost. Finally, returning to the path of improving state capacity in Iran requires a comprehensive and coordinated look at the three extractive, coercive, and administrative dimensions and designing policies that strengthen these dimensions simultaneously.

Abstract Introduction The digitalization of societies has transformed governance structures and reshaped the way they are organized. In this context, emerging technologies have not only influenced how the world operates but have also revolutionized the use of modern tools to manage democratic processes and political engagement. Accordingly, parliaments, as the highest representative institutions in a democracy, need to reform their traditional methods to align with public demands and serve as pillars of stability and trust during times of political, security, and economic crises. In this process, data plays a fundamental role. Thus, moving toward a "smart parliament" is essential. Achieving "smart parliaments"—whose main goals are enhancing transparency, increasing accountability, facilitating public participation in policymaking and implementation, and improving the efficiency of legislative and oversight processes—requires a positive approach toward new technologies and their adoption as effective tools in the development of governance systems. In this regard, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, as a legislative body and representative of the people, can play a fundamental role in increasing the quality of governance by making its processes smarter. Although some measures have been taken, such as the approval of the Transparency Law and the launch of crowdfunding systems for laws, policy studies and past experiences show that there are serious gaps in achieving effective citizen participation in the legislative process.This research, therefore, seeks to analyze existing executive policies, identify current challenges, and propose a comprehensive model for leveraging technological capacities and enhancing public participation in order to advance smart legislative governance. Attaining this framework can lead to greater transparency, strengthened social capital, more participatory decision-making processes, and ultimately, improved efficiency and democratization of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Overall, the main objective of this study is to present a comprehensive and practical framework for utilizing technological potential and public participation to smarten parliamentary governance. Materials and Methods The present study is a qualitative research conducted within an interpretive-constructivist paradigm, utilizing the meta-synthesis strategy based on the seven-stage model proposed by Sandelowski et al. (2007). The research population includes two main sections: Scientific documents: Including articles, books, and theses published between 2011 and 2025 (1390 to 1403 in the Iranian calendar and 2000 to 2024 in the Gregorian calendar); Focus groups: Including university professors, researchers in the field of smart parliament studies, managers from the Research Center of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and experts from the Legal Affairs Department of the Parliament. In line with the meta-synthesis approach, purposive sampling was applied to both scientific documents and participants. As a result, 27 studies were selected for document analysis. Additionally, the snowball sampling method was used to identify suitable individuals for participation, leading to a final sample of 13 experts. Sampling adequacy was ensured using the theoretical sampling method, meaning the process continued until data saturation was achieved. To ensure the validity of the study, Lincoln and Guba's (1985) criteria—credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability—were employed. Credibility was achieved through systematic data analysis and continuous review of findings, while dependability was ensured through precise documentation and regular data verification. After completing the meta-synthesis and extracting the components of a smart governance framework with an emphasis on public participation, these components were discussed in focus group sessions. The findings were then adapted to the context of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Iran's Parliament), and practical and operational recommendations were developed in line with the proposed framework. These recommendations were refined through iterative feedback and revisions. Results and Discussion The present study was conducted with the aim of providing a framework for smart governance focusing on public participation in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Based on the results obtained, 4 main categories and 19 subcategories were identified in the form of 60 concepts based on the meta-synthesis method. Based on the results of the present study, four categories: 1- Convergence and coordination at the governance level, 2- Division of institutional work in different parts of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, 3- Facilitation and encouragement of participation and interaction with society and citizens, and 4- Determination of tasks and necessary measures in order to develop the smart governance platform, were considered as functional dimensions affecting capacity building in smart parliamentary governance. In the areas of citizen participation in smart governance, five areas appropriate to the parliament were identified and refined by the focus group, which include 1) Participation in problem identification and prioritization, 2) Formulation and formation of laws, 3) Evaluation of approvals, 4) Monitoring and evaluation of law implementation, and 5) Demanding and strengthening the function of representation. Another component of the framework presented was the levels of citizen participation in smart governance, which was examined from four aspects: 1) transparency and awareness of citizens, 2) consultation and feedback from citizens, 3) cooperation and involvement of citizens, and 4) empowerment and delegation of decision-making to citizens. The platforms for realizing public participation in smart governance of the Islamic Consultative Assembly are one of the important components of the presented framework, which includes six systems: 1) Transparency system of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, 2) Participation system in problem identification, 3) Citizen participation system in legislation, 4) Law Observatory, 5) Public communication system with representatives, and 6) Integrated public monitoring system. These systems have been proposed as a complement to the framework extracted from scientific literature and with the aim of adapting it to the conditions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Conclusion Smart governance with a focus on public participation in the Islamic Consultative Assembly requires creating appropriate platforms for citizen engagement with legislative, oversight, and policymaking processes. Achieving this goal requires providing prerequisites that, while strengthening the institutional capacity of the Assembly, pave the way for greater transparency, efficiency, and accountability. Also, it can be concluded that legal, supervisory and functional capacity building in the parliament will not only increase the efficiency and transparency of policies, but also provide the possibility of direct interaction of the people with the legislative body and will lead to the improvement of smart governance, promotion of social capital, increase of public trust and strengthening of the efficiency of the decision-making system.

Abstract Introduction
This article critically examines the approach of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in attributing international responsibility to states for actions conducted "on behalf of" another state. Against the backdrop of increasing intergovernmental cooperation in areas such as migration control and multinational military operations, the question of accountability for human rights violations has emerged as a pivotal challenge. The primary objective of this study is to evaluate the efficacy of the Court’s "exclusive control" doctrine in ensuring state accountability and to identify gaps in its jurisprudence. The central research question asks whether the Court’s adherence to the exclusive control criterion, aligned with Article 6 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, sufficiently safeguards human rights in contexts of shared governance or indirect state influence. The hypothesis posits that while this stringent approach ensures legal clarity, it risks creating accountability vacuums and necessitates a paradigm shift toward recognizing "shared responsibility" based on effective influence and complementary obligations.
Research Question(s)
How does the ECtHR navigate the attribution of responsibility when states act on behalf of others, and does its reliance on the "exclusive control" test sufficiently uphold human rights accountability under the ECHR? 
Literature Review
The theoretical framework of this study is rooted in Article 6 of the ILC’s 2001 Articles, which predicates responsibility on a state’s "exclusive direction and control" over an organ or agent. The ECtHR has consistently applied this principle, as seen in cases like *Jaloud v. Netherlands* and *Al-Skeini v. UK*, where responsibility was attributed to states exercising direct operational and hierarchical control. Conversely, in cases such as *Pad v. Turkey* and *Behrami v. France*, the Court declined attribution due to insufficient institutional integration or exclusive control. 
Critics, including scholars like Milanović, argue that the Court’s narrow focus on formal control overlooks structural power imbalances and indirect influence mechanisms (e.g., economic coercion or political dependency), enabling states to outsource human rights violations while retaining de facto authority. Alternative frameworks, such as "shared responsibility" and "complementary obligations" (under Article 16 of the ILC Articles), emphasize accountability for states exerting effective influence, even absent direct control. These critiques highlight tensions between legal formalism and the realities of modern transnational governance. 
Methodology
This study employs a theoretical and comparative legal analysis of key ECtHR rulings in intergovernmental cooperation cases. Four landmark cases—*X and Y v. Switzerland*, *Xhavara v. Italy and Albania*, *Vearncombe v. UK and Germany*, and *Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain*—are examined as case studies. These cases are analyzed through the lens of attribution criteria (e.g., exclusive control, institutional integration, and operational authority) and their alignment with the ILC’s principles. Dissenting judicial opinions and scholarly critiques are incorporated to identify unresolved tensions in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
Results
The findings reveal the ECtHR’s unwavering reliance on the "exclusive control" threshold for attribution. For instance, in *X and Y v. Switzerland*, the Court attributed responsibility solely to Switzerland, as its authorities enforced domestic laws without delegating sovereign powers to Liechtenstein. Similarly, in *Xhavara v. Italy and Albania*, Italy was held solely accountable for maritime operations, as it retained full operational command despite a bilateral agreement with Albania. 
However, this approach falters in cases involving indirect control or structural influence. In *Drozd and Janousek*, the Court absolved France and Spain of responsibility for unfair trials in Andorra, despite their constitutional roles as co-princes, due to the absence of direct judicial oversight. This decision drew criticism from dissenting judges, who warned of a "responsibility vacuum" enabling powerful states to evade accountability through legal fictions. 
The study also demonstrates the Court’s nuanced recognition of "secondary obligations" in cases of complicity. For example, in *El-Masri v. Macedonia*, North Macedonia was held liable for facilitating CIA renditions, underscoring the distinction between primary attribution and obligations to refrain from aiding violations. While this approach mitigates some gaps, it remains insufficient to address systemic issues arising from indirect governance or coercive influence. 
Discussion
 The ECtHR’s rigid adherence to the "exclusive control" doctrine underscores a fundamental tension in international human rights law: the clash between legal predictability and the need for adaptive accountability mechanisms in an era of complex state interactions. While the Court’s formalism ensures consistency and guards against arbitrary attributions, it risks legitimizing structural inequities. For instance, powerful states may exploit legal loopholes to outsource rights-violating operations to subordinate actors or third parties, as seen in Drozd and Janousek, where France and Spain evaded accountability despite their constitutional authority over Andorran institutions.
This rigidity also disregards the evolving nature of state influence, where control is increasingly exercised through economic leverage, political dependency, or institutional coercion rather than direct command. Milanović’s critique of the Court’s blindness to "neo-colonial" dynamics—where states like Italy or the UK exert indirect control through migration agreements or security partnerships—resonates here. The Inter-American Court’s advisory opinion on environmental harm, which recognizes extraterritorial responsibility for corporate actions funded by states, offers a counter-model. By contrast, the ECtHR’s reluctance to address such indirect influence perpetuates accountability gaps, particularly in transnational contexts like border externalization or privatized detention systems.
The Court’s recognition of "secondary obligations" in cases like El-Masri and Al Nashiri v. Romania signals a partial shift toward holistic accountability. However, this remains reactive and fragmented, focusing on complicity rather than systemic prevention. A more robust framework would integrate the ILC’s broader interpretation of "direction and control" (Article 17), which includes coercive inducement, and embrace "shared responsibility" to reflect the interconnectedness of modern governance. For example, in migration control operations, both funding states (e.g., EU members) and implementing states (e.g., Libya) should bear responsibility for systemic violations, irrespective of direct control.
Conclusion
The ECtHR’s attribution framework, though grounded in clear and predictable principles of international law, faces limitations in addressing the complexities of modern intergovernmental cooperation. While the "exclusive control" criterion safeguards state responsibility coherence, it struggles to ensure accountability in contexts of shared governance, structural influence, or systemic harm (e.g., transnational security cooperation or border control). 
This study advocates for a paradigm shift inspired by the ILC’s broader interpretation of "direction and control" and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ progressive stance on extraterritorial obligations. Recognizing "shared responsibility" and "complementary obligations" would require states to account for effective influence, even without direct operational control, and to prevent human rights violations within collaborative frameworks. Such evolution would align the ECtHR with global human rights trends, close accountability gaps, and strengthen protections in an era of transnational interdependence. 
Ultimately, balancing legal formalism with pragmatic flexibility is key to achieving equitable accountability under the European Convention on Human Rights. By integrating principles of effective influence and systemic prevention, the Court can uphold its mandate to protect human rights while adapting to the realities of 21st-century governance. 
Keywords: Exclusive attribution, Complementary obligations, European Court of Human Rights, International Law Commission, Responsibility, Direction and control.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank professors and colleagues at the University of Qom’s Law Faculty for their analytical feedback during the initial research stages. Gratitude is extended to the university’s law library for providing access to specialized resources and international databases. Special thanks to the anonymous peer reviewers whose insights significantly enhanced the quality of this work.

Abstract Research Problem and Background The United Arab Emirates (UAE), as one of the Persian Gulf countries, has succeeded in positioning itself at the forefront of transformation and development despite possessing a non-democratic political system and a traditional authoritarian system of governance. By adopting distinctive development strategies, the country has achieved remarkable economic progress. Against this background, the central research question of the present study is: How have the governing elites in the United Arab Emirates contributed to the realization of economic development? This study is based on the hypothesis that the governing elites of the United Arab Emirates have played a decisive role in promoting economic development by forming a cohesive governing elite coalition, adopting diverse fiscal, trade, and investment policies, and ensuring the rapid implementation of government decisions. These measures have significantly contributed to improving the country's economic development indicators and sustaining economic growth. This research is conducted within the theoretical framework of Peter Evans's Developmental State Theory. Evans emphasizes the role of an efficient bureaucracy and development-oriented elites in the process of development and argues that successful states create the institutional capacity required for industrial and economic development through institutional cohesion and close linkages with society. His principal argument is that certain states, by relying on development-oriented elites, facilitate collective action and create the conditions necessary for development through strategic investment in infrastructure. Within this framework, the governing elite coalition constitutes one of the principal determinants of the success of developmental states. The existing literature indicates that numerous studies have examined the role of the state in economic development. Evans (2004), Kohli (2004), among others, emphasize the importance of state capacity and development-oriented elites in the development process. Likewise, studies on the United Arab Emirates (e.g., Al-Khatib et al., 2021; and Ulrichsen, 2012) have primarily focused on economic growth, economic diversification, and human development indicators. Nevertheless, relatively few studies have directly examined the role of the governing elite coalition within Evans's theoretical framework in relation to the UAE's development policies. The present study seeks to fill this gap in the existing literature. Research Objectives The primary objective of this study is to analyze the role and strategies of the governing elites in the economic development of the United Arab Emirates based on Peter Evans's theoretical perspective. Research Method This study adopts a descriptive–analytical research method. The data were collected from library resources, scholarly articles, policy documents issued by the UAE government, and international statistical reports published by the World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The theoretical framework of the study is based on Peter Evans's Developmental State Theory, with particular emphasis on the concept of embedded autonomy. Within this framework, the roles of state institutions, bureaucratic coherence, and the governing elite coalition in the process of economic development are examined. Research Findings Within the theoretical framework adopted in this study, economic development is defined as a multidimensional process that extends beyond the quantitative growth of gross domestic product (GDP). It encompasses structural transformation of the economy, increased productivity, improved resource allocation, enhanced employment, and the strengthening of the state's institutional capacity. In this context, the state, as the central actor in the development process, plays a decisive role in directing development through macroeconomic policymaking, economic regulation, and the establishment of institutional infrastructure. According to Developmental State Theory, an efficient bureaucracy, institutional cohesion, and the presence of development-oriented elites constitute the principal prerequisites for achieving sustainable economic growth. According to Peter Evans's analytical framework, the developmental state is characterized by embedded autonomy. This concept refers to the state's ability to maintain institutional autonomy from particularistic interests while simultaneously establishing strong structural and institutional linkages with society and the private sector. This model is realized through four complementary state roles—**custodian, demiurge, midwife, and husbandry**—which collectively facilitate industrial and economic development. The findings of the study indicate that the United Arab Emirates possesses the principal characteristics of a developmental state. Prior to the 1950s, the country's economy was based on a limited subsistence structure. However, following the discovery of oil and the establishment of the federation in 1971, the country entered a period of rapid economic transformation. In subsequent stages, the government's overarching development strategy focused on economic diversification, reducing dependence on oil revenues, and strengthening the non-oil sectors of the economy. Analysis of macroeconomic indicators demonstrates that, over recent decades, the United Arab Emirates has achieved significant growth in gross domestic product, foreign direct investment (FDI), and human development indicators. The findings further indicate that the economic development of the United Arab Emirates is the direct outcome of the formation and continuity of a cohesive governing elite coalition within the country's federal monarchical system. By combining traditional sources of legitimacy rooted in tribal structures with modern institutions of governance, the UAE government has succeeded in establishing a high degree of socio-political stability. The governance structure of the United Arab Emirates combines centralized authority at the federal level with the relative autonomy of the individual emirates. This institutional arrangement has facilitated rapid decision-making, centralized policymaking, and the coordinated implementation of development programs. The coalition among the governing elites of the principal emirates—particularly Abu Dhabi and Dubai—has played a significant role in maintaining political stability and ensuring the continuity of development policies. The development strategies adopted by the governing elites have been formulated and implemented within the framework of the country's national vision documents. These strategic frameworks aim to enhance global competitiveness, diversify the national economy, expand non-oil exports, and strengthen an innovation-driven economy. They have also contributed to improving coordination between state institutions and the private sector. The UAE government has implemented a coordinated package of development policies in various fields, including: Fiscal policies; Monetary policies; Trade policies; Investment policies; Privatization policies. Finally, the development of advanced technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), e-government, and the knowledge-based economy has also played an important role in the structural transformation of the country's economy. Conclusion Overall, the experience of the United Arab Emirates demonstrates that, in developing countries, a coalition of development-oriented governing elites can play a pivotal role in accelerating structural transformation and achieving sustainable economic growth. This finding supports Peter Evans's argument that a developmental state must simultaneously possess two essential characteristics: an efficient bureaucracy and governing elites that pursue developmental objectives through close engagement with society.  From the perspective of Peter Evans's theoretical framework, the United Arab Emirates exhibits the principal characteristics of a developmental state. The country's governing elites, which have achieved high rates of economic growth and successful structural transformation, have created the institutional capacity required for national development through the formation of a cohesive coalition of development-oriented leaders and the establishment of strategic relationships with citizens and the business sector. Accordingly, the experience of the United Arab Emirates indicates that institutional capacity, coherent policymaking, and the strategic orientation of governing elites have collectively enabled the state to realize rapid economic development. The findings of this study therefore support Evans's proposition that development is not determined solely by economic resources; rather, it depends fundamentally on the state's institutional capabilities, bureaucratic effectiveness, and the capacity of development-oriented elites to formulate and implement coherent long-term development strategies.

Abstract One of the most fundamental topics discussed in the process of public policy is problemology. The mechanism of identifying and prioritizing public issues is one of the essentials of correct and efficient policy making, which frees policymakers from superficial, one-dimensional and short-term views and shapes public demand. If a problem is not identified correctly and for various reasons; such as personal and group interests, to be preferred over more important and effective public problem, or even to be incomplete and misunderstood; It will not only reduce the effectiveness of the political system, but it will also affect future policies; Because misrecognition of the problem will affect its policy making and will not produce a favorable result. One of the most important types of problems is the unstructured or wicked problems. The concept of " wicked problems " has been used in the literature of social, economic and management sciences since the 1970s, and has been greatly expanded since then. Some of the most important public policy problems in Iran have more or less resembled malignant issues. Issues such as the environment and water, the banking system, the tax system, the state of pension funds and exiting the recession have serious similarities to the wicked problems. The literature and knowledge generated on wicked problems can help improve our understanding of public policy in this area.
These problems, which challenge governance structures, skill bases and current organizational capacities, require deep understanding by governments. Recognizing and analyzing such issues requires the use of multiple viewpoints and analyzes far from superficiality. Facing such problems, there is no opportunity for trial and error, and every attempt to solve the problem has heavy consequences, especially when there is no set of solutions. Although the term " wicked problems " is widely used in many fields of research today, there is no consensus on its theoretical foundations and its application to research. With the development and increasing complexity of the systems, it becomes necessary to create special mechanisms of governance, which is referred to as the governance of problems, and in order to maintain a responsive system to solve problems, governments need such governance, which uses people's participation and methods. Reflectors of the issues should act better. Governance of issues is a new type of social construction in the field of problem solving, power play and stakeholder participation. The governance of problems pays more attention to complicated problems, and the emergence of its concept was related to the inefficiency of solving problems, which caused the necessity of governing problems. Therefore, when the governance of problems is mentioned, it mainly refers to wicked problem. The purpose of this article is to study and review the existing literature in the field of wicked problems to lead to the creation of a framework including concepts, approaches and governance in this field. For this purpose, the current research is based on a systematic review method on the existing research in this field. For this purpose, a large number of articles with the title of wicked problems were selected from reliable databases such as Google scholar, Science direct, Springer, Web of Science. Then among them, the articles that had the keywords Wicked problems, Unstructured problems and Wicked problems governance were selected and the rest were discarded. Among the remaining studies, 4 studies with richer literature were selected. The results showed that the concept of wicked problems is often associated with social pluralism (interests and values of multiple stakeholders), institutional complexity and scientific uncertainty. Also, the governance related to such issues becomes necessary due to the complexity and increase in the number of problems, change in the way of people's participation and pluralism of vision. In other words, it is necessary to improve the fields of knowledge about wicked problems in a system, to deal with the underlying causes of such issues, and to improve the cooperation of stakeholders in the governance of these problems. The main strategies for responding wicked problems include: avoidance and denial, mandatory controls, management of small problems, technocratic problem solving, gradual adjustment, stakeholder cooperation, and prevention. Finally, in order to implement the governance of wicked problems in organizations, three factors of policies, interactions and conflicts of political and social stakeholders, and research and development mechanisms should be taken into consideration.