State Studies

Abstract Introduction Cultural organizations are among the most important instruments for achieving cultural, social, and identity-related objectives in contemporary societies. They play a critical role in implementing cultural policies and fostering cultural and social capital. In Iran, numerous cultural institutions have been established over the past decades, and considerable resources have been allocated to the cultural sector. Nevertheless, questions have continually been raised regarding the effectiveness of these institutions, the alignment between their missions and actual performance, and their capacity to respond to ongoing social and cultural transformations. Changes in citizens’ lifestyles, the expansion of communication technologies, increasing diversity of cultural preferences, and the emergence of new actors in the cultural sphere have intensified the need to reconsider the structures, processes, and governance mechanisms of cultural organizations. In this context, the Tehran Municipality Cultural and Artistic Organization, as one of the largest and most extensive cultural institutions in the country, represents an appropriate case for examining both the capacities and challenges of cultural organizations due to its broad network of cultural centers, diversity of activities, and direct engagement with citizens. Purpose The main objective of this study is to diagnose the Tehran Municipality Cultural and Artistic Organization and identify its principal capacities, challenges, and organizational shortcomings. Drawing upon the experiences and perspectives of managers, experts, and scholars familiar with the organization, the study seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of its current situation and to identify the key factors affecting organizational performance at strategic, structural, managerial, and operational levels. Furthermore, the study aims to reveal broader challenges commonly faced by cultural organizations in Iran and to provide insights that may contribute to improving cultural management and policymaking. Method This study employed a qualitative research design using thematic analysis as its methodological framework. Data were collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews with 32 participants, including current and former senior managers, middle managers, organizational experts, and scholars familiar with the organization and the broader field of cultural management. Participants were selected through purposive sampling, and data collection continued until theoretical saturation was reached. All interviews were transcribed, coded, and systematically analyzed to identify basic, organizing, and overarching themes. To enhance the credibility of the findings, participants with diverse professional backgrounds and experiences were included, allowing the phenomenon to be examined from multiple perspectives. Findings The findings indicate that the Tehran Municipality Cultural and Artistic Organization possesses several significant strengths and capacities. These include an extensive network of cultural centers across the city, direct access to citizens, accumulated executive experience developed over decades of operation, a wide range of cultural and artistic activities, and access to specialized human resources. At the same time, the organization faces a set of interconnected challenges. The most important of these include ambiguity regarding its mission and organizational identity, a lack of consensus about its core purpose and role within the city’s cultural management system, weak strategic coherence, a gap between official plans and actual implementation, managerial instability caused by frequent leadership changes, excessive centralization, and limited autonomy at local levels. The findings also reveal weaknesses in the performance evaluation system, particularly the predominance of quantitative and activity-based indicators over assessments of cultural outcomes and impacts. Additional challenges include inadequate knowledge management and documentation practices, insufficient transfer of organizational learning across managerial periods, human resource management problems, the absence of clear professional development pathways, financial constraints, a high proportion of personnel expenditures, bureaucratic administrative and financial procedures, and weaknesses in audience analysis and cultural needs assessment. The study further demonstrates that many of these challenges are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, creating cumulative effects on organizational performance and effectiveness. Conclusion The findings suggest that a considerable proportion of the organization’s challenges originate from structural, managerial, and strategic factors. Consequently, merely increasing resources or expanding activities is unlikely to improve organizational effectiveness. Addressing these challenges requires a reconsideration of the organization’s mission and governance arrangements, greater managerial stability, increased delegation of authority to local units, the establishment of a comprehensive knowledge management system, reforms in human resource management, the development of systematic audience research mechanisms, and a shift from activity-oriented evaluation toward the assessment of cultural outcomes and impacts. Overall, the study indicates that the future effectiveness of the organization depends largely on its ability to move beyond routine program administration toward a model of cultural governance grounded in strategic orientation, evidence-informed decision-making, organizational learning, and results-based management. Leveraging existing organizational capacities while addressing identified challenges can strengthen the organization’s contribution to the cultural development of Tehran and enhance the effectiveness of cultural institutions in Iran.

Abstract Introduction The collapse of the Safavid state in 1722, after more than two centuries of rule, remains a central problem in Iranian history. A state that had established a relatively durable political order and reached a high point under Shah Abbas I was defeated by a comparatively small tribal insurgent force. Existing explanations have emphasized the personal weaknesses of Shah Sultan Husain, the confinement of princes, court extravagance, growing clerical influence, and the declining position of the Qizilbash military. Although these interpretations identify important developments, treating them as separate causes does not fully explain their interactions or why a seemingly enduring order lost the capacity and willingness to defend itself. This article approaches the Fall of the Safavids through Natural State Theory, developed by Douglass North and his colleagues. In this framework, a natural state is governed by a Dominant Coalition of powerful political, military, economic, and religious actors who cooperate to generate and distribute rents while competing over their allocation. The distribution of economic benefits must remain broadly compatible with the distribution of political power and the capacity for violence. This principle of double balance connects the cohesion of the coalition to the control of violence and offers a framework for considering the longer Development Process. Research Objective The study seeks to interpret political and economic changes in the Safavid Dominant Coalition from the death of Shah Abbas I in 1629 to the surrender of Isfahan in 1722. Rather than presenting a list of immediate causes of collapse, it examines how rent generation, the composition of the coalition, the role of the monarch, and the position of the militaries changed across successive reigns. It also considers whether changes in administration, territorial control, and elite organization moved the Safavid state toward more developed forms of the natural state and how the Safavid experience contributed to Iran’s subsequent Development Process. Research Method The research employs a qualitative, library-based historical method grounded in the analysis of chronicles, travel accounts, historical documents, and secondary scholarship. Evidence concerning land tenure, taxation, trade, court expenditure, military organization, appointments, rebellions, and relations among elites is interpreted through the concepts of Natural State Theory. The analysis follows the reigns of Shah Safi I, Shah Abbas II, Shah Suleyman, and Shah Sultan Husain, while using the political and economic configuration inherited from Shah Abbas I as its point of comparison. It also compares the initial formation, consolidation, and subsequent weakening of the Safavid Dominant Coalition. The approach is interpretive: it reconstructs relationships between incentives, rents, and violence rather than claiming to estimate their causal effects statistically. Research Findings At the end of Shah Abbas I’s reign, the Safavid Dominant Coalition combined a powerful monarch with tribal commanders, salaried military forces, provincial governors, bureaucrats, religious authorities, and a more limited presence of merchants and other specialists. Reforms had reduced the exclusive position of Qizilbash commanders, increased the role of royal military slaves, expanded crown lands, and strengthened central administration. Military and economic interests were sufficiently balanced to sustain a substantial flow of rents, limit elite conflict, and support internal security. Under Shah Safi I and Shah Abbas II, disputes and royal violence did not destroy this arrangement. Considerable economic resources, continuing trade, and an established administrative apparatus helped preserve the coalition despite periodic struggles over appointments and authority. Over time, however, the internal distribution of influence shifted. The palace establishment, especially the eunuchs, and the Shiite religious authorities acquired increasing power; bureaucrats also initially benefited from centralization. By contrast, the political standing, salaries, and numbers of military forces declined. Under Shah Suleyman, court actors increasingly influenced succession and important decisions, while the monarch’s role as an arbiter among the members of the Dominant Coalition weakened. Under Shah Sultan Husain, the king became primarily associated with the interests of the palace and influential clerics rather than acting as a guarantor of the coalition as a whole. Militaries lost both material incentives and influence over collective decisions, while rivalry among courtiers, clerics, administrators, and commanders impeded effective responses to threats. The decline in the resources available to coalition members intensified these tensions. The proliferation of elite households and positions increased the number of claimants to rents. Rising palace expenditure, fiscal exactions, insecurity on trade routes, pressure on agricultural producers, and disruptions to commerce reduced or strained the revenues that could be distributed. Because land-related revenues formed the principal fiscal foundation of the state, expanding expenditure could not easily be financed by equivalent growth in income. The resulting decline in rents per coalition member undermined cooperation and upset the double balance between economic rewards and political or military influence. Some salaried soldiers turned to extortion or predation, while tribal forces retained the capacity to mobilize violence outside effective central control. The Ghilzai uprising exposed rather than independently created the breakdown of the Dominant Coalition. Provincial and tribal actors could anticipate greater benefits from rebellion than from maintaining the existing order. During the approach to and siege of Isfahan, competition within the Safavid leadership obstructed military coordination. Some elite members regarded the attackers as a potential means of reallocating offices and rents rather than as an existential threat to their collective position. Consequently, the Safavid state collapsed without an effective unified defense, and the conquerors were unable to establish an immediately durable replacement coalition. Conclusion Natural State Theory helps explain the Fall of the Safavids as the outcome of a cumulative deterioration in the political and economic foundations of the Dominant Coalition, not simply the personal failings of the last shah or the military superiority of the insurgents. The weakening of the monarch’s coordinating role, the uneven redistribution of power, declining rents per member, and the persistence of independently capable tribal forces jointly made the coalition increasingly fragile. The Safavid period nevertheless featured developments relevant to the Development Process, including reduced internal warfare, expanded bureaucracy, greater centralization, and a wider range of participating elites. These advances did not establish the conditions for a basic or mature natural state, particularly because coercive organizations remained fragmented and reliable constraints on rulers and elite relations were limited. At the same time, the Safavids’ prolonged rule over much of Iran and their contribution to political integration provided an important historical foundation for later state formation. The Iranian case also points to a limitation in explanations derived mainly from European experience: repeated pressure from mobile, armed tribal groups could reverse institutional consolidation and reproduce fragile natural states even after significant periods of centralization.

Abstract Introduction In recent decades, the scale and nature of political tensions and conflicts have changed considerably. Alongside interstate disputes, intrastate and local conflicts, particularly those involving competing political-administrative territories, have gained increasing importance. Population growth, rising demand for natural resources and economic opportunities, ethnic and cultural differences, spatial inequalities, and changes in the political management of national territory are among the principal factors contributing to these conflicts. In this context, administrative divisions constitute a fundamental framework for the political organization of space and the exercise of state authority. Their structure can either facilitate territorial cooperation or intensify competition among neighboring areas. When administrative boundaries reflect geographical conditions, social relationships, cultural characteristics, economic linkages, and functional interdependencies, they can improve public service delivery, promote equitable resource allocation, and support balanced regional development. Conversely, territorial arrangements that disregard local realities may reinforce perceptions of discrimination, administrative fragmentation, local rivalries, and centrifugal tendencies. Previous studies have examined several dimensions of these problems, including spatial inequality, boundary disputes, place identity, competition over resources, and weaknesses in local governance. Nevertheless, a comprehensive framework linking the principal sources of territorial tension to appropriate management strategies remains necessary. The central problem addressed in this study is therefore to identify the sources of tension and conflict between political-administrative territories and explain the mechanisms through which these conflicts can be managed at national and regional-local levels. Research Objective The primary objective of this study is to identify and classify the sources and determinants of tension and conflict between political-administrative territories and develop a systematic conceptual model for managing, reducing, and preventing these conflicts, with particular emphasis on Iran's administrative division system. The study also seeks to connect conflict-generating factors with appropriate policy responses and provide an applicable framework for improving the political organization of space, enhancing territorial governance, and strengthening cooperation among administrative units. Methodology This research is applied in purpose, qualitative in nature, and descriptive-analytical in method. Information was collected from library sources, theoretical literature, and previous studies concerning political geography, the political management of national space, administrative divisions, and conflict management. The analytical process involved identifying and classifying the principal sources of tension between political-administrative territories, examining the characteristics and potential consequences of each factor, and proposing corresponding management strategies. In the final stage, the relationships among conflict-generating factors, policy interventions, and expected outcomes were integrated into a systematic conceptual model. The study focuses primarily on Iran's administrative division system, although some components of the proposed framework may also be applicable to other territorial governance systems. Accordingly, the findings are based on qualitative analysis and conceptual synthesis rather than statistical testing or field-based evaluation of policy effectiveness. Findings The findings indicate that tensions and conflicts between political-administrative territories arise from multiple interrelated factors. These include the spatial structure of government and the distribution of political authority; changes in administrative boundaries; natural and cultural heterogeneity among territorial units; boundary disputes; uneven regional development; the influence of political power and patronage on territorial decisions; local competition for resources, public budgets, and administrative positions; electoral districting; place identity and the symbolic implications of territorial boundaries; the inappropriate shape and size of administrative units; and environmental tensions. These factors do not operate independently. Their interaction can intensify competing interests, perceptions of deprivation, declining public trust, weak institutional cooperation, and instability in administrative boundaries. For example, boundaries that fail to correspond with watersheds or functional regions may complicate the management of shared resources. Similarly, territorial changes that disregard local identities and community preferences may revive historical disputes and reinforce perceptions of unequal treatment. The proposed model identifies complementary interventions at national and regional-local levels. At the national level, reforming administrative division legislation and replacing narrowly defined criteria with multidimensional assessments incorporating natural, social, economic, cultural, environmental, and security considerations are essential. Transparent procedures for boundary changes, independent professional assessment of territorial proposals, clear institutional responsibilities, fairer budget allocation, and reduced reliance on nontechnical considerations in administrative decisions are also important. Furthermore, administrative, political, and fiscal decentralization, where appropriate to local capacities and institutional conditions, can increase citizen participation and support a more balanced distribution of decision-making authority and responsibilities. At the regional-local level, priorities include accurately documenting administrative boundaries, establishing impartial legal mechanisms for resolving boundary disputes, coordinating the management of shared resources, involving social and cultural groups in decision-making, strengthening local councils, and expanding economic and cultural cooperation among neighboring territories. Greater consistency between administrative boundaries, ecological systems, functional relationships, and spatial planning frameworks can improve coordination and reduce the adverse consequences of territorial fragmentation. Equitable access to public services and infrastructure, effective communication networks, and joint environmental protection are also important measures. Where competing interests cannot be entirely eliminated, negotiation, mediation, and collaborative problem-solving can help produce mutually beneficial agreements. The proposed framework integrates these interventions into an interconnected system in which identifying conflict sources, selecting appropriate policies, and coordinating actions across governance levels contribute to the achievement of desired outcomes. These expected outcomes include stronger reciprocal cooperation, expanded cultural interaction, improved public service delivery, greater citizen participation, balanced regional development, protection of ecological foundations, equitable resource allocation, more stable administrative boundaries, the formation of functional regions, and the development of specialized growth poles based on territorial capacities. Conclusion Administrative divisions should not be understood merely as administrative mechanisms for subdividing national territory. They are fundamental instruments of political-spatial management that shape relationships among territories, communities, and local institutions. Sustainable management of local tensions and conflicts therefore requires a comprehensive, preventive, and multilevel approach integrating territorial reform, equitable resource distribution, meaningful local participation, recognition of place identity, functional coordination, balanced regional development, and environmental protection. Coordinated implementation of these policies can address structural sources of conflict, strengthen mutual trust and cooperation, and promote greater integration among political-administrative territories. Nevertheless, because this study is based on library research and conceptual analysis, further field-based research is required to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies across different regions of Iran and determine how their outcomes vary according to local conditions.

Abstract Introduction In this article, our aimis to explain that in the individual area morality is the transition from egoism to altruism. In the political area, morality involves a transition from partiality to equality. Equality is at the core of all moral theories. Nagel distinguishes three important concepts of equality: utility, right, and fairness. We will argue that these three types of concepts fall into two very general types of theories: action-oriented theory and consequence-oriented theory. The main debate regarding the relationship between ethics and politics is that we have not yet been able to create a kind of compatibility between these two types of theories, and they conflict fundamentally with each other. Research Aim Our objective is to analyze the interplay between ethics and politics through the lens of Thomas Nagel’s perspective, aiming to provide a novel comprehension of this relationship. Hence, it is imperative to elucidate our understanding of “ethics” before embarking on the ensuing discourse. We hold the fundamental belief that ethical conduct within the realm of personal interactions necessitates a transition from egoism and self-interest to an orientation that prioritizes altruism. As we progressively shift from egoism to altruism, our ethical stature becomes enhanced. Undoubtedly, as human beings, we all pursue our individual interests, irrespective of the specific nature of those interests. Our innate inclination is to prioritize the interests of ourselves, our families, friends, fellow citizens, and compatriots. However, Nagel posits that humans possess the capacity to simultaneously consider both self-centered and other-centered perspectives, taking into account the interests of others in our deliberations. Methodology In this study, employing a documentary research method and examining Nagel’s writings in this field, we distinguish between three key conceptions of equality: the utility-based conception, the rights-based conception, and the fairness-based conception. Findings Nagel contends that moral conduct within the political domain entails a movement away from favoritism and towards equality. Just as the conflict between egoism and altruism stands as the most prominent moral conflict in personal interactions, Nagel argues that the conflict between partiality and equality occupies a central position in the political arena. “Equality” represents a paramount ideal in both morality and morally-informed politics. Political systems are regarded as morally sound to the extent that they progressively transcend partiality and embrace equality. Consequently, Nagel considers equality as the benchmark for evaluating the ethical nature of political systems. He posits that authoritarian and oppressive systems are rooted in a form of “partiality,” while ethical systems are grounded in a form of “equality.” Consequently, the reformist movement signifies a progression towards the ideal of equality. However, both “partiality” and “equality” are multifaceted concepts that demand further elucidation. Nagel discerns three fundamental notions of equality that delineate distinct forms of reformism. When “equality” serves as our guiding principle for imbuing politics with ethical considerations, it assumes paramount importance as the yardstick for assessing and determining conduct within both individual and institutional realms. These three conceptions of equality can be categorized as follows: Rights: Grounded in the principle of non-interference, this conception emphasizes the preservation and respect for individual rights. Utility: Centered around the pursuit of maximizing overall well-being for the greatest number of individuals, this notion underscores the importance of promoting collective welfare. Fairness: Anchored in a hierarchical framework of needs, this conception entails prioritizing and addressing societal disparities to achieve a more equitable distribution of resources and opportunities. Our discussion revolved around the concept of ethical living, which entails a transition from egoism to altruism in the realm of individual existence and from partiality to equality in the domain of collective life. Hobbes, a philosopher, dismissed the notion of humans possessing the capacity and potential for other-selection, attributing self-interest as the foremost motivation and primary impetus in individuals. Consequently, Hobbes’ primary endeavor was to derive collective self-interest from individual self-interest, such as security… Subsequently, we illustrate that within the annals of political thought, three significant and classical interpretations of equality or altruism have emerged. The rights-based interpretation, as advocated by Locke and Nozick, which emanates freedom. The utility-based interpretation, espoused by Hume and Mill, which emanates welfare. And the fairness-based interpretation, put forth by Rawls, which emanates justice. Thus, these three interpretations give rise to three paramount ideals in the realm of politics: freedom, welfare, and justice… Conclusion Now, the most pivotal issue within political theories is how to reconcile these four grand human ideals in the political realm, encompassing security, freedom, welfare, and justice. Moreover, in instances of conflict, which ideal supersedes the others and why?

Abstract Introduction The Iranian automotive industry presents a compelling paradox. five decades of sustained state patronage, substantial resource allocation, and periodic reform initiatives have failed to produce a globally competitive, technologically dynamic, or qualitatively acceptable sector. Accounting for approximately 3.5% of GDP and 10% of manufacturing value-added, this industry epitomizes the broader structural ailments afflicting Iran's industrial policy regime namely, the predominance of rentier mentalities, the subordination of economic rationality to political expediency, and the systematic marginalization of societal participation. The industry's evolution from pre-revolutionary assembly operations through post-1979 nationalization, uneven privatization attempts, and contemporary sanctions-induced isolation offers a longitudinal laboratory for understanding how "fetishized" state presence in policymaking becomes an obstacle rather than an enabler of industrial transformation. This article critically interrogates the government's policymaking apparatus governing Iran's automobile sector, arguing that the industry's chronic malaise stems not from managerial deficiencies or exogenous shocks alone, but from a deeper institutional pathology: the idolization of state authority in policy formulation, execution, and evaluation, which systematically excludes societal actors, stifles competitive dynamics, and perpetuates a self-serving equilibrium among bureaucratic, military, and para-governmental stakeholders. Research Aim The primary objective of this research is to conduct a systematic examination of the government's policy cycle governing Iran's automotive industry, diagnosing the root causes of persistent inefficiency and proposing actionable reform pathways. The central research question is: What are the fundamental factors underlying the Iranian automotive industry's developmental stagnation, and how can a transition toward a more efficient, competitive, and value-generating configuration be achieved? This objective is operationalized through three interconnected tasks: mapping the historical trajectory of automotive policymaking across successive developmental plans; scrutinizing the interplay between formal policy instruments and informal networks of rent-seeking; and evaluating performance outcomes across production volume, quality, technological sophistication, environmental sustainability, and financial viability. The underlying assumption is that by identifying deficiencies within each stage of the policy cycle—design, execution, output, and assessment targeted interventions can address structural bottlenecks rather than merely treating symptoms. (De Oliveira, 2002; Rothstein, 2005; Yülek et al., 2020). Literature Review The scholarly literature on Iran's automotive industry reveals considerable diversity in analytical approaches yet exhibits notable methodological and conceptual gaps. Dara and Rezaeian (2022), in their comparative study on the role of the state in industrial development, juxtaposed Iran's automotive sector with that of South Korea but failed to employ up-to-date empirical data from either country, limiting the robustness of their conclusions. Similarly, Hosseinigoli and Saei (2017) adopted a comparative policy framework to examine Iran and South Korea's automotive strategies; however, their analysis remained largely descriptive, lacking the institutional depth necessary to explain divergent developmental trajectories. Fartoukzadeh and Tahmasebi (2020) addressed what they termed the "missing link" in Iran's industrial policymaking, offering a macro-level policy perspective that nonetheless overlooked the micro-institutional and implementation-level dynamics critical to understanding policy failure. Monem et al. (2021) investigated the dominant patterns of capital structure in the automotive and parts manufacturing sectors, but their financial focus neglected the structural, regulatory, and quality-related challenges that constitute the industry's core dysfunctions. In a more comparative vein, Torkamani et al. (2020) applied a developmental state lens to evaluate the divergent performances of Iran, China, and Mexico's automotive industries, effectively underscoring the salience of industrial policy in advanced manufacturing contexts; yet their study remained primarily concerned with cross-national macro-level outcomes, offering limited engagement with Iran's internal institutional pathologies and processual failures. Methodology This study adopts a qualitative, analytically driven approach situated within the institutionalist tradition. The methodological framework integrates three complementary strategies. First, process tracing within the systemic policy cycle model disaggregates policymaking into sequential phases agenda-setting, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation enabling identification of breakdown points where policy intent diverges from outcomes. Second, institutional mapping delineates the constellation of state and non-state actors involved in automotive governance, including formal institutions. By mapping their mandates, resources, and interaction patterns, the analysis reveals how jurisdictional overlaps and competitive rivalry produce policy incoherence. Third, historical-institutional comparison both diachronically across Iran's post-revolutionary administrations and synchronically with developmental states such as South Korea isolates factors specific to Iran's political economy. Data sources include primary policy documents, parliamentary legislation, government decrees, and secondary literature comprising academic journal articles and industry white papers, with statistical indicators triangulated across official and independent sources. Results and Discussion The empirical findings substantiate the thesis that state fetishism operates through five reinforcing mechanisms constituting a developmental trap. First, policy ambiguity and doctrinal absence pervade the industry's strategic orientation. Despite fifty years of state involvement, no coherent production doctrine clarifies whether the sector aspires to brand development, technology acquisition, or regional export orientation. The industry operates as a "fifty-year-old infant perpetually dependent on governmental support yet never maturing into autonomous competitiveness. Second, institutional fragmentation among the three branches of government, extra-constitutional bodies, and military-affiliated entities paralyzes coherent decision-making. The Competition Council's price mandates conflict with the Industry Ministry's production incentives, creating an environment characterized by ad holism and the absence of credible commitment. Third, the unresolved privatization paradox epitomizes institutional schizophrenia: while formal laws envision reducing state ownership, actual control remains concentrated through golden shares, board appointments, and captive financing. The 2019 Automotive Industry Reform Act nominally emphasizes competition, yet implementation has reinforced centralization. Fourth, the systematic exclusion of the public sphere consumers, civil society, professional associations—deprives the industry of crucial feedback mechanisms. Consumers are treated as passive recipients rather than rights-bearing stakeholders, reflected in alarmingly high traffic fatalities 10,720 deaths in the first half of 2022 alone. Fifth, short-termism and political business cycles have systematically undermined strategic planning. The industry has experienced alternating waves of expansion and contraction correlated with oil revenue volatility and sanctions intensity rather than industrial fundamentals. Quantitatively, value-added contribution has declined from 13% of manufacturing (2009) to under 9.5%, while foreign exchange leakage exceeds $4,500 per unit for Iran Khodro's 207 platform, underscoring the failure of localization rhetoric. Conclusion The Iranian automotive industry exemplifies developmental pathologies arising from the idolization of state authority in policymaking. The fetishized state presence manifested through monopolistic control, regulatory capture, institutional fragmentation, public sphere exclusion, and short-term political expediency has produced an industrial configuration misaligned with the imperatives of technological upgrading and global integration. The findings challenge conventional narratives attributing the industry's problems solely to sanctions, demonstrating that these operate within and are exacerbated by a deeper institutional architecture that systematically rewards rent-seeking over productivity. A sustainable transition requires fundamental reconfiguration of the state-industry relationship, moving from fetishized domination to an enabling, regulatory role.