State Studies

Abstract Introduction In the age of the attention economy, the scarcity of attention, rather than information, has fundamentally altered political power, shifting its logic from territorial sovereignty toward a new form of perceptual sovereignty exercised through algorithmic power. While classical theories of sovereignty (Bodin, Hobbes, Schmitt) defined political authority in terms of territory, population, and legitimate violence, the digital revolution and the rise of digital platforms have rendered these frameworks inadequate. The emergence of digital platforms, big data, AI, and the algorithmic power embedded in recommender systems has transformed information production, distribution, and consumption, reshaping the public sphere itself. Herbert Simon recognized that in an information-rich world, a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention—the very scarcity that drives the attention economy (Simon, 1971). Michael Goldhaber argued that in the digital economy, attention has become the primary currency of competition. Despite extensive research on the attention economy, surveillance capitalism, and algorithmic power, the existing literature lacks a coherent framework explaining how the attention economy transforms political power into perceptual sovereignty, and how the erosion of cognitive security accompanies this transformation. Research Question How has the attention economy transformed the structure of political power in the age of algorithmic power? Specifically, is political power transitioning from territorial sovereignty toward perceptual sovereignty, a new model based on control of perception, attention, and information infrastructures across digital platforms? Literature Review The literature is classified into four streams: classical sovereignty studies, attention economy research, algorithmic power and digital platform governance studies, and cognitive warfare and cognitive security research, the four pillars underpinning the theory of perceptual sovereignty. Classical sovereignty theories (Bodin, Hobbes, Schmitt) conceived sovereignty as absolute, perpetual, and indivisible state power over a defined territory. Foucault introduced disciplinary power, while Deleuze anticipated the shift to networked, fluid power. Neither provided a systematic framework for digital-age sovereignty in the era of algorithmic power—a gap that the concept of perceptual sovereignty seeks to fill. Attention economy studies began with Simon, who argued that attention is the primary scarce resource. Goldhaber claimed attention has become the most valuable capital within the attention economy. Tim Wu demonstrated how attention, initially harnessed by digital platforms for economic profit, was appropriated by states for political mobilization. Nelson-Field emphasized that the attention economy is a framework for understanding power relations in networked societies, laying the groundwork for a theory of perceptual sovereignty. Algorithmic power research (Bucher, Gillespie, Kitchin) shows that algorithmic power operates through digital platforms as a mechanism shaping perception and governing behavior. Zuboff demonstrated that surveillance capitalism transforms behavioral prediction into a new source of algorithmic power. Han introduced psychopolitics, showing how digital power penetrates the psyche. However, Han's analysis remains at the individual level, while perceptual sovereignty extends algorithmic power to macro-structures of governance. Cognitive warfare research (Claverie & du Cluzel) defines cognitive warfare as an unconventional form of warfare using cyber tools to alter cognitive processes, exploit mental biases, and influence decision-making—the operational front line on which perceptual sovereignty is contested. Rid argues that cognitive warfare targets the epistemic order, eroding the ability to distinguish reality from falsehood. The EUISS defines cognitive security as protection of perceptual and decision-making processes from external manipulation, while NATO-CCDCOE emphasizes that cognitive security requires maintaining coherence of core structures: trust, identity, epistemic standards, and strategic orientation. Methodology This research adopts a theoretical-analytical approach employing three complementary strategies: conceptual analysis to formulate a precise definition of perceptual sovereignty; theoretical interpretation to clarify its relationship with classical traditions of sovereignty; and comparative review of interdisciplinary literature across the four domains of the attention economy, algorithmic power, cognitive warfare, and cognitive security, and the transformation of digital platforms and the public sphere. This study relies on primary sources from key theorists using documentary methods. By nature, this research is theoretical and reflective, employing no empirical methods. Results Perceptual sovereignty, defined as the ability to direct, regulate, and restructure collective perception through control of information flows, digital infrastructures, data, and algorithmic power, encompasses four key indicators that together constitute the architecture of perceptual sovereignty. First, the management of public attention flows, the core resource of the attention economy, operates through voluntary self-display and active collaboration of subjects, which Han explains within "digital transparency." Second, the architecture of information and data functions as a mechanism of algorithmic power shaping users' perceptual horizons. Pasquale describes how ranking systems and recommender algorithms on digital platforms profoundly influence what we see, think, and do. Third, the reorganization of the public sphere involves the transformation from rational deliberation to spaces fragmented by algorithmic curation (Habermas), a shift that erodes cognitive security at the societal level. Fourth, the influence of digital platforms on policymaking refers to the informal algorithmic power shaping political decisions. Zuboff describes surveillance capitalism as a "Big Other" controlling human experience. Castells argues that communication processes constitute the main field for the formation of planning projects and the legitimization of social bases. Digital platforms become effective policy actors whose formal power does not correspond to their actual influence within the emerging public sphere. Perceptual sovereignty complements rather than replaces territorial sovereignty. States maintain border control and legal authority, but new arenas of algorithmic power have emerged in the communication networks of digital platforms. Cognitive warfare provides the operational basis for perceptual sovereignty, and the defense of cognitive security has become its counterpart. Korobeynikov, Davydiuk, and Mokhor argue that cognitive warfare targets not what people know but how they construct knowledge and perceive reality. Rid argues that active measures of cognitive warfare erode the epistemic order gradually; when the authority of evidence erodes, emotions fill the void, undermining cognitive security at both the individual and the collective levels. This transformation redefines sovereignty, power, and democracy through the lens of perceptual sovereignty. Power has simultaneously political, informational, and cognitive dimensions. States have ceded part of their power to the algorithmic power of digital platforms. Economic criteria based on the logic of the attention economy have replaced normative criteria based on rational discourse in the public sphere. Cognitive security has become a fundamental dimension of national security, and, by extension, of perceptual sovereignty itself. Discussion Perceptual sovereignty offers several theoretical innovations: it integrates the fragmented literatures of the attention economy, algorithmic power, cognitive warfare, and cognitive security into a unified framework; bridges classical and critical theories of sovereignty; extends Han's psychopolitics to macro-structures of governance; and provides a conceptual basis for understanding changing political competition within the public sphere. However, critical questions remain. Perceptual sovereignty supplements rather than supplants territorial sovereignty. The relative algorithmic power of digital platforms versus states requires further empirical investigation. 6. Conclusion This study demonstrates that the attention economy has shifted political power from territorial control to the control of perception and public attention. Under current conditions, attention and data flows have become the new axis of algorithmic power; non-state actors, particularly digital platforms, play a decisive role in managing public perception and reshaping the public sphere; cognitive warfare and the erosion of cognitive security have become integral to this contest; and states have ceded part of their power to algorithmic spaces. Perceptual sovereignty offers a new theoretical framework for understanding this transformation of power in the digital age.

Abstract Introduction Contemporary Traditionalism offers a distinctive model of state and governance, yet its political thought remains understudied. Existing scholarship falls into three broad categories: historical-intellectual studies (e.g., Sedgwick’s Against the Modern World), comparative studies (e.g., Malekian, Pazouki), and critical studies (e.g., Legenhausen). Historical studies trace the movement’s development but rarely analyze its political content systematically. Comparative studies contrast Traditionalism with fundamentalism or religious intellectualism but focus mainly on epistemological and anthropological differences, not on the structural relations among political concepts. Critical studies offer valuable critiques but do not employ network analysis to formalize them. Moreover, conventional hermeneutic and qualitative methods are largely linear and text-centered, incapable of mapping complex conceptual networks, distinguishing central from peripheral concepts, or assessing coherence quantitatively. This study addresses both gaps: the content gap concerning Traditionalist political thought and the methodological gap in studying conceptual networks. It applies network analysis of concepts, a method rooted in actor-network theory and cognitive semantics, enabling a structural, systemic, and visual study of political thought. The research question is: What are the fundamental components of the concept of state in the thought of Guénon, Schuon, Coomaraswamy, Burckhardt, and Nasr, and what relationships obtain among them? The hypothesis is that hierarchical anthropology—based on innate inequality, epistemic elitism, and natural classes—is the central node; other components acquire meaning only in relation to it. The study has a twofold aim: first, to provide a systematic re-reading of Traditionalist political thought centered on the concept of state; second, to introduce network analysis as a quantitative and visual complement to interpretive methods. It also seeks to show that even if one accepts the implicit political implications of this anthropology, an unresolved internal contradiction remains. The critique is thus not of the absence of an answer, but of the inconsistency of existing implicit answers. Methodology Network analysis of concepts was applied. Key political works of the five thinkers were purposively sampled. Selection criteria included direct discussion of state, government, or politics; reference to concepts such as justice, guardianship, democracy, and secularism and their derivatives; and presence of the concept in at least three thinkers. Concepts were extracted based on semantic repetition and thematic importance, and each received an operational definition. Two independent coders achieved Cohen’s kappa = 0.86, indicating high reliability. Triangulation was also used. Four relationship types were defined: synonymy (two concepts referring to the same thing, e.g., perfect man and quṭb); hierarchy (one concept being a subset of another, e.g., natural classes under hierarchical anthropology); opposition (two concepts standing against each other, e.g., equality vs. inequality); and implication (one concept necessitating another, e.g., spiritual guardianship implies epistemic elitism). After identifying relationships among 14 concepts, the network was drawn, consisting of 14 nodes and 47 edges. Density is 0.52; average geodesic distance is 1.7, indicating high coherence. Degree centrality and betweenness centrality were calculated to identify central and peripheral concepts. Findings The network centers on hierarchical anthropology (degree centrality 11; betweenness 0.42), composed of inequality, natural classes, and perfect man. In the second rank are spiritual guardianship (degree 9) and negation of democracy (degree 8), which are themselves implications of hierarchical anthropology. Spiritual guardianship, due to its implicational relationship with epistemic elitism and secularism, plays a key role in establishing the epistemic basis of political legitimacy, though Traditionalists refrain from formulating its institutional form. The third rank includes non-separation of religion and politics (6), primacy of duty (5), and minimal government (4). Return to tradition (3) is peripheral, indicating it is the proposed solution, not the foundation. Oppositions include equality vs. inequality, democracy vs. spiritual guardianship, secularism vs. non-separation, and primacy of right vs. primacy of duty. Thus Traditionalism defines itself as an anti-modern political philosophy in which each concept stands in direct opposition to a fundamental concept of modernity. Nasr holds a distinct position. Unlike Guénon and Schuon, influenced by Hindu and Buddhist traditions, Nasr draws on Islamic philosophy (Mulla Sadra) and Shiite mysticism, linking guardianship and the perfect man to social guidance. However, this remains potential and never becomes a practical political theory. In later works, especially after 9/11, he adopts clear political and ethical positions but offers no operational governance model. On the desired political system, he is ambiguous: he acknowledges wilāyat al-faqīh as comprehensive but neither endorses nor structurally criticizes it, retreating to abstract mystical guardianship and the vague idea of “action without action.” This reveals a fundamental gap in moving from metaphysical critique to institutional design. Conclusion Traditionalist political thought is internally coherent, organized around hierarchical anthropology and the primacy of self-cultivation over institutional engineering. Reform of the state depends on reform of the human being, and no independent institutional model is offered. Yet reliance on self-cultivation without institutional mechanisms creates an aporia in the modern world. Network analysis revealed the hidden core and visually displayed the internal contradiction between minimal government and non-separation of religion and politics. Despite coherence, Traditionalism faces three major criticisms: (1) conflict between negating democracy and affirming freedom without institutional guarantees; (2) lack of an objective, operational model for the desired state; (3) neglect of modernity’s positive achievements, such as reduced structural violence, expanded education, and relative welfare. Nonetheless, its critique of spiritual crisis and extreme individualism remains valuable. Future research can compare its conceptual network with fundamentalism, religious intellectualism, and other political theories, and explore whether Nasr’s post-2001 developments can help Traditionalism overcome its operational impasse.

Abstract Introduction The question of the state has long been one of the most fundamental and complex issues in political thought. What is the state? From where does its legitimacy derive? What are its ends and functions? How is its relationship with religion, ethics, reason, and society defined? These questions have received different answers across intellectual traditions. In modern Western political thought, the state is typically defined as a contractual, secular institution arising from the will of free individuals—an institution whose task is to regulate social relations, guarantee individual rights, and maintain public order. In the liberal tradition, the state is the guardian of natural rights, and its legitimacy stems from the social contract. In the Hobbesian tradition, the state is the Leviathan that establishes order through fear and coercion. In the republican tradition, the state is the institution for realizing the common good and civic virtue. In contrast, in the Islamic tradition, and especially in Shi’i thought, the state is intimately linked to the concepts of prophethood, Imamate, wilāya, and human vicegerency (khilāfa). It is not merely an instrument of power but the manifestation of divine order in the social sphere. Political theology (kalām siyāsī), as an interdisciplinary field emerging from the interaction of traditional and modern theology, contemporary political developments, and political science, has acquired a special place in contemporary Islamic thought. This field, particularly in its branch concerned with the question of the state and “statehood”, which addresses doctrinal and faith-based teachings related to the state, government, political legitimacy, power structures, and the relations between the state, society, and citizens, seeks to redefine the relationship between religion and politics in the context of the challenges of modernity, secularism, and democracy. The question of the state is central because every political theory must ultimately answer how a state becomes legitimate, effective, and legitimized, and what its relationship is with religion and the people. Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi Amoli, as one of the most prominent contemporary Shi’i thinkers, offers a coherent theory of the Islamic state and statehood through an integrative approach combining Transcendent Theosophy (ḥikmat muta’āliya), comprehensive jurisprudence, revelation-centered rationality, and Qur’anic exegesis. In his intellectual system, the state is not merely an executive institution but an epistemic, ethical, and civilizational structure that operates in continuity with divine lordship (rubūbiyya), human vicegerency, and Qur’anic guidance. Its mission is education, guidance, and the realization of human dignity. For him, the question of the state transcends the level of administration and control and rises to the level of guidance and civilization-building. Javadi Amoli’s political thought is significant in multiple respects: the relative comprehensiveness of his understanding of religion, the diversity of his works across various dimensions of political thought, his active presence in both theoretical and practical politics, the vitality of his long scholarly life, and his mastery of the greater jurisprudence (fiqh akbar), of which political-theological discussions form an important part. Aims The main aim of this research is to examine and reconstruct the question of the state in the political theology of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli by employing Quentin Skinner’s intentionalist hermeneutics. The central research question is: How is the question of the state conceived in Ayatollah Javadi Amoli’s thought, and how can his intentions and purposes be reconstructed through Skinner’s intentionalist hermeneutics? The research hypothesis states that the political theology of the state in Javadi Amoli’s view is oriented toward contemporary issues and, with relative comprehensiveness and internal coherence based on the synthesis of traditional and modern theology, reconstructs existing norms. In this reconstruction, wilāyat al-faqīh is presented as the extension of epistemic-civilizational Imamate; legitimacy is divine with popular acceptance; democracy is monotheistic and guided; secularism is the negation of legislative lordship; and international relations are grounded in justice and the monotheistic primordial nature (fiṭra). Compared with rival systems (Western and traditional), this approach seeks to present the Islamic state as an ethical, rational, and civilization-building institution. Subsidiary aims include identifying the objective and subjective contexts that shaped Javadi Amoli’s view of the state; examining the conventional norms in the political theology of the state (Islam and state legitimacy, Islam and democracy, Islam and secularism, and Islam and international relations); and analyzing Javadi Amoli’s novel interventions and redefinitions of these norms. Methodology This research employs Quentin Skinner’s intentionalist hermeneutics. Skinner emphasizes the discovery of the author’s intention through the examination of four key elements: subjective contexts (presuppositions, doctrinal foundations, and intellectual orientations), objective contexts (social and political developments), conventional political-theological norms, and the thinker’s interventions in those norms. Skinner’s method occupies a moderate position between text-centered and context-centered approaches and regards an accurate understanding of the author as requiring the simultaneous analysis of various elements such as life environment, political space, language, intellectual background, and written works. Accordingly, the study first examines the objective contexts of Javadi Amoli’s life and political engagements (the cultural environment of Amol, the experiences of Tehran and Qom, and political developments across four periods: pre-revolution, post-revolution, system consolidation, and thereafter). It then analyzes the subjective contexts, including Transcendent Theosophy, revelation-centered rationality, comprehensive jurisprudence, and Qur’an-to-Qur’an exegesis. Next, the conventional norms in the Islamic and Shi’i traditions regarding the state are extracted. Finally, Javadi Amoli’s interventions and redefinitions in relation to the modern Western state, the Sunni Islamic state, and the traditional Shi’i state are examined. Findings The findings show that in Javadi Amoli’s intellectual system, the Islamic state is not merely an executive institution but an epistemic, ethical, and civilizational structure formed in continuity with divine lordship, human vicegerency, and Qur’anic guidance. Its mission is not only administration but education, guidance, and the realization of human dignity. The state provides the ground for the realization of humanity’s divine vicegerency on earth and must prepare the conditions for the growth of reason, ethics, and human dignity. Society without a regulating institution tends toward injustice and corruption, and the Islamic state must be the manifestation of divine justice. Functionally, Javadi Amoli emphasizes the downsizing of the state sector and the transfer of executive affairs to the people, assigning the state the primary roles of supervision, regulation, and guidance. He explicitly states that the state sector should be reduced, tasks should be entrusted to the people, and the state should assume the responsibility of supervision. In his thought, the state more closely resembles a gardener and guiding educator than an executive laborer or a mere regulator. The key to understanding the scope of the state’s function in Javadi Amoli’s thought is the distinction between “amr Allāh” (the domain of divine command) and “amr al-nās” (the domain of people’s affairs). In the domain of amr Allāh (fixed legal rulings), the people have no role in legislation, and the state is obliged to implement these rulings. In the domain of amr al-nās (customary affairs, permissible matters, non-inferred subjects, and the region of discretion—manṭiqat al-farāgh), popular participation and intervention are complete, and the people’s opinion is valid. The region of discretion provides a legitimate space for social reason and popular participation in legislation and decision-making. The legitimacy of the state is, in the ontological sense (maqām al-thubūt), divine and based on wilāyat al-faqīh (deputyship of the Infallible Imam). However, in the sense of actualization and continuity (maqām al-ithbāt), it requires popular acceptance and support. Without popular backing, a religious government can neither be established nor sustained. The people are partners in establishing justice (qisṭ), and their supervision through the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil is obligatory; even the Guardian Jurist is not exempt from this supervisory circle. The people’s bay’a (pledge of allegiance) with the legitimate walī reveals social acceptance; it does not create legitimacy. Javadi Amoli regards wilāyat al-faqīh as the extension of epistemic and civilizational Imamate and interprets absolute guardianship as guardianship within the framework of divine rulings, not as unlimited and arbitrary domination. Religious democracy in this system is monotheistic and guided, resulting from the genuine fusion of Qur’anic teachings with revelation-centered rationality. Unlike secular democracy, which rests solely on the will of the majority, religious democracy is organized on the basis of monotheism, justice, and rationality. Secularism is critiqued in his works as the denial of legislative lordship and the removal of religion from the public sphere. Javadi Amoli considers it a form of planning for human life without awareness of the two sides of eternity (pre-eternity and post-eternity). In contrast, he presents a model of religious government with active popular participation in which religion is not only the source of legitimacy but also the method of administering society. In the sphere of international relations, Javadi Amoli regards the international language of Islam as the monotheistic primordial nature (fiṭra). Relations are regulated on the basis of justice, rejection of domination, fulfillment of covenants, and invitation to the good. Defensive war is obligatory, and initiatory war is for removing obstacles to guidance. The state is the representative of divine ethics and the bearer of the message of monotheism. Conclusion In sum, Javadi Amoli’s political theology is a theoretical effort to reconstruct the fundamental concepts of the state in the light of religious rationality, Islamic philosophy, and Qur’anic guidance. While remaining faithful to the Shi’i tradition, this model transforms the state into an ethical, epistemic, and civilizational institution whose mission is the education of the human being, the realization of justice, and active presence in the global arena. In his thought, the state rises from the level of domination and control to the level of guidance and education, playing the role of gardener and guiding educator. Divine legitimacy is combined with popular acceptance; democracy acquires meaning within the framework of monotheism and justice; and secularism is rejected as the negation of legislative lordship. This theory redefines the political language of Islam for global dialogue and offers a human-centered alternative to the modern power-centered order. The research findings demonstrate that through his novel interventions in conventional norms, Javadi Amoli has succeeded in presenting a coherent, rational, and civilization-building model of the Islamic state that is both faithful to tradition and responsive to contemporary challenges.

Abstract Introduction The national interest is one of the most widely used yet conceptually ambiguous concepts in political science and international relations, particularly in foreign policy. The multiplicity of meanings attributed to it has led some scholars to argue that the concept lacks a clearly identifiable referent. A similar ambiguity exists in contemporary Iran, where some political and intellectual elites maintain that the national interest has yet to be clearly defined. Yet the Iranian debate differs from the broader literature in an important respect. Since the Islamic Revolution, some Iranian scholars have emphasized the government’s transnational responsibilities at the expense of its national ones. Nationalism, the absolute export of the revolution, and the Umm al-Qurā doctrine represent three positions that have emerged from this debate. Thus, whereas debates elsewhere have largely been substantive debates over the nature and meaning of the national interest, in Iran they have at times become existential: the question concerns not only what the national interest is, but whether it exists at all. This dual problem complicates the evaluation of governmental and civic actions, since no generally accepted criterion exists for determining whether such actions serve the national interest. This is particularly significant given Clinton’s (1994) characterization of the national interest as a common language of society. Developing a theory of the national interest in Iran that can provide such a criterion requires first identifying the conceptual range and patterns of reasoning through which the national interest has been constructed in the scholarly literature. Literature Review Islamic values and ideals have been important elements shaping the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Sariolghalam, 2000; Tajik, 2004; Ebrahimi, 2009; Azghandi, 2010; Gahramanpour, 2015). This has generated an extensive body of scholarship centered on the relationship between the national interest and Islamic interests, with debates over the nature of the national interest largely framed within this broader controversy. Much of this literature is normative, advocating the primacy of either the national interest or Islamic interests, or seeking to reconcile the two. At a first level, the literature can thus be divided into three broad positions: proponents of the national interest (e.g., Seifzadeh, 2001; Bashiriyeh, 2001; Moqtader, 2000); proponents of Islamic interests (e.g., Larijani, 1990; Mahmoudikia, 2023; Shojaei, 2013); and those seeking to reconcile or integrate the two (e.g., Ekhtiari Amiri et al., 2025). Even studies that review or classify these debates have rarely moved beyond this established conceptual framework. For example, Ghobadi (2005) classifies the positions of proponents and opponents of the national interest while ultimately favoring an integrative approach that gives priority to the national interest. Ranjbar (in Kiani, 2007) goes somewhat further by examining the underlying bases of disagreement, distinguishing between religious and ideological foundations among those who prioritize Islamic interests. Yet such efforts largely remain concerned with classifying and evaluating existing positions rather than reconstructing the deeper relationships among the concepts, themes, and patterns of reasoning underlying the debate. The gap in the literature, therefore, is not simply the absence of another classification of existing positions, but the lack of a coherent account of the conceptual and argumentative spectrum of this body of scholarship. Given the conceptual ambiguity and existential crisis of the literature on the national interest in Iran, it is necessary to begin by clarifying the scope and boundaries of this field of inquiry. More specifically, a conceptual map of the literature is needed to identify the range of concepts within which scholars have framed their discussions. Methodology Methodologically, the research employs a scoping review because its objective is not to evaluate empirical evidence but to comprehensively map the conceptual landscape of an evolving body of scholarship. Following the methodological framework proposed by Arksey and O’Malley (2005), Persian scientific articles addressing national interest were systematically identified, screened, and selected according to predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria. The selected studies were subsequently analyzed through thematic analysis in order to identify recurring concepts, interpretive patterns, and relationships among themes. In this study, thematic analysis functions not merely as a coding technique but as a method of conceptual reconstruction, through which individual themes are reorganized into higher-order analytical categories capable of revealing the implicit conceptual structure of the literature. Findings The findings demonstrate that the extensive yet fragmented literature on national interest in Iran can be systematically reconstructed around three conceptual domains: preconditions, objectives, and instruments. The first domain concerns the preconditions of national interest, particularly democracy and globalization. Divergent understandings of these conditions shape different conceptions of how national interests are defined and pursued, and underlie many theoretical disagreements in the Iranian literature. The second domain concerns the objectives of national interest. The literature divides between approaches that prioritize the security, welfare, development, and prosperity of the Iranian nation-state and those that assign greater priority to the interests of the Islamic Umma, Islamic civilization, and transnational religious responsibilities. This divergence reflects competing conceptions of political community and the purpose of political action, and constitutes a distinctive feature of the Iranian literature. The third domain concerns the instruments for pursuing national interest. Two main debates emerge: whether ideology should determine foreign-policy priorities or function as an instrument subordinate to national interest, and whether national interests are best pursued through negotiation, engagement, and accommodation or through resistance, confrontation, and deterrence. These positions reflect contrasting assumptions about international politics, power, and the relationship between idealism and pragmatism. Conclusion Building upon these findings, the study argues that the diverse and often disconnected debates within the Iranian literature can be reorganized into two broader paradigms. The first paradigm emphasizes high politics, ideological commitments, revolutionary ideals, and civilizational objectives, whereas the second prioritizes low politics, state-centered pragmatism, socioeconomic development, public welfare, and effective governance. From a broader philosophical perspective, these competing paradigms may also be interpreted as alternative conceptions of politics and anti-politics, insofar as they are grounded in fundamentally different assumptions concerning political community, sovereignty, legitimacy, collective identity, and the purpose of political action. The study concludes that both the conceptual ambiguity and the ontological contestation surrounding national interest in Iran originate from deeper philosophical disagreements regarding the nature of politics, the relationship between religion and the state, the definition of political community, and the hierarchy of moral obligations. Consequently, theorizing national interest in the Iranian context requires more than conceptual clarification or definitional refinement; it necessitates sustained engagement with political philosophy and the philosophical foundations of the social sciences. The principal contribution of this study lies in the development of a three-dimensional conceptual framework consisting of the preconditions, objectives, and instruments of national interest, through which the Persian-language literature is systematically reconstructed. By establishing a bridge between scoping review and conceptual theory building, the proposed framework provides a foundation for cumulative knowledge production, theoretical development, and future comparative research on national interest in both Iranian and broader international contexts.

Abstract Over the past half century, governance has become a central yet highly contested concept in the study of political, economic, and social orders (Levi-Faur, 2012). The increasing complexity of public problems, the proliferation of actors involved in decision-making, and the limitations of state-centered models have generated a growing demand for analytical frameworks capable of capturing the dynamic nature of governance processes (Jessop, 1997). Building on the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) distinction between “normative approaches”, most notably the good governance theory, and “political-economy approaches” that emphasize power relations and non-state actors, this paper argues that these approaches remain insufficient to explain the historical dynamics, interpretive meanings, and evolving configurations of governance (Bojic et al., 2022). This paper contends that the FAO’s categorization can be further enriched by incorporating a third approach, referred to as the “interpretive approach.” Accordingly, introducing and reviewing the theory of Evolutionary Governance, developed within the interpretive approach, constitutes the central focus of this paper. The present study aims to extend this analytical landscape by introducing an interpretive approach and examining the theory of Evolutionary Governance as a complementary framework for understanding governance change. Specifically, it aims to identify the main approaches within the governance literature, to articulate the theoretical and practical limitations of normative and political-economy approaches, and to demonstrate how alternative governance frameworks can offer a more comprehensive and context-sensitive understanding of governance trajectories. Methodology This study adopts a descriptive–analytical approach based on a critical review of the governance literature. The analysis proceeds through the identification, classification, and comparative examination of major theoretical approaches, focusing on their underlying assumptions, explanatory frameworks, and conceptual and practical limitations. Building on this comparative analysis, the study introduces evolutionary governance theory as a complementary interpretive perspective for understanding governance as a dynamic, nonlinear, and historically situated process shaped by the interactions among institutions, actors, discourses, and meanings. Findings and Discussion This review identifies and evaluates three principal strands in the governance literature: the normative (good-governance) approach, the political-economy approach, and the interpretive strand exemplified by Evolutionary Governance. The normative approach emerged in the wake of structural-adjustment failures and persistent corruption in many developing countries, with the World Bank providing an early, influential definition of governance as the manner in which power is exercised to manage a country’s economic and social resources for development. The World Bank’s subsequent formulation specified three dimensions—political regime, the processes through which authority is exercised, and state capacity to design and implement policy—and translated these into a five-fold good-governance agenda (public sector management, accountability, rule of law, transparency, and access to information) (World Bank, 1992, 1994). Proponents argued that establishing these institutional arrangements would generate a self-reinforcing cycle of economic and political development. The global diffusion of the agenda by multilateral organizations broadened its reach but also exposed blind spots: an overemphasis on state-centered reforms, inadequate attention to equity and inclusion, and unrealistic expectations regarding implementation in contexts characterized by poverty, weak legitimacy, and political instability. Empirically, the optimistic assumption that good governance reforms would automatically yield development outcomes proved problematic, as implementation gaps and contextual mismatches substantially limited their effectiveness. In response, the political-economy perspective foregrounded power, interests, and the distributional mechanisms that shape governance outcomes. Scholars emphasized “good enough” or contextually feasible reforms (Grindle, 2004, 2007), while the theorists of limited-access orders and political settlements demonstrated how elite bargains, rent distribution, and interactive orders condition institutional trajectories (Khan, 2013, 2018; North et al., 2007). Concepts such as political topographies and center–periphery bargaining have shown that understanding a country’s governance structures depends on grasping the bidirectional interactions between elites and society; absent such alignment, reform prescriptions often remain rhetorical or counterproductive (Boone, 2003). The interpretive approach, particularly Evolutionary Governance Theory (EGT), provides a complementary, context-sensitive analytical lens. EGT offers an interpretive and dynamic framework for addressing the complexity of governance by conceptualizing governance as a co-evolving system of actors, institutions, and discourses. Drawing on social systems theory, post-structuralism, and institutional and development economics, EGT emphasizes that governance trajectories are shaped through interactions among actors, formal and informal institutions, historical path dependencies, and discursive practices (Beunen et al., 2015; van Assche et al., 2014). Key concepts within this framework include actor–institution configurations, power–knowledge configurations, and processes of dependency and path creation, all of which shape trajectories of governance transformation. Governance is thus understood as a discursive process involving subjects (actors) and objects (socially constructed concepts), in which narratives, metaphors, and open concepts continuously redefine the scope of action and influence policy outcomes (Van Assche et al., 2011a, 2014). Conclusion Over recent decades, governance has become a central concern in political science, prompting a plurality of theoretical responses. Normative approaches—most notably the good governance agenda—have promoted broad and often universal institutional prescriptions, whereas alternative perspectives emphasize that governance outcomes are contingent upon context-specific configurations of power, elite bargains, and differential access to resources. While political-economy approaches have advanced a more context-sensitive understanding of governance, the persistent inability of many governance reforms to address emergent and complex problems underscores the need for an interpretive turn. EGT responds to this need by offering a holistic and dynamic perspective in which governance is conceptualized as a co-evolving system of actors, institutions, discourses, narratives, and power relations. EGT highlights the significance of historical pathways, non-linear change, and the mutual reconfiguration of material conditions and meaning-making processes. Accordingly, governance transformation cannot be reduced to isolated changes in actor strategies or institutional arrangements; rather, it requires the co-evolution of actors, institutions, discourses, and power configurations over time. By embedding discursive processes within institutional and historical contexts, EGT provides a more comprehensive analytical framework for understanding long-term and intertwined governance change and for informing more realistic, adaptive, and context-sensitive policy responses.

Abstract Introduction The relationship between institutions and cognitive rules is a central issue in contemporary political analysis. Institutional theories usually emphasize formal organizations and governance structures, whereas cognitive institutionalism highlights the role of shared beliefs, values, and mental frameworks in shaping political legitimacy. Political legitimacy depends not only on institutional performance but also on the compatibility between institutional arrangements and dominant societal beliefs. When this compatibility weakens, legitimacy declines and the possibility of institutional transformation increases. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 provides an important case for examining this interaction. During the Pahlavi regime, rapid modernization, political centralization, and state-led secularization transformed the institutional structure of Iran. However, these reforms increasingly conflicted with the prevailing cognitive rules of large segments of society, particularly religious values and traditional norms. As a result, the regime’s political legitimacy gradually eroded, while alternative cognitive frameworks based on Islamic governance, anti-Westernism, and social justice gained wider acceptance. Although many studies have analyzed the Iranian Revolution from economic, sociological, or historical perspectives, fewer have investigated the reciprocal relationship between institutions, cognitive rules, and political legitimacy within a single analytical framework. This study addresses that gap. The study aims to explain how the interaction between institutions and cognitive rules affected political legitimacy and contributed to the occurrence of the Iranian Revolution. It seeks to identify the mechanisms through which institutional arrangements shape cognitive rules, how cognitive rules influence institutional change, and how the compatibility or incompatibility between them affects political legitimacy. Methodology This research employs a qualitative, interpretive, and analytical approach. Data were collected from historical documents, academic books, scholarly articles, constitutional texts, and political records. The analysis is informed by cognitive institutionalism and political legitimacy theory. The study examines four dimensions: the institutional structure of the Pahlavi regime; the cognitive rules promoted by the regime, including secularism, nationalism, and Western-oriented modernization; the emergence of alternative cognitive rules centered on Islamic political thought and revolutionary ideology; and the interaction between institutional transformation and cognitive change before and after the revolution. The qualitative approach allows a comprehensive examination of historical processes, ideological transformations, and institutional evolution. Findings The findings show that political legitimacy is strongly influenced by the degree of alignment between institutions and cognitive rules. The institutional structure of the Pahlavi regime was characterized by centralized authority, concentration of power in the monarchy, extensive security institutions, and limited political participation. While these institutions promoted economic modernization, they increasingly failed to accommodate religious values, cultural diversity, and social demands. At the same time, the regime promoted cognitive rules emphasizing secular nationalism, Westernization, and royal authority. These cognitive rules gradually lost social acceptance. Economic inequalities, political repression, perceived corruption, and cultural tensions widened the gap between institutional practices and dominant societal beliefs, leading to a crisis of political legitimacy. During the revolutionary period, new cognitive rules became increasingly influential. Islamic governance, the doctrine of Wilāyat al-Faqīh, anti-Western discourse, revolutionary activism, and social justice formed an alternative cognitive framework that provided ideological coherence for revolutionary mobilization. Following the revolution, major institutional transformations accompanied cognitive change. The monarchy was abolished and replaced by the Islamic Republic, whose institutional structure integrated religious authority into formal political institutions. Organizations such as the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts institutionalized the dominant cognitive rules of the new political order. The study therefore demonstrates that the establishment of the Islamic Republic represented not only a change of regime but also a simultaneous transformation of both institutional structures and cognitive rules. Conclusion The interaction between institutions, cognitive rules, and political legitimacy offers a comprehensive explanation for revolutionary political transformation. The collapse of the Pahlavi regime resulted from the growing divergence between its institutional arrangements and the dominant cognitive rules of Iranian society. Conversely, the initial legitimacy of the Islamic Republic was strengthened by the alignment between newly established institutions and widely accepted revolutionary beliefs. The study argues that neither institutions nor cognitive rules alone can fully explain major political transformations. Revolutionary change occurs when existing institutions lose cognitive support while competing cognitive rules become sufficiently institutionalized to provide an alternative basis for political legitimacy. This framework contributes to the broader literature on cognitive institutionalism by showing that political legitimacy is produced through the continuous interaction between institutional arrangements and cognitive rules, and it may be applied to the analysis of regime stability and institutional change in other political contexts.

Abstract Introduction Before encountering the civilizational order of Western modernity, the Iranian agent possessed a historical awareness that it had to shape its destiny on two levels. First, how to create a connector or intermediary among the diverse Iranian ethnic groups and religions within the shared geographic bedrock of the Iranian plateau. This connector would serve as a foundation for achieving the technology of “Iranian Peace” within the geographic territory of the Iranian plateau. Second, how to create an intermediary and modality between rulers and the governed, through which they could access the technology of the “Iranian State” in their history. The technologies of “Iranian Peace” and the “Iranian State” represent two formations of the Iranian governance order. This governance order and its technologies are referred to in this article using the theories of Hegel and some other contemporary theorists of “civilization.” The fundamental question of this article is the conceptualization of governance and its nature in Iranian politics and its relation to the nature of governance in the West. The historical nature of governance in the foundational history of Iran, before encountering the civilizational order of Western modernity in the 16th century, cannot be articulated within the dual models of governance in the West, namely “empire” and “nation-state.” Instead, this foundational history, based on the geographical and historical components of Iran, possesses a historical structure distinct from the dual Western models of governance. This governance model is conceptualized here as a “civilizational nation.” The idea of a civilizational nation is conceptualized based on James Rosenau’s concept of governance and the Hegelian concept of Aufheben. Based on the concept of the “civilizational nation,” the research findings show that the idea of Iran in its history has had the following three levels: “Iran”: the object of Iran’s geographical territory as an independent, non-constructed ontological object with an eternal and everlasting nature. “Iranian”: the pluralism of diverse and opposing ethnic groups and religions as social agents that have been constructed and are constantly undergoing historical transformation. “Governance Technologies of the Iranian Civilizational Nation”: mechanisms of governance or ruling without a relationship of dominance and subjugation between rulers and the ruled, and among the diverse Iranian ethnic groups and religions sharing the geographical bedrock of the Iranian plateau, which mediate between the concept of “Iran” and the concept of “Iranian.” Narrating the foundational history of pre-modern Iran based on the governance order of the “Iranian Civilizational Nation” and the governance technologies of “Iranian Peace” and the “Iranian State” represents a reversal of the official and dominant interpretations in discourses on “underdevelopment,” such as Mohammad Ali Homayoun Katouzian’s reading of “Iranian Despotism,” Aramesh Dustdar’s “The Impossibility of Thinking in the Religious Culture,” Mahmoud Sariolghalam’s “Tribal Characteristics of Iranians,” Ahmad Ashraf’s “Patriarchal Tribal Despotism,” and others, which conceptualize the pre-modern historical past of Iranians as the “cause of underdevelopment” in modern times. Contrary to the narratives of “underdevelopment,” the concept of the “Iranian Civilizational Nation” conceptualizes the historical past of Iranians before their encounter with the civilizational order of Western modernity not as a “decadent past” but as a “developed past.” In this view, the Iranian agent, considering its geographical and historical singularities, was able to articulate its unique governance order in its history. This order, or governance technology, allowed the Iranian agent to achieve “peace” within its territorial geography and to access the “art of connecting” rulers and the ruled in its history. Methodology This article discusses the idea of Iran as a civilizational nation by drawing on James Rosenau’s work on governance and Hegel’s concept of the concrete universal, with modifications and adjustments made by the authors. The research method in this article is the “history of thought” or “history of ideas.” The following foundational principles can be outlined for the conceptualization of this scientific method. The combination of the “descriptive-explanatory” method with the “prescriptive-normative” method is one of the features of the scientific method of the “history of ideas.” Findings Within the theoretical framework of the “civilizational nation,” a fundamental distinction emerges between the concept of “Iran” as an ontological object—independent of the Iranian subject, eternal and everlasting within the natural boundaries of the Iranian plateau—and the concept of “Iranian” as a constructed, historical, temporary, and variable subject corresponding to the diverse and non-reducible ethnicities and religions. In the reading of the “Iranian Civilizational Nation,” coordination is established between the source of continuity and stability of the Iranian nation, which is the concept of “Iran,” and the source of change and transformation in the Iranian nation, which is the concept of “Iranian,” through a third level that acts as an intermediary and modality between the two levels of “Iran” and “Iranian.” This third level is the Iranian governance order. Historically, it acted as an intermediary between the source of continuity and stability of “Iran” and the source of change and transformation of “Iranian” before the encounter with the civilizational order of Western modernity. Through its mediation between the geographical territory of the Iranian plateau and the diverse Iranian ethnic groups and religions, this governance order formed the technology of “Iranian Peace”; through its mediation between rulers and the ruled, it created the technology of the “Iranian State.” Conclusion Before encountering the West, Iranians were able to develop governance technologies as intermediaries between points of unity and diversity in their foundational history. These technologies, independent of individuals and personal power, led to the formation of the “art of connecting,” nation-building, integration, historical continuity, stability, and long-term historical perspective. In the governance order of Iranian peace, this technology of unity in diversity operated through the triad (Nowruz / King of Kings / Royal Road), linking the geographic unity of the Iranian plateau with the diversity of Iranian ethnic groups and religions in ancient Iran’s foundational history. Similarly, in the governance order of the Iranian state, the technology of governance operated through the triad (Iranian etiquette / Iranian ministry / dehqān), uniting Arab, Turkmen, and Mongol rulers and conquerors with the diversity of Iranian cities in foundational Iranian history. This process began to decline from the mid-reign of Shah Abbas of the Safavid dynasty, with Iran’s encounter with the West and its efforts to Europeanize, although it had continued successfully during ancient Iran, the Islamic period, and even the Mongol era. The attempt to Europeanize and eliminate these intermediaries has been the main obstacle to revisiting them and combining Iranian peace and the Iranian state over the past four centuries. The revival of these orders depends on returning to them with an interpretation that aligns with contemporary needs.

Abstract Introduction Governance has emerged as one of the most influential concepts in public administration and political science, providing the institutional framework through which societies are directed, resources are managed, and public interests are protected. Contemporary governance theories emphasize principles such as accountability, transparency, participation, rule of law, equity, and strategic management. Although these principles have been extensively discussed in modern literature, most existing governance frameworks are derived from Western philosophical and administrative traditions. Consequently, there is an increasing need to develop indigenous governance models grounded in the cultural and intellectual heritage of non-Western civilizations. Persian classical literature represents a rich source of ethical, social, and managerial thought. Among its most distinguished figures, Abu-Mohammad Muslih al-Din Saadi Shirazi (1210–1292) occupies a unique position because his masterpieces, Golestan and Bostan, transcend literary expression and offer profound insights into leadership, justice, administration, ethics, and social responsibility. Through stories, anecdotes, and moral reflections, Saadi presents practical guidance for rulers, administrators, and society, emphasizing the inseparable relationship between justice, morality, and effective governance. Despite the significance of Saadi's intellectual contributions, previous studies have primarily examined his works from literary, linguistic, philosophical, or ethical perspectives. Few studies have systematically explored his ideas within the framework of governance theory or attempted to construct a comprehensive governance model based on his teachings. Addressing this research gap, the present study seeks to identify and conceptualize the essential governance principles embedded in Golestan and Bostan and to develop a coherent governance model that reflects indigenous values while remaining relevant to contemporary governance discourse. Methodology This study adopted a qualitative exploratory-descriptive design within the interpretivist research paradigm. Documentary analysis was employed to collect data, while thematic analysis served as the primary analytical approach for identifying and organizing governance-related concepts. The research population consisted of all narratives contained in the first chapter of Golestan ("On the Conduct of Kings"), comprising 41 anecdotes, and all sections of the first chapter of Bostan ("Justice, Prudence, and Governance"), comprising 24 sections. Since every relevant narrative was examined, census sampling was applied rather than selective sampling. The temporal scope of the study corresponds to the 2023 research period. The analytical process followed the six-step thematic analysis procedure. Initially, the texts were read repeatedly to achieve conceptual familiarity. Meaningful statements associated with governance, leadership, ethics, justice, administration, and public responsibility were then extracted and assigned initial codes. Similar codes were subsequently grouped into basic themes, which were further integrated into organizing themes and finally synthesized into overarching governance components. To improve analytical rigor, coding consistency was continuously reviewed, conceptual overlaps were eliminated, and the resulting themes were refined until theoretical coherence was achieved. Findings The findings indicated that the governance model derived from Saadi's Golestan and Bostan comprised 11 major governance components supported by 30 basic themes. These components collectively represent a comprehensive framework integrating ethical, managerial, social, and strategic dimensions of governance, including justice-orientation, rule of law, attention to human resources, effective communication, provision of welfare and poverty reduction, management and leadership, God-centeredness, self-management, participation and teamwork, and strategic vision (foresight and proper use of resources). Justice emerged as the central pillar of the proposed model. Rather than being interpreted merely as legal equality, justice encompasses opposition to oppression, fairness in interpersonal relations, protection of citizens' rights, and equitable treatment of society. Saadi consistently portrays justice as the foundation of governmental legitimacy and social stability, suggesting that sustainable governance cannot exist without moral justice. The second component emphasizes rule of law, including citizenship rights, ethical conduct, and adherence to social values. Unlike purely legalistic interpretations, Saadi integrates legal authority with ethical responsibility, arguing that effective governance requires both institutional regulations and moral commitment. Another important dimension concerns human resource management, which includes meritocracy, preservation of human dignity, and employee motivation. The findings demonstrate that competent leadership should rely on qualified individuals rather than personal relationships or political favoritism. Respect for human dignity is presented not only as an ethical obligation but also as a prerequisite for organizational effectiveness. The model further highlights effective communication through dialogue, persuasion, trust-building, constructive social relationships, and freedom of expression. These findings indicate that governance is strengthened when communication flows openly between leaders and citizens, enabling mutual understanding and social cohesion. The component of social welfare and poverty alleviation emphasizes benevolence, poverty reduction, and public welfare as essential governmental responsibilities. Saadi repeatedly associates political legitimacy with rulers' ability to improve the living conditions of society, suggesting that economic justice and social welfare are inseparable from good governance. The findings also identify administrative management as another key component, including strategic planning, creativity, managerial competence, and effective leadership. In Saadi's perspective, successful governance depends upon wisdom, foresight, and the ability to allocate resources efficiently rather than relying solely on authority or power. Furthermore, the governance model incorporates God-centeredness, reflecting the spiritual dimension of leadership. Dependence on divine guidance is viewed as reinforcing ethical responsibility, humility, and accountability rather than replacing rational decision-making. Another significant component is self-management, encompassing self-improvement, integrity, anti-corruption, prudence, commitment, and responsibility. The findings suggest that personal moral development constitutes the foundation of effective public leadership, since ethical governance begins with ethical leaders. The model also emphasizes participatory governance, including public service, attention to collective interests, teamwork, cooperation, and citizen participation. This perspective aligns with contemporary governance theories advocating collaborative decision-making while grounding participation within an ethical and community-oriented framework. Finally, strategic vision emerged as an essential component characterized by foresight, anticipation of future challenges, and appropriate utilization of available resources. Saadi repeatedly stresses that wise governance requires long-term thinking rather than short-term reactions, highlighting strategic leadership as an indispensable characteristic of successful rulers. Conclusion This study demonstrates that Saadi Shirazi's intellectual legacy provides a comprehensive and coherent framework for governance extending far beyond literary or ethical instruction. The proposed governance model integrates justice, rule of law, meritocracy, ethical leadership, communication, public participation, social welfare, strategic management, and moral responsibility into a unified conceptual structure. Unlike many contemporary governance models that primarily emphasize institutional efficiency, Saadi's framework balances administrative effectiveness with ethical values and human dignity. Theoretically, this research contributes to governance literature by introducing an indigenous governance model rooted in Persian-Islamic intellectual traditions, thereby enriching comparative governance studies and expanding the cultural foundations of governance theory. Practically, the model offers valuable implications for policymakers, public administrators, leadership development programs, and governance reforms seeking culturally grounded approaches to organizational and governmental management. Future studies may validate the proposed model quantitatively across different organizational and governmental contexts or compare Saadi's governance philosophy with contemporary governance frameworks such as good governance, public value governance, and collaborative governance. Such comparative investigations may further demonstrate the continuing relevance of classical Persian thought in addressing modern governance challenges.

Abstract Introduction The concept of the state is one of the most complex and multifaceted phenomena in human history, serving as the primary mechanism for legislation, social order, and communal administration. While Western political science often treats the state as a modern construct arising from social contracts and secular rationalism, the historical trajectory of ancient Iran presents a fundamentally different paradigm. In Iranian civilization, particularly during the Sasanian era, the state was not a mere secular entity but was deeply intertwined with cosmic and religious orders. The transition from the Parthian Empire to the Sasanian Empire marked a pivotal shift in the nature of Iranian governance. While the Parthians maintained a more decentralized, Hellenistic-influenced model, the Sasanians sought to consolidate power through a centralized, ideological, and deeply religious framework. This research aims to investigate the mechanism through which the Sasanian government integrated religious logic into the administrative layers of the state, effectively transitioning from the relatively pluralistic Parthian model to a highly structured religious monarchy. The central inquiry focuses on how the concept of the “Ideal King” served as the cornerstone for this new political-religious identity. Materials and Methods This study employs a qualitative, analytical approach, utilizing a historical case study methodology centered on the Sasanian period. The research is grounded in the scrutiny of the relationship between political principles and theological interpretations within the framework of “Iranshahri” (Iranian-centric) political thought. To ensure academic rigor, the study analyzes a diverse array of historical and archaeological evidence, including: Numismatic evidence: examining the iconography and inscriptions on Sasanian coinage, particularly the titles used by rulers such as Ardashir Babakan (e.g., the emphasis on being a “Mazda-worshiper”) to establish divine legitimacy. Epigraphic and textual analysis: reviewing historical accounts regarding the policies of the early Sasanian monarchs and the sociopolitical influence of the Zoroastrian clergy (mowbeds). Conceptual framework: applying the theoretical lens of the “Ideal King” and the interplay between the concepts of arta (truth/cosmic order) and xšaθra (dominion/power) to understand the divine mandate of the Sasanian throne. Discussion and Results The findings of this research reveal a sophisticated, albeit rigid, integration of religion and statehood that redefined the Iranian political landscape. Institutionalization of Theocracy: One of the most significant results of the Sasanian political strategy was the formalization of the clergy’s role within the state apparatus. Under the leadership of Ardashir Babakan, the Zoroastrian priesthood (mowbeds) was elevated from a religious class to a powerful political institution. This was not merely a symbolic gesture; it was a structural integration. The clergy, exemplified by figures such as the high priest Kartir, gained unprecedented influence over state affairs, ranging from judicial decisions to economic administration. This resulted in a “state within a state,” where the religious establishment possessed the authority to guide and, at times, constrain the monarch’s executive power. Doctrine of Sacred Kingship: The research identifies the “Sacred King” as the central axis of Sasanian governance. Unlike secular models where the king is a protector of the law, the Sasanian king was seen as the earthly manifestation of divine will. The king was both the political administrator and the supreme guardian of the sacred fire and religious truth. This created a binary political reality: the social and political order was perceived as a reflection of the cosmic order. Consequently, any political rebellion or deviation from state policy was not merely viewed as treason but as a demonic (druj) act against the divine order (aša/arta). Ideological Rigidity and Its Sociopolitical Consequences: While the infusion of religious ideology provided the Sasanian state with immense internal cohesion and a strong sense of civilizational identity, it also introduced significant structural vulnerabilities. The research highlights several critical consequences: Suppression of diversity: the drive for religious uniformity led to the violent suppression of heterodox beliefs and followers of other faiths (such as Manichaeism and other minority sects). This reduced the state’s capacity to integrate diverse social groups. Administrative inflexibility: the heavy involvement of the clergy in civil administration created a bureaucratic rigidity. The focus on maintaining ritualistic purity and clerical authority often superseded the need for pragmatic and adaptive governance. Resource depletion: significant state resources were directed toward the establishment and maintenance of clerical authority and religious monuments, which, in the long term, strained the empire’s economic stability during periods of external pressure. Conclusion The Sasanian era represents a landmark period in the history of political thought, where the state was reconstructed as a religious entity built upon the foundation of the “Ideal King.” This model succeeded in creating a powerful, centralized identity that could withstand external cultural hegemonies and define the essence of Iranian statehood for centuries. However, the study concludes that the very mechanism used to ensure stability—the fusion of political power with religious dogma—ultimately became a source of systemic fragility. The inability to separate essential civil governance from rigid theological enforcement, coupled with the overwhelming influence of the religious elite, created internal fissures. Therefore, while the Sasanian religious state was a masterclass in identity preservation, it also serves as a historical cautionary tale regarding the dangers of ideological absolutism and the loss of administrative flexibility in the face of evolving geopolitical realities.