The State
Hossien Salimi
Abstract
IntroductionAlthough the study of politics is no longer limited to the examination of the state as an institution and encompasses all aspects of social life, the nature and function of the state remain among the most significant subjects of discussion in this historically significant field. Especially ...
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IntroductionAlthough the study of politics is no longer limited to the examination of the state as an institution and encompasses all aspects of social life, the nature and function of the state remain among the most significant subjects of discussion in this historically significant field. Especially as continuous and fundamental changes in society and global relations have led to transformations in both functions and perceptions of the state. States still represent the most important social institution in human existence, and the primary question facing social and political scientists is whether the fundamental transformation of global relations will lead to the elimination or alteration of the state institution. Some theorists of international relations, particularly among realists, believe that the state neither disappears nor does its primary function change. The state of the world and international relations is fundamentally the same as it has always been. That is, states will remain the main actors in the field of international relations, and their primary role will continue to be ensuring security and protecting interests within their borders, all within an anarchic world that lacks any centralized power to govern it and has its own unique rules and order.Accordingly, the main question of this article is how, according to Anne-Marie Slaughter, can the state continue to play its role in a networked world. The secondary question is whether the indicators proposed by Slaughter for the state's role in a networked world align with current realities.Our preliminary answer to this question is that, according to Slaughter, the functions of the state continue in a manner that aligns with the internal rules of global networks, albeit the discontinuous state as Slaughter has described has not yet fully materialized. The subsidiary hypothesis is that the state will act as a discontinuous institution within judicial, decision-making, action-oriented, and norm-setting global networks. However, we cannot yet speak of the emergence of a new form of the state called the discontinuous state.Our method for examining these hypotheses is a mixed approach derived from a deductive strategy. This means that Anne-Marie Slaughter's theory will serve as the main framework for analysis, and this theory will be tested using qualitative interpretations and indicators on one hand, and quantitative indicators on the other. To this end, we will first examine Slaughter's concepts based on her primary sources and then evaluate the indicators of this theory with empirical evidence.Although Anne-Marie Slaughter has been influenced by other theorists' viewpoints, she strives to present new insights. She believes we are facing a serious paradox in the age of global networks. On one hand, there are global networks that have made globalization an inevitable part of human life, and on the other hand, there is an increasing need for states to govern and manage various issues that encompass all dimensions of social life in different countries. Some believe that the expansion of globalization and the inevitability of global networks will weaken or eliminate the state, thus reducing the need for its governance and role. However, Slaughter argues that the need for states and their roles in the process of globalization will increase, presenting a paradox in the modern world. She understands global political networks as follows: "Global political networks stem from diverse projects of 'reinventing and reimagining the state,' both academically and practically. These projects focus on various ways the private sector can perform functions and roles traditionally associated with government, from providing expertise for public services to overseeing and controlling compliance."An examination of the indicators that Slaughter presents regarding state networks in the global arena shows that these indicators somewhat reflect reality, but as this theorist claims, they have not led to the emergence of a new phenomenon. An analysis of global realities indicates that such networks do exist, and as we will explore in subsequent pages, their existence and influence cannot be denied. However, given that her central concept is the discontinuous state, these networks have not yet resulted in a discontinuity of states. As we will demonstrate, these networks influence decisions and laws in various countries, but not to the extent that would transform a continuous state into a discontinuous one.Anne-Marie Slaughter offers a new perspective on the role and manner of state functioning in the global age, aptly termed the disaggregated state. This new perspective can explain many phenomena and new developments in the world and provide a fresh theoretical framework for understanding the state. Nevertheless, while Slaughter's concept and theory align with many ongoing transformations and open a new window for understanding them, they still cannot explain all dimensions of the actual state and political world, nor can many new political currents and realities be accounted for within this theory. The statistics and examples presented in this article reveal that although initial sprouts of the phenomenon of the discontinuous state are visible, it has not yet fully materialized. States continue to play significant roles in most areas...
History
Mohamad Hosein Sadeghi
Abstract
IntroductionOne of the most contentious topics in the historiography of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution is the question of its influence by the Ottoman Empire. The geographical proximity and the extensive political, cultural, and economic relations between the two countries provided a fertile ground ...
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IntroductionOne of the most contentious topics in the historiography of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution is the question of its influence by the Ottoman Empire. The geographical proximity and the extensive political, cultural, and economic relations between the two countries provided a fertile ground for such influence. However, the nature and extent of this influence remain subjects of debate among historians of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. Broadly speaking, there are two prevailing views on this matter: 1) Those who deny any influence of the Ottoman Constitutional Revolution on Iran, and 2) Those who acknowledge the influence of the Ottoman Constitutional Revolution on Iran. Representatives of the first group include Adamiyat, Nategh, and Tabatabai, while the second group is represented by figures such as Taghizadeh, Hazrati, and Feirahi. Other scholars, such as Zarinebaf and Raisnia, although not explicitly stating their positions, have discussed the Ottoman Constitutional Revolution and its relation to the Iranian Constitutional Revolution in a way that aligns them with the second group. Alongside the information based on historical documents and evidence, what makes the first group's perspective untenable is their contradictory discourse and misinterpretation of the second group's views. The perspective that denies the influence of Ottoman Constitutionalism on Iranian Constitutionalism began with Fereydun Adamiyat, was continued by Homa Nategh, and was further emphasized by Javad Tabatabai. This essay aims to address the contradictions in Adamiyat and Nategh's arguments and critique Tabatabai's misinterpretation. This misinterpretation stems from his belief that proponents of Ottoman influence argue that Iranians learned constitutionalism—entirely and directly—from the Ottomans, and that without the Ottoman Constitutional Revolution, Iran could not have experienced constitutionalism. Even though such a claim has never been made. While emphasizing the necessity of avoiding a 'single-cause' explanation for historical events, it must be acknowledged that during the period in question, the wave of constitutionalism had already begun and would inevitably reach Iran sooner or later. Nevertheless, in Iran's encounter with this wave, the Ottoman Empire played a more significant role compared to other centers of constitutionalism. This is precisely the focus of this research. Otherwise, in addition to the Ottoman Empire, England, France, India, Russia, and Japan each contributed to some extent to familiarizing Iranians with the 'idea of constitutionalism'. Considering what has been said, this research aims to review various perspectives on the influence of the Ottoman Constitutional Revolution on Iran, test them against historical evidence, and evaluate their validity using historical sources.Materials and ApproachThis research adopts a descriptive approach and relies on historical sources and studies to address its central question. Results and DiscussionThe influence of the Ottoman Empire on the Iranian Constitutional Revolution is one of the most debated topics, leading to diverse viewpoints. This study aimed to review these perspectives, assess their validity using historical evidence, and evaluate their accuracy based on historical sources. To this end, the study first categorized proponents and opponents of the influence of the Ottoman Constitutional Revolution on Iranian Constitutionalism Accordingly, Taghizadeh, Hazrati, and Feirahi, who acknowledge this influence, stand in contrast to Adamiyat, Nategh, and Tabatabai, who reject it. Next, by examining the Tanzimat reforms as a precursor to the constitutional movements in both Iran and the Ottoman Empire, the study explored various perspectives on the Tanzimat in Iran and its influence by the Ottoman Tanzimat. In this regard, Nategh, Tabatabai, and Feirahi argue that Iran imitated the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms. Hazrati, by rejecting the imitation view, asserts that the relationship between the Iranian and Ottoman Tanzimat was more about influence than mere imitation, while Adamiyat completely denies any imitation or influence. Based on the evidence presented in this study, the views of Nategh, Tabatabai, Feirahi, and Hazrati align more closely with 'historical reality' than Adamiyat's perspective. Similar disagreements exist regarding the constitutional movements. Adamity, Nategh, and Tabatabai, by rejecting that the first Ottoman constitution was truly 'constitutional,' also do not accept the influence of the Ottoman Empire on Iran's constitutional movement. The flaw in this perspective lies in its disregard for the historical context and its one-dimensional, purely legalistic view of the constitutional movement. It is undeniable that, despite its flaws, the First Ottoman Constitution embodied a form of constitutional governance. Tabatabai further argues that the intermediary for Iranians' familiarity with constitutionalism was not the Ottoman Empire but India. This claim is made even though no one argues that the Ottomans were the sole intermediary. Just as other countries such as Japan, Russia, England, and France played roles in introducing Iranians to constitutional ideas, so did India and the Ottoman Empire. What matters is the nature and manner of this role. Before Shushtari, whom Tabatabai references, encountered the 'Justice House' in India, Abu Bakr Ratib Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna, had already discussed the 'new system' in his diplomatic reports. In the final step of this research, by examining the influence of Ottoman modernization (particularly the Tanzimat and constitutionalism) on Iranian constitutional pioneers such as Mirza Malkam Khan, Sepahsalar, Mostashar al-Dawla, and Mirza Agha Khan Kermani, the profound impact of Ottoman modernization and its models on their Iranian counterparts became evident. Conclusion Based on the findings of this study, it can be argued that the Ottoman influence is clearly visible in Malkam Khan's promotion of the Tanzimat idea, Sepahsalar's implementation of reforms, and Mostashar al-Dawla and Mirza Agha Khan Kermani's efforts to legitimize constitutionalism. An important point to note is that, except for Mostashar al-Dawla, who had a brief stay in Istanbul during his travels to France, all these individuals had a long history of residence in the Ottoman Empire (at least ten years). As long as the dominant discourse of reform was the Tanzimat, Iranian reformers were influenced by their Ottoman counterparts both in theory and practice. The similarities between the theoretical efforts (e.g., writing works such as Defter-i Tanzimat (Book of Reforms), Majlis-i Tanzimat (Council of Reforms), and Ketabcheh-ye Tanzimat-e Hasaneh (The Book of Beneficial Reforms) ) and practical endeavors (e.g., establishing institutions like the 'Majlis-i Showra-ye Dowlati' (State Consultative Assembly) and the 'Maslihatkhaneh' (House of Expediency) ) of Iranian reformers and their Ottoman counterparts further highlight the extent of this influence. This influence is also evident in the discourse of constitutionalism. It was in Istanbul that Malkam Khan recognized the role of the people in "legislation" and, for the first time, moved away from the Tanzimat discourse toward constitutionalism. Sepahsalar, as Iran's ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, acted as a "reporter of Ottoman reforms" for Iranian statesmen and played a significant role in introducing Naser al-Din Shah to the Ottoman Tanzimat and its outcomes during the Shah's visit to Arab Iraq, alongside Midhat Pasha. Later, as prime minister, he devoted all his efforts to advancing his reform project (Tanzimat-e Hasaneh). Mostashar al-Dawla, who took significant steps in legitimizing constitutionalism, was in contact with the Young Ottomans, and his discourse closely resembled theirs. If 'justice' is considered the central theme of his legal discourse, the influence of the Young Ottomans on him becomes even more apparent, as they had previously used the concept of justice in the same manner. Additionally, it is important to note that a significant portion of works containing constitutionalist thought in the Ottoman Empire (primarily Istanbul) were written there. It was in Istanbul that Mirza Agha Khan Kermani defined constitutionalism as the 'best foundation and form of governance.” Following the approach of the Young Ottomans and Mostashar al-Dawla, sought to legitimize constitutionalism by introducing concepts such as 'human rights” and “national interests' to his audience; an achievement that would have been impossible during his time in Iran.
Political Sociology
Javad Alaei Avargani
Abstract
Extended Abstract
Introduction
If the political system is viewed as a system with both outputs and inputs (Almond & Powell, 2005), it becomes clear that the inputs and data within this system strongly influence one another. Examining the status and balance of these inputs can help gain ...
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Extended Abstract
Introduction
If the political system is viewed as a system with both outputs and inputs (Almond & Powell, 2005), it becomes clear that the inputs and data within this system strongly influence one another. Examining the status and balance of these inputs can help gain insight into how the political system functions and identify its potential crises. One of the most important factors contributing to the stability of a political system is political participation and support for it, which can be considered an input to the system. The availability of resources and facilities within society is a significant factor influencing political participation and public support for the political system. Improving these resources is likely to increase participation levels. However, if resources are distributed in a manner that deepens the gap between social classes and fosters a sense of injustice, political apathy and reduced political participation are likely outcomes. It is important to note that the validity of the claim linking the (re)distribution of resources with political and social action in all societies is debatable. In some contexts, the nature of these processes may not influence individual actions. For example, in countries where an idealistic ideology or deep ethnic–tribal culture binds individuals together and guides their social actions, economic issues may hold less significance. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran sought to redistribute resources in order to enhance social justice. Over several decades, various distribution and redistribution policies were implemented. However, a review of economic statistics and data reveals that the government struggled to achieve significant success in equitably distributing resources. It is thus essential to understand the public perception of justice and the resource distribution. Given that students are recognized as an influential group within the political sphere, the present research aimed to explore their perceptions of the outcomes of distribution and redistribution policies. Focusing on graduate students at the universities located in Tehran, the study tried to explain the relationship between their perceptions of justice regarding (re)distribution policies and their political participation. The research is based on the hypothesis that the sense of injustice felt by graduate students has led to political passivity, apathy, and a reduced willingness to engage in politics at various levels.
Materials and Methods
This study is an applied and survey-based research. The statistical population consisted of graduate students from University of Tehran, Allameh Tabataba’i University, and Tarbiat Modares University across various disciplines. The Cochran formula was applied to determine the sample size. The maximum permissible error (d) was accurately calculated, and the confidence level was set at 0.95. The library and documentary methods were employed to review the literature and describe the theoretical framework. Moreover, a field study was used to collect data from the statistical population through a questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of a series of closed-ended questions, each scored on a Likert scale. As a correlational study in nature, the research adopted a post-event design in terms of data collection method.
Results and Discussion
The results of the descriptive and empirical statistical analyses partially confirmed the main hypothesis. It is important to note that students’ perceptions of justice across various dimensions, as well as their views on distribution and redistribution policies, suggested that they believe these policies have not achieved the government’s intended goals. Students perceive the distribution of resources in society as unfair in the aforementioned dimensions. Moreover, in terms of participation, an average of 38.5% of students were not willing to participate in the presidential elections, while 35% showed interest in participating, and approximately 26.5% were neutral. As noted, factors such as religious–ideological ties, nationalism, and the importance placed on democracy are key determinants of electoral participation. These results align with findings of previous research. For instance, a study by Masoudnia et al. (2012) found a significant relationship between relative deprivation and electoral participation. Similarly, Castillo (2009) demonstrated that economic inequality strongly affects political participation. This is also consistent with studies by Gorsin (2018) and Brandsma (2016), which show that income inequality negatively impacts political participation and voter turnout. Moreover, Carlos and Castillo (2015) confirmed that the perception of fair distribution is linked to political participation—greater fairness in distribution leads to higher participation, while perceived unfairness discourages it. Concerning the participation in government political gatherings (e.g., conferences and rallies), the results revealed that about 42% were willing to attend, while 29.5% were unwilling. This reflects a weakening of the symbolic support for the government and the political system. Alternatively, one key reason for participation in the events is the ideological–religious connection that binds the public to the political system. However, if this bond weakens due to growing inequalities, the number of individuals participating in government-led political events will likely decrease. As stated by Almond and Powell (2005) and Easton (1953), in the systemic approach, inefficiency in distribution policies leads to a breakdown in support for the political system. Conversely, if the system successfully distributes resources and values within society, we see an increase in support through the feedback process.
Conclusion
The analysis showed a significant relationship between the perception of justice and political participation. A change in this perception can influence participation in elections and rallies. It is important to note that the type of response, particularly protests, to perceived injustice depends on the social and political conditions prevailing in a society. At times, this perception may align closely with the actual state of society, with little difference between the two. However, there are instances when a substantial gap exists between the perceived situation and reality, often for various reasons. Moreover, statistics and economic indicators show an unfavorable distribution of resources and opportunities within the Iranian society, especially the inequality between the center and the periphery. This contributes to increased political apathy and decreased political participation.
Political Thought
Mohammad Abdolahpour Chenari
Abstract
Extended Abstract
Introduction
Behemoth is one of Hobbes’s most important and final works. Its significance for research lies not in its references to historical events or the links between its arguments and historical materials. Instead, its value stems from addressing a fundamental question: ...
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Extended Abstract
Introduction
Behemoth is one of Hobbes’s most important and final works. Its significance for research lies not in its references to historical events or the links between its arguments and historical materials. Instead, its value stems from addressing a fundamental question: what causes the collapse and downfall of newly established states? Centered around that same Hobbesian concern, the present study aimed to understand the conditions under which newly established states fail, and the factors that lead to their downfall. A central assumption of the study is that collapse is fundamentally a cognitive phenomenon. In the realm of political knowledge, the issues of collapse and fall are as vital as those of establishment and continuity. This idea also resonates within the Iranian intellectual tradition, particularly in Siasatnameh by Khajeh Nizam al-Mulk. Hobbes is a fitting figure for this research, not only for his insights as a thinker of the New Testament, but also for recognizing that the collapse of newly established states—what we might now call in the modern context artificial persons characterized by political sovereignty—is a defining problem of the modern age. This age has seen repeated regressions into the state of nature, civil war, and national disintegration. For Hobbes, the breakdown of the state involves two dimensions: the legal aspect, addressed in Leviathan, which concerns the moment of the establishment of the state; and the mental or psychological aspect as discussed in Behemoth, which relates to the continuity of power. Before Hobbes, Machiavelli had tackled a similar issue in Discourses, using the decline of the ancient Roman as a historical case. In contrast, Hobbes philosophically examined the collapse of state authority in the context of 17th-century England, particularly during the reign of Charles I. He developed a more expansive theory of state collapse in newly established states and offered an innovative solution that went beyond Machiavelli’s emphasis on brute force.
Materials and Methods
This research adopted a cognitive psychology approach to analyze Hobbes’s thought. This method is chosen because alternative approaches—such as Quentin Skinner’s hermeneutic intentionalism, John Donne’s biographical method, or Strauss’s reading between the lines—do not adequately address mental and psychological metaphors. These approaches primarily focus on political concepts, often overlooking the significance of psychological factors. Gardner (2017) suggests that the cognitive approach seeks to illustrate how mentalities within a political society evolve. He argues that individuals’ mindsets can shift in response to various empirical conditions. One such condition is exposure to environments where diverse beliefs and convictions—often at odds with one’s own—are presented. Another is the experience of trauma, which can profoundly alter a person’s outlook on their surroundings. In addition, encounters with enlightened or influential figures can prompt shifts in perspective. These changes may occur suddenly, such as a rapid shift in religious belief, or gradually over time (Gardner, 2017, p. 101). Ultimately, metaphors play a crucial role in explaining these changes—whether they are the metaphors used by thinkers to interpret the world or those through which ordinary people perceive politics.
Results and Discussion
According to Carl Schmitt, the metaphor of leviathan in Hobbes’s political theory suggests that just as the establishment of the modern state is rooted in political matters, so is the collapse of newly founded states dependent on political and cognitive factors. On the one hand, behemoth serves as a metaphor within a religious context, illustrating the relationship between the Creator and the creature, as well as the dynamics between limited and unlimited power. On the other hand, this concept carries an additional metaphorical significance, implying that collapse, unlike a simple fall, is primarily a mental phenomenon influenced by human cognitive beliefs. Accordingly, the demise of a state should be understood in terms of its mental dimensions, rather than its natural aspect—defined as the end of political power. Hobbes argued that beliefs such as the desire for power and self-interest have led individuals to conflict with one another, prompting a regression to a more primitive state and creating challenges for newly established states. The historical expression of these dual beliefs is evident in the concepts of salvation and liberation. The first belief highlights the issue of sin, positing that the path to salvation involves seeking forgiveness and pardon, which, over time, has undermined the authority of the ruling prince. Conversely, the second belief addresses oppression, suggesting that liberation can be achieved through popular rule—emphasizing the necessity of eradicating tyranny by invoking historical references and contemporary events. In the context of Hobbes’s cognitive framework presented in this work, the notion of departure emerges as a fundamental belief. He contends that realizing and maintaining security depends on creating political fear and instilling a sense of political subordination. This approach is arguably more problematic than the previously mentioned beliefs. According to Hobbes, this educational endeavor should aim to purge the populace of these two rebellious beliefs, fostering obedience and compliance with the ruler’s mandates. The ultimate goal of this education is to cultivate a politically constructed individual—a subject entirely submissive and perceived as the foundation of the prince’s power.
Political Science
Ali Akbar Gorji Azandaryani; Shahriar Hoseini
Abstract
Extended Abstract
Introduction
Ethnic and cultural diversity has always been a fundamental aspect of social reality across the world. However, these diversities become particularly significant when they intersect with the process of nation-building. Diversity can either contribute to national stability ...
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Extended Abstract
Introduction
Ethnic and cultural diversity has always been a fundamental aspect of social reality across the world. However, these diversities become particularly significant when they intersect with the process of nation-building. Diversity can either contribute to national stability or ignite the flames of civil war. In the early stages of nation-building, states often adopted culturally homogeneous policies, seeking to resolve diversity through ethnic and cultural assimilation in the name of national unity and integration. They perceived ethnic and cultural diversity as an obstacle to the formation of a nation–state. In ethnically and linguistically diverse societies, cultural issues must be addressed in a pluralistic manner, reflecting the society’s inherent characteristics. Yet, during the nation-building process, cultural matters are sometimes narrowly defined to accelerate the process and secure political legitimacy, with their scope limited to the cultural components of the majority. In such cases, because the driving force behind nation-building relies heavily on the support of the majority, cultural matters become subsumed under political concerns. As a result, culture is often overshadowed by the hegemony of power, leading to the marginalization or erasure of minority cultures. In this model of nation-building, leaders attempt to maintain the internal cohesion of the group they claim to represent by politicizing cultural matters. To advance their political goals, they may alter or even fabricate cultural markers, ultimately subordinating culture to politics. Drawing a clear boundary to prevent cultural matters from being overshadowed by political agendas during nation-building is an extremely difficult and complex task. The process of nation-building in Switzerland since the early 19th century has puzzled researchers, raising the question of how a country with such cultural and linguistic diversity managed to survive at the heart of Europe, surrounded by more homogeneous nation-building efforts. For those who view linguistic and cultural homogeneity as essential to nation-building, Switzerland represents a significant anomaly. Given Switzerland’s linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity, the question arises as to what path its nation-building process has taken to accommodate these differences without allowing one language or culture to dominate. Has the cultural dimension been separated from the political in the formation of the Swiss nation? What constitutes the identity of the Swiss nation? Considering its internal diversity, should Switzerland be considered as a single-nation or a multi-nation state?
Materials and Methods
The present study adopted a legal, historical, and interpretive approach to explore the complexities of nation-building in Switzerland. It relied on a collection of texts obtained through library research.
Results and Discussion
First, the study examined the historical development of the concept of nation, categorizing nation-building processes as either democratic or non-democratic—in relation to the function of cultural matters. In democratic nation-building, efforts are made to define ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversities alongside one another. In contrast, non-democratic nation-building tends to subsume cultural issues under political matters, often resulting in conflicts among various ethnic, cultural, and religious pluralities. This approach frequently leads to the marginalization of minority rights. While non-democratic nation-building may yield short-term success, it ultimately fails to foster long-term political stability and social cohesion. Instead, it leads to the construction of a highly fragile nation, one that is somewhat incompatible with the ideals of democracy.
Non-democratic nation-building typically involves the strategic selection of specific segments of the population—usually those belonging to the ethnic or linguistic majority—for the purpose of identity construction. From a scholarly perspective, Switzerland’s nation-building process can be analyzed through three main theoretical frameworks: the liberal–multinational model, the postnational–liberal model, and the liberal–nationalist or single-nation theory. Interestingly, despite their differing viewpoints, proponents of all three theories often cite Switzerland as a distinctive and exemplary case. However, according to the findings of this study, Switzerland’s experience does not align with traditional nation-building processes based on objective criteria such as shared language, culture, or religion. In Switzerland, the political is defined by the cultural rather than the other way around. Therefore, the Swiss nation-building process cannot be reduced to a shared or dominant language, race, culture, or religion. Instead, it reflects a more subjective conception of nationhood rooted in self-awareness. Throughout Switzerland’s nation-building journey, cultural matters were neither sacrificed nor politicized. The formation of the nation process was never monopolized by a privileged class with specific ethnic, linguistic, or religious concepts. On the contrary, the Swiss elites explicitly framed nation-building as a non-ethnic endeavor, consistently acknowledging and incorporating the country’s pluralism into every stage of defining the political.
Conclusion
The Swiss nation is the product of a classical process, one that did not involve the state apparatus, political parties, or individual will—
unlike most nation-building projects. In other words, most nation-building processes follow a top-down approach where the cultural characteristics of the majority group are treated as political instruments. However, in the Swiss case, cultural aspects such as ethnicity, language, or religion were not used as political instruments by the state to satisfy the majority or to forcibly retain minorities. The findings indicated that Switzerland’s nation-building process developed from the bottom up, following a democratic path. Therefore, the classical understanding of Swiss national identity is, to some extent, a political understanding based on shared conception of republicanism, federalism, direct democracy, and neutrality. Importantly, these political matters are not rooted in the cultural matters of any majority ethnic group. However, this does not mean that cultural factors were absent in shaping national identity or completing the nation-building process in Switzerland. On the contrary, both cultural and political elements played a role. The key lies in how the boundaries between them were drawn, ensuring that neither was sacrificed for the sake of the other. As a result, Swiss national identity is two-dimensional. At the cantonal and local levels, there are shared ethnic and cultural elements, but when the Swiss nation is considered as a whole, there is a political and neutral understanding of linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity. This suggests that nationhood does not require a uniform or homogeneous conception of the elements involved in the nation-building process. In conclusion, the democratic nation-building process defines the political under the cultural, accepting and incorporating existing differences within society. Though this process takes time, it leads to the creation of a stable and enduring nation and national identity.
Iranian Studies
Ebrahim Abbasi; Mohammad Jamiri
Abstract
Extended AbstractIntroductionThe theory of developmental state is an approach to industrial and economic development that shares certain features with the policies of Reza Shah’s regime in Iran. This perspective has often been used in Iran to explain the industrial trajectories of the Asian Tigers, ...
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Extended AbstractIntroductionThe theory of developmental state is an approach to industrial and economic development that shares certain features with the policies of Reza Shah’s regime in Iran. This perspective has often been used in Iran to explain the industrial trajectories of the Asian Tigers, as well as to analyze the efforts to adapt to the industrialization trend in the post-Islamic Revolution period. However, the core assumptions of this theory have not yet been thoroughly examined concerning the industrial and economic transformations that occurred during Reza Shah’s rule. In this respect, the present study tried to answer the question of whether Reza Shah’s industrial and financial measures can be understood within the theory of the developmental state. The objective was to evaluate the key indicators of this theory and assess how they align with the developments that took place during Reza Shah’s reign.Materials and MethodsThe current study adopted a qualitative and explanatory approach, and drew on primary sources such as memoirs, documents, and authentic analytical works from the period to address the research question. Moreover, the theory of developmental state was used as the framework of analysis. The concept of developmental state (also known as developmentalist state) offers a theoretical framework that can help evaluate the economic transformations of Reza Shah’s reign. This theory is based on the idea that government intervention can play a central role the country’s industrial development process. The term developmental state was first popularized by Chalmers Johnson, who used it to describe a theoretical model to explain a reality derived from the experiences of countries such as Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Botswana, and Taiwan. A distinguishing feature of these countries was their continuous and sustainable economic growth—averaging 4% or more over two decades—accompanied by the increased level of welfare and living standards and effective inflation control. Although these governments did not follow economically liberal models and often advocated for a maximalist system, they simultaneously provided significant support to the private sector through a highly effective and efficient bureaucracy. The theory of developmental state was later developed further by scholars such as Peter Evans and Adrian Leftwich. Leftwich defines developmental states as those whose domestic policies and foreign relations are aimed at gaining power, autonomy, independence, capability, and capacity. These goals are pursued either through the direct organization of economic growth or by fostering conditions that encourage it—or a combination of the two.Results and DiscussionThe indicators of a developmental state, as applied to the context of Reza Shah’s regime, included a centralized and comprehensive bureaucracy, developmental elites, the absence of a central development body in Iran, state independence, a favorable international environment, and the neglect of agriculture. First, a key requirement of a developmental state is a centralized and comprehensive bureaucracy that extends across the entire country. In this context, bureaucracy refers to a powerful, proficient, and corruption-free network. Prior to the Pahlavi period, Iran lacked such a unified bureaucratic system. With Reza Khan’s rise to power, the need to concentrate power in order to counter internal fragmentation and promote national unity led to the establishment of a unified and comprehensive bureaucracy. However, from the outset, Iran’s administrative system faced significant intellectual, cultural, and managerial challenges. These obstacles prevented it from evolving into an agile, dynamic, and corruption-resistant system. As a result, the bureaucratic system became a persistent obstacle to development—one that continues to affect the country to this day. The administrative system remains dependent, passive, and informal. Within such systems, managers tend to be subordinate to the decisions coming from the top of the political pyramid. The second key indicator was the role of developmental elites. Elites—both executive and intellectual—are regarded as essential to transforming society and advancing the objectives of the state. Under Reza Shah’s regime, Iran’s political elite could be broadly categorized into two groups. The first included individuals such as Davar, Hekmat, Foroughi, and Taghizadeh, who were primarily intellectuals and played a significant role in shaping the cultural and ideological foundations of the state. The second group, which exercised greater influence over political and executive affairs, comprised figures like Teimur Tash, the powerful Minister of the Court, Nosrat al-Dowleh Firouz, Seyyed Mohammad Tadayyon, and Sardar Asad. This dominant group entrenched irrational, self-centered, and anti-developmental practices within government operations, effectively limiting opportunities for capable and competent elites to emerge and advance. In addition, none of the elites during Reza Shah’s reign—including Foroughi, Hekmat, Davar, Kasravi, Taghizadeh, Bahar, and others—produced any substantial work on Iran’s industrial or economic development. Their intellectual contributions, including newspaper articles, were overwhelmingly focused on cultural, literary, political, and civilizational issues. Another important indicator was the absence of a central development body in Iran. The existence of a central organization capable of managing national development through well-designed planning is an essential component of a successful developmental state. Such an institution ensures policy coherence and helps identify and nurture talent. However, during Reza Shah’s rule, no such organization existed. While there were efforts toward industrialization and modernization, the idea of systematic, planned economic development was not operationalized until Reza Shah’s exile. According to Ebtehaj, the failure to institutionalize planning during this period stemmed from Reza Shah’s resistance to the centralization of planning. The fourth indicator was state independence, which refers to the state’s autonomy from reliance on social classes. In the case of Iran, the state was not dependent on any particular class but operated beyond class affiliations. Reza Shah, as the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, did not view his government as being indebted to any social group or class. Iran’s historical experience suggests that although his regime maintained independence from all social groups, it was also distinctly isolated from them. On the one hand, the government was entirely detached from the religious leadership and groups—who constituted the majority of the population—and there was little to no shared logic. On the other hand, ties with traditional and small merchants—who represented the backbone of Iran’s commercial sector—were also severed. A favorable international environment is another critical factor in enabling a developmental state. Without a suitable international environment is essential for the export and competitiveness of domestically produced good, developmentalist states face significant challenges. Many argue that the conditions in South Korea and Taiwan after World War II were exceptional. These included unwavering U.S. support aimed at curbing the spread of communism, as well as the broader conditions of the Cold War. In contrast, Iran faced a different set of challenges. During the same period, the competing interests of major powers—particularly Britain and the Soviet Union—acted as major obstacles to Iran’s development. Between the two world wars, Iran was exposed to the rivalry of the superpowers, and its development became subject to their pledge and distraint. The last and sixth indicator was the neglect of agriculture during the reign of Reza Shah. Agriculture was of great importance for reasons such as leveraging the value-added potential of the agricultural sector for industrial expansion, countering the influence of communism, and ensuring the production of affordable and essential food for the population in the developmental state. At the same time, attention to agriculture, along with land reforms in Iran, was necessary and essential, but these goals were not realized in practice. This neglect can be attributed to factors such as the Shah himself becoming the largest landowner in the country. ConclusionThe research findings indicate that although certain elements of the theory—such as a proficient bureaucracy, a weak civil society, a permanent army, and developmental elites—appear consistent with the political and economic approaches of Reza Shah’s reign, in practice, several critical factors undermined a true alignment. These include the absence of a development planning body, the government’s lack of engagement with social classes, an unfavorable international environment, the elimination of developmental elites and their replacement with non-developmental ones, and Reza Shah’s neglect of essential development measures, such as land reforms, which are considered foundational for national development. What was necessary for real production—across industry, agriculture, services, and especially science and technology—was not achieved, with most sectors remaining subordinate to foreign markets. Iran’s industrial expansion strategy was driven by individual preferences rather than being organization-oriented and purposeful. No organization or collective body was involved in planning economic and industrial growth. For these reasons, despite sharing some characteristics with the theory of developmental state—such as a weak civil society and a permanent army—Reza Shah’s administration cannot be classified as developmentalist.
Political Thought
Ehsan Kazemi; Morteza Kazemi
Abstract
Extended AbstractIntroduction Any attempt to review the history of philosophical thought inevitably begins with ancient Greece. As the cradle of political thought, ancient Greece holds an influential position in the history of political thought. Thus, examining political thought in ancient Greece remains ...
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Extended AbstractIntroduction Any attempt to review the history of philosophical thought inevitably begins with ancient Greece. As the cradle of political thought, ancient Greece holds an influential position in the history of political thought. Thus, examining political thought in ancient Greece remains a compelling area of study for historians of political thought. A critical aspect of ancient Greek political thought is its evolution and the elements that influenced its development. Historians of political thought argue that various elements—such as governance systems, culture, and geography—served as key drivers in shaping political thought in ancient Greece. Understanding these elements provides deeper insight not only into ancient Greek political thinking but also into the broader development of Western political thought. In this respect, the present study aimed to analyze the role and significance of the discourse on the polis in the evolution of political thought in ancient Greece. The central question guiding this research is: What influence did the emergence of the polis have on the foundations of thought in ancient Greece? The research is based on the hypothesis that the rise of the polis as a dominant discourse not only influenced daily political relations in ancient Greece but also played a decisive role in the development of political thought as a distinct field of knowledge. In other words, political thought, as a form of historical knowledge, evolved according to the norms of discourse formation and transformation.Materials and MethodsThe current study employed discourse analysis as the methodological approach to explore the underlying logic behind the formation of political thought in ancient Greece.Results and DiscussionAccording to the research methodology, the prevailing discourse of each era significantly shapes its modes of thought. In the monarchical discourse, mythical thinking—shaped by dominant values andnorms—laid the foundation for a specific form of thought known as mythical thought. This discourse constructed methods and models of thinking that would reproduce the dominant discourse. With the transition from the monarchical discourse to the discourse on the polis, it was not only the political order that underwent change but also the entirety of Greek social and political life. Beyond shifts in lifestyle and living models, a new mode of thinking emerged within the polis discourse. This new paradigm marked a shift from mythical to rational thought, emphasizing rationality over instinctual or national aspects of the human. This transformation reshaped the nature of relations between political institutions. As a result, the foundation of political legitimacy and stability moved away from metaphysical or mythical justifications toward an earthly, citizen-centered foundation.ConclusionThis research examined the discourse on the polis in contrast with the discourse of monarchy, outlining several transitional stages from the monarchy to the polis. The first stage involved the crisis and eventual decline of the hegemonic monarchical discourse. The second stage marked the emergence and consolidation of the polis as the new dominant discourse. The third and final stage was characterized by the structuring of the discursive elements of political thought around a central sign, namely the polis itself. With the transition from the discourse of monarchy to that of the polis or city-state, not only did the political order change, but the entire social and political life of the Greeks was transformed. Beyond mere biological changes, a new mode of thinking emerged within the discourse of the polis. In thisA new way of thinking, rational thought gradually replaced mythical thinking, and rationalism led to the emergence of political thought.
Public Policy
Sajedeh Safikhani; Arashk Holisaz
Abstract
Extended Abstract
Introduction
In recent decades, the implementation of environmental regulations has shifted from traditional command-and-control approaches to newer strategies emphasizing participation and reduced penalties. The limitations of coercive instruments in environmental protection became ...
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Extended Abstract
Introduction
In recent decades, the implementation of environmental regulations has shifted from traditional command-and-control approaches to newer strategies emphasizing participation and reduced penalties. The limitations of coercive instruments in environmental protection became increasingly evident, prompting legislative institutions to adopt less punitive policy frameworks and instruments. Non-coercive instruments move away from the command-and-control strategy and instead encourage voluntary compliance through participatory management and the involvement of resource users in management and policy development. Research on the adoption of these new political instruments for solving environmental problems can generally be grouped into several categories. The first category comprises studies that examine the instruments used by legislative bodies in developing environmental laws and regulations. The second category includes research comparing the effectiveness of coercive versus non-coercive instruments in mitigating environmental problems. Despite the valuable contributions of existing studies on regulatory instruments and the use of coercive and non-coercive approaches in policymaking, a fundamental issue remains underexplored: identifying which organizations and institutions are subject to coercive and non-coercive policy instruments. This gap in the literature highlights the need for more specialized research in this area. Accordingly, the present study aimed to address this shortcoming by examining which organizations and institutions in Iran are subject to coercive and non-coercive policies in the country’s environmental laws.
Materials and Methods
The study used the network analysis approach to examine the topic. Network analysis is an emerging method in multi-criteria decision-making that can be used to prioritize factors and criteria. In the current study, all words indicating coercive and non-coercive policies—as well as the names of organizations and institutions subject to these policies—were first extracted from the text of relevant laws and regulations. It helped analyze the network of environmental laws and regulations and generate the primary data for this research. Then, a two-dimensional word–institution matrix was constructed, with the rows representing coercive and non-coercive policy words and the columns representing the corresponding organizations and institutions identified in the legal literature. In the next step, UCINET software was used to calculate the degree centrality and betweenness centrality indices for the coercive and non-coercive literature for each law. NetDraw software was then employed to visualize the results through graphs illustrating the degree centrality and betweenness centrality.
Results and Discussion
An analysis of the coercive network graphs revealed that the greatest diversity of coercive words was produced during the period from the implementation of land reforms to the Islamic Revolution (1963–1979). In addition, the highest number of institutions influenced by coercive literature was observed during both Rouhani’s presidency (the twelfth administration, 2013–2020) and the period of land reforms leading up to the Islamic Revolution. Similarly, an analysis of the non-coercive network graphs indicated that the most diverse use of non-coercive words was found in two periods: from the implementation of land reforms to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and from Reza Khan’s coup to the onset of land reforms (1921–1963). The highest number of institutions targeted by non-coercive literature appeared during the period of land reforms up to the Islamic Revolution, and from the Islamic Revolution to the end of the Iran–Iraq War.
Conclusion
The legal and administrative structure governing the environment and natural resources in Iran adopts a top-down approach. However, this coercive literature is primarily directed at non-governmental actors—namely, the general public—while the concept of punishment is rarely applied to government institutions. As a result, the government’s primary focus is on the first dimension of environmental issues: the belief that it is the actions of people that disrupt environmental processes. Consequently, the mainstream political science tends to emphasize exerting greater coercion and pressure on the public. In other words, legislative bodies use non-coercive literature when addressing government agencies and institutions, while coercive and punitive language is reserved mainly for citizens and non-governmental organizations. However, the government should also apply the second dimension of the pressure framework—acknowledging its own role and obligations. Ideally, coercive measures should be accompanied by accountability on the part of government institutions. This would help foster a perception that the law applies equally to both those who follow and those who violate the rules when environmental issues and problems arise. A more effective approach would involve the government promoting a quasi-voluntary, cooperative atmosphere. The government should balance how coercive and non-coercive discourse is applied to both governmental and non-governmental actors. In this way, the government can help build public trust and foster a kind of quasi-voluntary compliance.
Management
Masoumeh Najibi; Mostafa Hadavinejad
Abstract
Introduction
Public trust, defined as people’s belief in the behaviors and actions they expect from the government, is a crucial indicator of the effectiveness and legitimacy of a democratic government. This trust is of particular importance to public affairs managers, who work to enhance it by ...
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Introduction
Public trust, defined as people’s belief in the behaviors and actions they expect from the government, is a crucial indicator of the effectiveness and legitimacy of a democratic government. This trust is of particular importance to public affairs managers, who work to enhance it by using their skills and independence, and by identifying and applying the most effective methods and tools. Low public trust in the government or public organizations reflects public pessimism. Many people believe that governments are not functioning effectively, leading to a lack of trust. Therefore, for governments to provide better service to citizens, they must create an optimal level of public trust. A key area of interest for theorists and researchers is exploring the strategies governments use to reverse the decline in public trust. One proposed solution is e-government readiness, which refers to the ability of an organization, group, or unit to successfully adopt and benefit from information and communication technologies (ICT). It is argued that e-government readiness can enhance public trust by streamlining bureaucratic processes, channeling the citizens’ voice to the government, and making government services to the public more transparent and accessible. In addition, transparency is claimed to be essential for fostering and rebuilding trust in government. Transparency can help prevent mistakes by government officials by encouraging public oversight and dialogue between citizens and policymakers before decisions are made. ICT is often seen as an affordable and appropriate means to promote transparency. As a result, in recent years, e-government initiatives have been implemented with the aim of increasing transparency. This suggests that e-government may enhance public trust in government by increasing transparency. This theoretical conception is the central concern of the present research.
Materials and Methods
The present study used a survey research method to collect the data. A sample of 311 faculty members from public universities in Shiraz was selected. They completed questionnaires based on the variables, whose validity and reliability were tested. To test the hypotheses, the study first relied on confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate the research measurement models. Then, the data was analyzed using structural equation modeling with multiple regression in AMOS Graphics software. Baron and Kenny’s (1986) method was employed to investigate the mediating role of organizational transparency. The process examined the significance of the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable, the independent variables on the mediator, and the mediator on the dependent variable. Subsequently, the effect of the mediator variable was held constant, and the insignificance of the independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable was measured.
Results and Discussion
At the 99% confidence level, the relationships within the model and the partial mediating role of organizational transparency were confirmed. It was found that e-government readiness positively affects organizational transparency, and both public trust and organizational transparency act as mediators, increasing public trust. Previous research generally indicated that greater access to information and increased transparency through ICT enhance public trust in the government. Although the present study confirmed that e-government readiness has a partial direct effect on public trust through organizational transparency, it also revealed that e-government readiness independently has the capacity to build public trust.
Conclusion
According on the results, managers of public organizations are advised to focus on increasing various forms of organizational transparency, including participatory, informational, accountability, overall, and secretive transparency. Furthermore, since e-government readiness is seen as a key factor in enhancing organizational transparency and public trust, it is suggested that government organizations strengthen their e-government capabilities. To achieve this, it is essential to establish clear strategies, objectives, and action plans related to IT. The goals of the IT sector should be focused on internet-based activities. Additionally, it is important to ensure that those responsible for implementing e-government within the organization have the support and access to senior management. IT should be integrated into all activities and aspects of individual roles within the organization, and efforts should be made to promote it in a way that satisfies stakeholders. The organization’s service delivery process must be transformed through the use of IT. Extensive collaboration with other public organizations is necessary to solve problems, provide services, and performs tasks more effectively through electronic means. Moreover, clear processes should be set up to assess and compare the organization’s e-government strategy with its current implementation status, while continuously monitoring and evaluating e-government activities. It is also essential to develop standard criteria for the use of IT by both employees and clients, and high-quality information should be provided to stakeholders. Appropriate software solutions should be offered to stakeholders, and a high-quality website is a necessity. Adequate security measures must be implemented for the organization’s IT, and high-quality hardware suitable for its IT needs should be used. Hiring skilled and dedicated staff for the organization’s IT unit is crucial, as is involving stakeholders in the design, development, and modification of the organization’s IT systems. Finally, it is essential to ensure the availability of necessary hardware, software, and personnel to support IT operations in the workplace.
