Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran

2 Assistant Professor, Department of Theology, Bushehr University of Medical Sciences, Bushehr, Iran

Abstract

Introduction
There is an approach to the issues of industrial and economic expansion called the theory of developmental state, which seems to have similarities with the Reza Shah Regime in some of its components. This perspective has been repeatedly used in Iran to explain the industrial situation of the Asian tigers and even the adaptation to the industrialization trend in the post-Islamic Revolution period. However, the assumptions of this theory have not been tested in detail so far in its adaptation to the industrial and economic transformations of the Reza Shah era. That is why the main question of the present paper is whether or not the industrial and financial measures of Reza Shah can be placed within the framework of the theory of developmental state. The aim of investigation into the indicators of the theory of developmental state is to compare those developments during the Reza Shah era.
Methodology
One of the theories that can evaluate the economic transformations of Reza Shah's era is that of the developmental state. The theory of a developmental state or developmentalist state is based on the possibility of government intervention in the country's industrial development process. Chalmers Johnson popularized the term developmental states for the first time and considered it a description of a theoretical configuration to explain a reality derived from the experience of countries such as Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Botswana, and Taiwan. The distinctive feature of these countries was continuous and sustainable economic growth averaging 4% or more over two decades, increased level of welfare and living standards of the people along with controlling inflation. Although those governments were not economically liberal and believed in a maximalist government, they provided serious support to the private sector through a very proficient and strong bureaucracy. The theory of developmental state was further evolved by the people such as Peter Evans and Adrian Leftwich. Leftwich defines developmental states as the ones whose domestic policies and foreign relations are aimed at gaining power, authority, independence, capability, and capacity, which are determined and encouraged through the creation and promotion of conditions for economic growth or direct organization, or a combination of the two. This paper presents a qualitative method and an explanatory approach, and collects the necessary information from authentic sources such as memoirs, documents, and authentic analytical books from that period.
Findings and Discussion
The indicators of a development-oriented government in adaptation to Reza Shah administration are:
Centralized and comprehensive bureaucracy: The existence of a centralized and comprehensive bureaucracy, in a way that encompasses the entire country, is one of the primary requirements for a development-oriented government. Here, bureaucracy means a powerful, proficient, and corruption-free network. Iran lacked a unified bureaucratic network before the Pahlavi era. With Reza Khan taking the power and the need to concentrate power in order to confront multilateralism in the country and to create national unity, a unified and comprehensive bureaucracy was established in the country. However, the Iranian administrative system was faced with serious intellectual, cultural, and managerial challenges from the very beginning. Challenges that failed to transform it into an agile, dynamic, and anti-corruption bureaucratic complex and consequently, it became one of the obstacles to development in the country even up to the present time. The administrative system is dependent and passive, and informal in these types of systems and has managers who are merely subordinate to the decisions of the top of the political pyramid.
Developmental elites: Elites, both executive and intellectual, are considered to be the main components of transforming the community and advancing the goals of the government. The political elites of Iran at this time consisted of two groups. A group such as Davar, Hekmat, Foroughi, Taghizadeh, who were actually among the intellectuals and solidified the intellectual and cultural foundations of that government. The second group consisted of people such as Teimur Tash, the powerful Minister of the Court, Nosrat al-Dowleh Firouz, Seyyed Mohammad Tadayyon, Sardar Asad, etc., who were often active in the political and executive arenas. The dominance of this group over the affairs of the country was far beyond the first group. They institutionalized their irrational, self-centered, and anti-developmental behaviors in governmental affairs in such a way that the path for the promotion of capable and competent elites became narrow. In addition, none of the elites of the Reza Shah era, from Foroughi to Hekmat, from Davar to Kasravi, Taghizadeh, Bahar, and others, produced any work on the industrial and economic expansion of Iran. Most of the writings and works of the aforementioned individuals, and even their newspaper notes, have been devoted to cultural, literary, political, and civilizational issues.
Lack of a central development body in Iran: The existence of a central organization, which can manage the development program in the country by a precise design, is an undeniable necessity. Such a body paves the way for coherence in policies and the emergence of talents. There was no body for development planning in Iran. Although steps were taken for industrialization and modernization during the Reza Shah era, the concept of economic expansion within the planned framework was never operationalized until Reza Shah was exiled. Ebtehaj believed that the failure of planning thinking during that period was because Reza Shah did not believe in the centralization of planning work.
State Independence: The meaning of the state independence is the state's lack of dependence on social classes. The states were generally not dependent on a specific class in Iran, but rather were beyond any class. Reza Shah, who was the founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty, did not consider his government indebted to any group or class. Iran's historical experience shows that although Reza Shah's administration was independent of all social groups, it was cut off and separated from all of them. On the one hand, it was completely separated from the religious leaders and groups that formed the majority of society, and there was no common logic between them. The state's relationship with traditional and small merchants and traders, who mainly formed the commercial sector of Iran, was also severed.
Favorable international environment: If there is no suitable international environment for the export and competition of domestically-produced goods, the developmentalist government will face serious weaknesses. Many believe that the special conditions and situation of the developmentalist governments in South Korea and Taiwan after the World War II were exceptional. Among them, we can mention the unwavering support of the United States for these countries to prevent the influence of communism and the special conditions of the Cold War. But the influence of the great powers, especially Britain and the Soviet Union in Iran during this period, and their competition with each other was one of the important obstacles to development. Iran was exposed to the competition of the superpowers between the two world wars, and its expansion had become a matter of their pledge (distraint).
Neglect of agriculture during the Reza Shah Reign: Agriculture was of great importance for reasons such as utilizing the value-added capacity of the agricultural sector for industrial expansion, combating the influence of communism, and ensuring the production of needed and cheap food for the people in development-oriented governments. At the same time, paying attention to agriculture, along with land reforms in Iran, was also necessary and essential, but it was not realized in practice. This neglect can be considered in factors such as the Shah himself becoming the largest landowner in the country.
Conclusion: The results of the research show that although some elements of this theory, such as proficient bureaucracy, weak civil society, establishment of a permanent army and some development-oriented elites, seem to be consistent with political and economic approaches of Reza Shah's era, in reality, the lack of a development planning body, the government's lack of cooperation with social classes, the unfavorable international environment, elimination of development-oriented elites and their replacement with non-development-oriented elites, along with Reza Shah's neglect of some necessary measures for development, such as land reforms, which are considered the infrastructure for realizing the expansion, indicate that there is no real relationship between this theory and economic transformation in that period. What was necessary for real production, including industry, agriculture, services, and especially science and technology during this period, was not achieved, and most of them were subordinate to foreign markets. Iran's industrial expansion strategy was individual-oriented and tasteful, not organization-oriented and purposeful. No organization or group was engaged in economic and industrial expansion planning. For these reasons, Reza Shah's administration cannot be called a development-oriented administration, although it had similar conditions to that theory in some aspects, such as a weak civil society or the creation of a regular army.

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Main Subjects

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