Document Type : Research Paper
Authors
1 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran
2 Assistant Professor, Department of Theology, Bushehr University of Medical Sciences, Bushehr, Iran
Abstract
Extended Abstract
Introduction
The theory of developmental state is an approach to industrial and economic development that shares certain features with the policies of Reza Shah’s regime in Iran. This perspective has often been used in Iran to explain the industrial trajectories of the Asian Tigers, as well as to analyze the efforts to adapt to the industrialization trend in the post-Islamic Revolution period. However, the core assumptions of this theory have not yet been thoroughly examined concerning the industrial and economic transformations that occurred during Reza Shah’s rule. In this respect, the present study tried to answer the question of whether Reza Shah’s industrial and financial measures can be understood within the theory of the developmental state. The objective was to evaluate the key indicators of this theory and assess how they align with the developments that took place during Reza Shah’s reign.
Materials and Methods
The current study adopted a qualitative and explanatory approach, and drew on primary sources such as memoirs, documents, and authentic analytical works from the period to address the research question. Moreover, the theory of developmental state was used as the framework of analysis. The concept of developmental state (also known as developmentalist state) offers a theoretical framework that can help evaluate the economic transformations of Reza Shah’s reign. This theory is based on the idea that government intervention can play a central role the country’s industrial development process. The term developmental state was first popularized by Chalmers Johnson, who used it to describe a theoretical model to explain a reality derived from the experiences of countries such as Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Botswana, and Taiwan. A distinguishing feature of these countries was their continuous and sustainable economic growth—averaging 4% or more over two decades—accompanied by the increased level of welfare and living standards and effective inflation control. Although these governments did not follow economically liberal models and often advocated for a maximalist system, they simultaneously provided significant support to the private sector through a highly effective and efficient bureaucracy. The theory of developmental state was later developed further by scholars such as Peter Evans and Adrian Leftwich. Leftwich defines developmental states as those whose domestic policies and foreign relations are aimed at gaining power, autonomy, independence, capability, and capacity. These goals are pursued either through the direct organization of economic growth or by fostering conditions that encourage it—or a combination of the two.
Results and Discussion
The indicators of a developmental state, as applied to the context of Reza Shah’s regime, included a centralized and comprehensive bureaucracy, developmental elites, the absence of a central development body in Iran, state independence, a favorable international environment, and the neglect of agriculture. First, a key requirement of a developmental state is a centralized and comprehensive bureaucracy that extends across the entire country. In this context, bureaucracy refers to a powerful, proficient, and corruption-free network. Prior to the Pahlavi period, Iran lacked such a unified bureaucratic system. With Reza Khan’s rise to power, the need to concentrate power in order to counter internal fragmentation and promote national unity led to the establishment of a unified and comprehensive bureaucracy. However, from the outset, Iran’s administrative system faced significant intellectual, cultural, and managerial challenges. These obstacles prevented it from evolving into an agile, dynamic, and corruption-resistant system. As a result, the bureaucratic system became a persistent obstacle to development—one that continues to affect the country to this day. The administrative system remains dependent, passive, and informal. Within such systems, managers tend to be subordinate to the decisions coming from the top of the political pyramid. The second key indicator was the role of developmental elites. Elites—both executive and intellectual—are regarded as essential to transforming society and advancing the objectives of the state. Under Reza Shah’s regime, Iran’s political elite could be broadly categorized into two groups. The first included individuals such as Davar, Hekmat, Foroughi, and Taghizadeh, who were primarily intellectuals and played a significant role in shaping the cultural and ideological foundations of the state. The second group, which exercised greater influence over political and executive affairs, comprised figures like Teimur Tash, the powerful Minister of the Court, Nosrat al-Dowleh Firouz, Seyyed Mohammad Tadayyon, and Sardar Asad. This dominant group entrenched irrational, self-centered, and anti-developmental practices within government operations, effectively limiting opportunities for capable and competent elites to emerge and advance. In addition, none of the elites during Reza Shah’s reign—including Foroughi, Hekmat, Davar, Kasravi, Taghizadeh, Bahar, and others—produced any substantial work on Iran’s industrial or economic development. Their intellectual contributions, including newspaper articles, were overwhelmingly focused on cultural, literary, political, and civilizational issues. Another important indicator was the absence of a central development body in Iran. The existence of a central organization capable of managing national development through well-designed planning is an essential component of a successful developmental state. Such an institution ensures policy coherence and helps identify and nurture talent. However, during Reza Shah’s rule, no such organization existed. While there were efforts toward industrialization and modernization, the idea of systematic, planned economic development was not operationalized until Reza Shah’s exile. According to Ebtehaj, the failure to institutionalize planning during this period stemmed from Reza Shah’s resistance to the centralization of planning. The fourth indicator was state independence, which refers to the state’s autonomy from reliance on social classes. In the case of Iran, the state was not dependent on any particular class but operated beyond class affiliations. Reza Shah, as the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, did not view his government as being indebted to any social group or class. Iran’s historical experience suggests that although his regime maintained independence from all social groups, it was also distinctly isolated from them. On the one hand, the government was entirely detached from the religious leadership and groups—who constituted the majority of the population—and there was little to no shared logic. On the other hand, ties with traditional and small merchants—who represented the backbone of Iran’s commercial sector—were also severed. A favorable international environment is another critical factor in enabling a developmental state. Without a suitable international environment is essential for the export and competitiveness of domestically produced good, developmentalist states face significant challenges. Many argue that the conditions in South Korea and Taiwan after World War II were exceptional. These included unwavering U.S. support aimed at curbing the spread of communism, as well as the broader conditions of the Cold War. In contrast, Iran faced a different set of challenges. During the same period, the competing interests of major powers—particularly Britain and the Soviet Union—acted as major obstacles to Iran’s development. Between the two world wars, Iran was exposed to the rivalry of the superpowers, and its development became subject to their pledge and distraint. The last and sixth indicator was the neglect of agriculture during the reign of Reza Shah. Agriculture was of great importance for reasons such as leveraging the value-added potential of the agricultural sector for industrial expansion, countering the influence of communism, and ensuring the production of affordable and essential food for the population in the developmental state. At the same time, attention to agriculture, along with land reforms in Iran, was necessary and essential, but these goals were not realized in practice. This neglect can be attributed to factors such as the Shah himself becoming the largest landowner in the country.
Conclusion
The research findings indicate that although certain elements of the theory—such as a proficient bureaucracy, a weak civil society, a permanent army, and developmental elites—appear consistent with the political and economic approaches of Reza Shah’s reign, in practice, several critical factors undermined a true alignment. These include the absence of a development planning body, the government’s lack of engagement with social classes, an unfavorable international environment, the elimination of developmental elites and their replacement with non-developmental ones, and Reza Shah’s neglect of essential development measures, such as land reforms, which are considered foundational for national development. What was necessary for real production—across industry, agriculture, services, and especially science and technology—was not achieved, with most sectors remaining subordinate to foreign markets. Iran’s industrial expansion strategy was driven by individual preferences rather than being organization-oriented and purposeful. No organization or collective body was involved in planning economic and industrial growth. For these reasons, despite sharing some characteristics with the theory of developmental state—such as a weak civil society and a permanent army—Reza Shah’s administration cannot be classified as developmentalist.
Keywords
Main Subjects
)