Document Type : Research Paper
Author
PhD, Department of Sociology, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
Introduction
This paper critically examines the conventional view of the state in Iranian social history, which commonly characterizes the state as an "oriental despotism"—a sovereign that is absolute, all-encompassing, and detached from society —thereby denying the existence of any independent social forces throughout Iran’s history. Contrary to this perspective, historical evidence and recent theoretical analyses offer a different picture of the state and society during the Qajar period in Iran: a fragmented and corporate power structure embedded within a complex social fabric composed of diverse groups — including tribal confederations among nomadic tribes, rural communities in villages, and “guild groups” in urban centers. Rather than relying solely on coercion to govern society, the Qajar state depended on an intricate and continuous process of negotiation and bargaining with these social groups. According to the dominant “oriental despotism” approach, however, it has often been assumed that independent guild organizations could not exist in Iranian cities because the state prevented their emergence and development. In light of this evidence and new theoretical analyses, the central question addressed here is: what was the nature of the relationship between the state and guild organizations in the bazaar in Iranian urban society during the nineteenth-century Qajar period?
Theoretical Framework
To analyze this relationship, the paper adopts Joel S. Migdal's "state-in-society" framework. In contrast to classical state-centered approaches, this perspective does not regard the state as a unitary and omnipotent actor, but rather as an ensemble of institutions that continuously interact and struggle with social forces to shape the rules of social order. Accordingly, the boundaries between state and society are not fixed; instead, the dynamics of power and resistance determine the institutional position of social actors. To further clarify the concept of “relative independence” of guild organizations, the paper draws on Max Weber’s conceptual distinction between “autonomy” (subjection to external authority) and “self-governance” (the internal capacity to manage and regulate affairs). This distinction shows that guild independence is a spectrum that depends on the degree of subjection to state authority and the degree of control over internal matters.
Methodology
This research is a historical study that designed a case study focusing on guild organizations in the Tehran market between 1800 and 1906. Data collection draws upon primary sources including archival documents, newspapers, travel accounts, reports from foreign envoys, and memoirs of Qajar officials, along with credible secondary literature.
Results
The findings are presented in two main parts:
At the structural level, an analysis of the state's administrative arrangements for managing guild organizations and its financial dependence on them reveals a "power-balancing policy" based on the mutual needs of the state and the bazaar, including guilds. The Qajar state failed to establish a centralized administrative system. This failure meant that it could not consistently collect stable taxes nor effectively govern the bazaar by fully integrating its institutions into the bazaar. In this context, the state was compelled to rely on the cooperation of bazaar merchants and guilds to secure revenue and maintain urban order, resulting in a “power-balancing policy” based on mutual dependence.
At the institutional level, the study shows that guild organizations possessed a form of "relative independence" in shaping and maintaining the rules that regulated socio-economic life in the bazaar. Analysis of elements such as the selection of guild heads, taxation, quality control, and pricing of goods, contracts, and labor conditions, master–apprentice relationships, dispute resolution (arbitration), social support, and financial-credit relations demonstrates that guilds exercised considerable self-governance in organizing work. Their subjection to the state was primarily defined through payment of guild taxes (bunyacha). In return for these taxes, the state not only allowed guilds to operate economically but also recognized their exclusive rights within their craft, effectively granting them a form of monopoly. Thus, guild groups in the bazaar experienced a kind of “relative independence” which, under state authority, allowed them a significant level of self-governance.
Discussion
The findings of this research challenge the one-sided portrayal of the "bazaar in bondage under absolute despotism" and instead illustrate a dynamic relationship between the state and the bazaar as a diverse and active urban institution where both sides were engaged in ongoing processes of negotiation, compromise, resistance, and the reproduction of socio-economic rules. Compared to major merchants who, due to their substantial financial capital, had political influence, retailers and artisans — despite their limited wealth — gained collective bargaining power through their organization. This arrangement enabled the everyday administration of the bazaar’s economic life, despite its formal subjection to the state, to be largely entrusted to enduring, informal, and reliable networks of guilds. Therefore, guild independence in Iran was neither absolute nor reducible to complete subjection; rather, it was a fluid spectrum that varied historically in response to the balance of social and economic forces.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Qajar state, unable to establish a centralized power structure to govern economic life, inevitably pursued a policy that maintained a balance of power with bazaar actors. As a result, the integration of state institutions into guild organizations in the bazaar remained limited. This, in turn, shaped an institutional setting for guilds characterized by relative independence that allowed them, under state subjection, to enjoy a noticeable degree of self-governance. A more nuanced understanding of state–society relations in pre-modern Iran thus requires moving beyond the image of a monolithic, omnipotent state and recognizing the diverse, negotiated forms of local governance. This perspective contributes to a better understanding of how local trust networks, market order, and intermediary institutions were historically formed.
Keywords
Main Subjects
)