The State
Mahdi Omidi
Abstract
Introduction
Good governance emerged as a dominant agenda in public policy and development discourse during the final decades of the twentieth century. Initially promoted by the World Bank and other international organizations, it emphasized principles such as accountability, transparency, rule of law, ...
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Introduction
Good governance emerged as a dominant agenda in public policy and development discourse during the final decades of the twentieth century. Initially promoted by the World Bank and other international organizations, it emphasized principles such as accountability, transparency, rule of law, institutional effectiveness, and anti-corruption. The concept aimed to provide an institutional framework for sustainable and equitable development. In theoretical literature, good governance is often equated with effective institutions and is assumed to have a reciprocal relationship with economic growth, poverty reduction, and policy effectiveness. However, despite its widespread adoption, the concept has faced significant criticism. These critiques question both its theoretical coherence and its practical applicability across diverse political and social contexts. This study revisits good governance with the benefit of historical distance and accumulated empirical evidence.
Research Question(s) What are the conceptual meanings and implications of good governance as promoted by international organizations, how has this discourse evolved over the past three decades, and what have been its practical outcomes, strengths, and limitations in the fields of public policy and development?
Literature Review
The literature on good governance largely originates from international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank, the IMF, and the United Nations. These organizations associate governance quality with institutional capacity, market efficiency, and effective public management. Empirical studies often report positive correlations between governance indicators and economic growth, income levels, and poverty reduction. At the same time, critical scholarship challenges these findings by questioning causality, measurement validity, and contextual neutrality. Comparative studies highlight cases where growth occurred in the absence of good governance indicators, and others where strong governance scores failed to deliver development outcomes. The literature thus reveals a deep divide between supportive and critical perspectives. This review situates good governance within these competing theoretical traditions.
Methodology
This study adopts a critical review methodology based on qualitative analysis of key international policy documents and foundational academic literature on governance and development.
Results
The findings indicate that good governance functioned both as a theoretical construct and as an operational policy agenda, shaping development interventions globally throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. International organizations framed governance primarily as a set of institutional qualities—such as regulatory effectiveness, control of corruption, and rule of law—designed to reduce transaction costs and enhance market performance. Empirical studies supporting this agenda reported positive relationships between governance indicators and economic growth, foreign direct investment, and public sector efficiency. These findings played a major role in legitimizing governance-based conditionality in development assistance.
However, closer examination reveals substantial limitations. First, the causal direction between governance and development remains contested. While some studies suggest that better governance leads to growth, others demonstrate reverse or bidirectional causality, or argue that a minimum level of economic development is a prerequisite for governance reforms. Second, the universality of governance prescriptions proved problematic. Countries with diverse historical trajectories, political regimes, and institutional legacies were subjected to standardized reform packages, often with limited success. Third, the operationalization of good governance resulted in excessively broad and ambitious reform agendas that exceeded the administrative and political capacities of many developing states.
The findings also show that governance reforms were frequently implemented in highly constrained environments characterized by weak institutions, limited resources, low legitimacy, and fragmented societies. In such contexts, governance indicators often became aspirational goals rather than achievable benchmarks. Moreover, international organizations tended to prioritize formal institutional reforms and “best practices,” leading to isomorphic mimicry rather than genuine capacity building. As a result, many governance reforms failed to deliver their intended outcomes, despite extensive policy adoption. Overall, the evidence suggests that while good governance contributed to re-centering the state in development discourse, it struggled to translate theoretical ideals into context-sensitive and effective practice.
Discussion
The discussion highlights a fundamental tension within the good governance agenda between normative ambition and practical feasibility. While the concept successfully reintroduced the importance of institutions and the state, it underestimated the political and historical conditions necessary for reform. Governance was often treated as a technical issue rather than a deeply political process. This depoliticization limited the effectiveness of reforms and obscured power relations embedded in institutional change. Furthermore, the expansion of governance objectives diluted priorities and overwhelmed implementation capacities. These shortcomings explain the gradual decline of good governance as a dominant development paradigm.
Conclusion
The good governance agenda possessed several important strengths that initially contributed to its prominence in development and public policy discourse. Most notably, it re-centered the state after decades of market-oriented approaches that had marginalized public authority. At the same time, it moved beyond a state-centric perspective by emphasizing the interconnected roles of the market and civil society, thereby promoting more participatory forms of policymaking. Network-based interpretations of governance further enriched this perspective by conceptualizing the state as an open and interactive system, dependent on continuous engagement with social, political, and economic actors.
Nevertheless, these strengths were gradually overshadowed by fundamental weaknesses. Chief among them was the excessive expansion of the good governance agenda, which transformed it into a comprehensive and highly ambitious reform package that exceeded the administrative, political, and institutional capacities of many developing countries. Although enhancing state capacity was one of the declared objectives of good governance, the successful implementation of this agenda itself presupposed the existence of capacities that were largely absent. As a result, goals and means were conflated, and governance reforms became trapped in a self-reinforcing cycle of unmet expectations and expanding prescriptions.
Furthermore, international organizations largely equated governance reform with institution building based on “best practices,” often neglecting political stability, historical context, and social conditions. This led to isomorphic imitation rather than genuine capacity development. Ultimately, the central weakness of good governance lies in its insufficient attention to the actual capacities of implementing states, underscoring the need for context-sensitive and politically informed approaches to governance reform.
Acknowledgments
The author declares no conflict of interest.
Public and International Law
Hasan Mohammadi
Abstract
Research Problem and BackgroundThe constitution, as the foundational covenant of political order, has always been the site of a major confrontation between two predominant approaches in defining the limits and duties of the state: The neutrality-based (or rights-based) approach, which, grounded in the ...
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Research Problem and BackgroundThe constitution, as the foundational covenant of political order, has always been the site of a major confrontation between two predominant approaches in defining the limits and duties of the state: The neutrality-based (or rights-based) approach, which, grounded in the protection of individual rights, freedoms, and autonomy, confines the state's duty to securing the "right" (justice, security, public interests); and the perfectionist approach, which prioritizes the "good" (a specific conception of the desirable life and human flourishing), assigning the state a mission beyond providing material interests, making it responsible for the ethical guidance and cultivation of citizens toward perfection. The emergence of the modern constitution through liberal-democratic revolutions was based on the separation of the "right" (justice) from the "good" (virtue), the distinction between the public and private spheres, and reliance on constituent power (popular sovereignty) and individual rights. However, some contemporary systems, by incorporating specific conceptions of the good life (with religious or philosophical character) into their constitutions, have adopted a perfectionist approach. This raises the central question: Is such an approach compatible with the foundations of the public sphere (as the legitimacy-bestowing realm in democratic theories) and the requirements of the modern constitution? Relying on the ideas of Jürgen Habermas, the prominent social philosopher, this article analyzes this conflict.Research ObjectiveThe primary objective of this article is to analyze the relationship between perfectionist constitutions and the possibility of realizing the public sphere in its Habermasian sense. The author seeks to demonstrate that incorporating perfectionist foundations and ends into a constitution not only conflicts with the rights-based and autonomous foundations of the modern constitution but also, due to the merging of the public and private spheres and the negation of pluralism, theoretically and practically precludes the realization of the public sphere. Therefore, the article's ultimate conclusion is to prove the impossibility of the public sphere within political systems based on perfectionist constitutions. Research MethodThis research employs a descriptive-analytical method, relying on library resources (Persian and English books and articles). The methodology is based on conceptual and comparative analysis. First, the key concepts of the "public sphere," "discourse ethics," and "perfectionism" are explained and examined by referring to the ideas of Habermas and other thinkers. Subsequently, the foundations of the modern constitution and the requirements of constitutional perfectionism are investigated. Finally, by comparing and evaluating the principles of these two domains, their relationship and the consequences of this conflict are analyzed.Findings of the ResearchThe research findings are presented in several main areas:Foundations and Function of the Habermasian Public Sphere: The public sphere is an intersubjective realm, independent of the state and the private sphere (market and family), in which free and equal citizens, in a space free from coercion and based on rational discourse and argumentation, discuss and deliberate on public matters. The output of this discursive process (norms and public opinion) influences the political system through institutions like parliament, bestowing rational legitimacy upon it. In Habermas's thought, the legitimacy of law and the political system is not intrinsic but discursive, dependent on its continuous confirmation by this sphere. Discourse ethics, with conditions such as freedom, equality, universal participation, and the exclusion of exclusion, specifies the procedural framework of this realm.Foundations of the Modern Constitution: The modern constitution is founded upon individual rights, autonomy (private and public), the constituent power of the people, and the separation of right from good. Justice (the right) belongs to the public sphere (regulating social relations), and the good life (the good) belongs to the realm of private individual choice. The modern state, in its ideal form, is neutral towards diverse conceptions of the good, providing only a legal framework for the peaceful coexistence of these plural conceptions.Nature and Consequences of Perfectionism in the Constitution: The perfectionist approach, with the primacy of the good over the right, seeks to obligate the state to guide society towards a specific "good life" (often derived from a religious or philosophical ideology) by defining it. In constitutions, this leads to the reduction of rights within the framework of that conception of the good and the transformation of the state into a societal tutor. The perfectionist state considers itself to possess "absolute truth" in recognizing human flourishing and deems itself responsible for its practical realization.Fundamental Conflict: The article's analysis reveals a structural and irreconcilable conflict between the foundations of constitutional perfectionism and the requirements of the public sphere:Negation of Pluralism and Freedom: Perfectionism, by insisting on a single narrative of the good, disregards or rejects ethical pluralism (a necessary condition for the public sphere).Merging of Spheres: By introducing the "good" into the realm of public legislation, this approach dissolves the fundamental distinction between the public sphere (right/justice) and the private sphere (good/virtue).Negation of Autonomy and Equality: By defining citizens based on adherence to the ruling ideology, the intrinsic equality of participants in discourse and their individual autonomy are called into question. Having a right is reduced to being right (in accordance with the model of virtue).Elimination of the Public Sphere: Under these conditions, the public sphere either does not form at all, or if it does, it is immediately absorbed and dissolved into the state sphere (which considers itself the embodiment of truth and the good). Instead of being supervised and influenced by the public sphere, the state legislates comprehensively across all spheres of life.Crisis of Legitimacy: By eliminating the public sphere as the continuous source of legitimacy-bestowal, the political system based on a perfectionist constitution faces a legitimacy crisis, as it cannot genuinely reflect the free will and discursive participation of the people.ConclusionThis article concludes that the possibility of realizing the public sphere in its Habermasian sense within the framework of perfectionist constitutions does not exist. Incorporating perfectionist concepts into the modern constitution creates an internal contradiction, as it places the rights-based and autonomous structures of the modern constitution in the service of an end inherently opposed to its foundations (separation of right from good, state neutrality, pluralism). This not only leads to the reduction of individual rights and the negation of autonomy but also, by merging the public sphere into the state and erasing the private/public boundaries, disables the sole rational and discursive source of legitimacy in complex modern societies. Therefore, the public sphere, which guarantees the dynamism, accountability, and legitimacy of constituted political systems, is doomed to impossibility within the perfectionist approach to constitutionalism. This research demonstrates that attempts to synthesize these two paradigms will come at the cost of losing one of them (primarily the public sphere and discursive democracy).
The State
Naser Pourhassan
Abstract
Introduction:With the Operation Al-Aqsa Flood of 7 October and the subsequent massive and all-out Israeli attack on Gaza, then on the West Bank, South Lebanon and the spreading of the crisis in the Middle East region, the formation of an independent Palestinian state alongside the Israeli state once ...
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Introduction:With the Operation Al-Aqsa Flood of 7 October and the subsequent massive and all-out Israeli attack on Gaza, then on the West Bank, South Lebanon and the spreading of the crisis in the Middle East region, the formation of an independent Palestinian state alongside the Israeli state once again became a regional agenda. It became international. Whereas before it had been almost completely off the political agenda of the Israeli government, regional actors and major world powers.Purpose of the research:The purpose of this article is the feasibility of realising the theory of two states in the changing conditions ahead. The main question of the article is: "In light of Israel's actions since the onset of the occupation of Palestine, particularly the developments that have transpired in the Gaza Strip during the years 2023 to 2025, the question arises as to the viability of establishing an independent Palestinian state alongside the established Jewish state of Israel.?" The article's hypothesis is formulated as follows: State-building in Palestine has involved two irreconcilable processes. In one process, the areas of positive state-building for the formation and stabilization of the Israeli state have been carried out, and in the opposite process, the possibility of state-building for the Palestinians in the areas of population, territory, government, sovereignty and recognition has been denied and collapsed. For this reason, the formation of two Palestinian and Jewish states is not possible, especially after 7 October 2023.MethodologyThe present study employs a descriptive-analytical approach in its methodological framework. The information was collected through library research, which entailed the review of scientific books and articles, as well as reports from reliable media sources, including the Al Jazeera network, in both English and Persian.ResultsThis article is written within the framework of the concept of " Nation-State -building", which eventually led to the new concept of " Nation-State -destruction". According to the first article of the Montevideo Convention, an independent state is a state that has "a permanent population", "a defined territory", "an independent government" and "sovereignty" and is capable of establishing relations with other countries. In the process of more than a century in the land of Palestine, especially since the Basel Congress in Switzerland in 1897 until 2024, an unfavourable trend has occurred in the land of Palestine in the field of nation-state elements. The contradictory processes of Nation-State building in Palestine have continued and intensified in various aspects. In the field of population, the process of increasing the Jewish population has been implemented against the elimination and destruction of the Palestinian population. With the systematic migration of Jews, the majority of the Palestinian population has been displaced and the process of killing them with genocide and ethnic cleansing has continued in its various aspects. The continuous destruction of the Palestinian population in various ways and the use of conventional and non-conventional weapons, targeted killing, frequent massacres and even the use of starvation as a weapon continue. Since 7 October, 72,000 Palestinians have been killed and more than 200,000 injured, most of them permanently disabled. The inconsistency of state building and state collapse in the territorial element continues to increase. In contrast to the process of expansionism and territorial integration of Israel, the territory of the Palestinians has become smaller and more divided. According to the developments of the last 24 months, the scope of Israel's territorial expansionism has expanded within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and even in South Lebanon and the Golan Heights.The 364 square kilometer territory of Gaza is divided into four regions. Settlement construction is not only in the West Bank, where an increase of one million people is planned; It will also spread to the Gaza Strip Again The inadequacy of state building is more tangible in the field of administrative-organizational organizations. Since the Jews immigrated to Palestine in the late 19th century, by creating military militias such as The Palmach, Irgun, and Stern, they created a strong military force, and with the direct and indirect aid of the United States, they have become one of the strongest military forces. While labeling any Palestinian military force as a terrorist, it has prevented the creation of a military force as a prerequisite for the government in Palestine. In the economic field, Israel has controlled the resources of the Palestinians, especially the water resources, in various ways, and has placed them under siege and severe dependence in terms of economic structure by capturing Jerusalem and declaring it as the eternal and indivisible capital of Israel, it has practically made the idea of forming a Palestinian state impossibleBy destroying all the infrastructures of life, from houses and roads to water sources and agricultural fields, Israel has destroyed all the infrastructures of the formation of a state in Palestine. During the recent war in Gaza, all the buildings in the Gaza Strip were razed to the ground and even the streets of the cities of the West Bank were ploughed up. While the effort to recognize the Israeli government continues through various methods, from the sale of arms to the influence of Jewish lobbies in America, by depriving Palestinian political identities such as the self-governing organizations of their sovereignty, against the recognition of the Palestinian government by other countries. It has resisted a lot.ConclusionDespite the insistence of some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, that the normalisation of relations with Israel depends on the formation of an independent Palestinian state, as well as international efforts, especially at the level of the United Nations General Assembly, and the recognition of the Palestinian state by some European countries, the realisation of the theory of two states in the land of Palestine will be practically impossible. The increase in the political and military power of the religious Zionists in Israel (especially the right-wing government ministers and Knesset representatives), as well as the density of hatred and disgust between the Israelis and the Palestinian people towards each other during the 2023-2025 war, as well as the coming to power of the most anti-Palestinian government in the second term of Trump's presidency, the United States makes the formation of an independent Palestinian state practically impossible.
Political Science
Sajjad Omidoiur
Abstract
IntroductionThe state, as the central institution organizing collective life, fundamentally possesses a monopoly on legitimate authority and territorial sovereignty within a defined realm. This concept rests on three pillars: sovereignty as the exclusive right to legislate and make final decisions, legitimacy ...
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IntroductionThe state, as the central institution organizing collective life, fundamentally possesses a monopoly on legitimate authority and territorial sovereignty within a defined realm. This concept rests on three pillars: sovereignty as the exclusive right to legislate and make final decisions, legitimacy based on the consent of the governed, and the capacity to wield organized force to ensure social order. Historically, the state has dynamically evolved in response to changing human needs, from pre-modern foundations in metaphysical and theological doctrines to the modern secular state grounded in popular sovereignty, rational bureaucracy, and social contract theory.Today, the emergence of the digital paradigm poses unprecedented challenges to these classical foundations. Digital governance signifies not merely the adoption of electronic tools but a paradigmatic shift in the very nature of power, sovereignty, and citizenship. It transforms traditional notions of territorial control into the management of data flows, recasts the citizen from a legal subject into a data source, and reduces policy-making to algorithmic processes focused on social engineering. This shift places the politics of the human body at the center of contemporary political theory and practice. The body is no longer solely a subject of discipline but has become a vital data infrastructure, a strategic economic resource, and an ideological battleground. Consequently, this research seeks to investigate how digital governance, through redefining the relationship between the state and the body, shapes the contemporary crisis of sovereignty across four distinct political systems: China, Germany, Singapore, and Russia.Materials and MethodsThis research employs a comparative case study design to analyze the logics of digital governance across four distinct political systems: China, Germany, Singapore, and Russia. These cases were selected as representative ideal types along the intersecting spectra of political centralization and the nature of the state-digital body relationship. The methodological approach is qualitative, relying on documentary analysis and thematic coding to construct a nuanced, interpretive understanding of how sovereignty is reconfigured in the digital age. The core analytical strategy involves a structured, focused comparison, where each case is examined through the lens of the same theoretical framework to identify unique patterns of convergence and divergence.Data collection was conducted through the triangulation of three primary document types to ensure robustness. First, primary policy documents, including national laws, formal state strategies, and official government reports, provided the foundational legal and discursive framework. Second, pre-existing interviews with experts, former officials, and activists, published by reputable media and research institutions, were analyzed as secondary textual sources to capture stakeholder perspectives. Third, technical reports and public interface analyses of relevant digital governance platforms offered insights into functional implementation. The collected data was subjected to a rigorous thematic analysis using a three-stage coding process—open, axial, and selective—to systematically identify, connect, and synthesize core categories into the four overarching governance models.Results and DiscussionThe analysis reveals four distinct models of digital governance, each forging a unique relationship between the state and the digitized body. In China, the body is constructed as a national data resource, harnessed through integrated systems like the Social Credit System to produce a disciplined "algorithmic subject." Germany exemplifies a model of bodily autonomy and privacy, legally constituting the body as a protected digital sphere and fostering a "multi-layered sovereign subject" through strict regulations like the GDPR. Singapore presents a hybrid neo-liberal efficiency model, treating the body as a transactional commodity where health data is exchanged for services, crafting a "computational-commercial subject." Conversely, Russia’s securitized authoritarianism frames the body as a political threat, weaponizing biometric data for surveillance and producing a "securitized subject."These findings demonstrate that digital technology does not drive a uniform political outcome but is instead shaped by dominant ideological frameworks into tools of either emancipation, control, or commodification. This divergence generates specific sovereignty crises. China exports its infrastructural power, creating extraterritorial bio-dependency, while Germany’s regulatory hegemony can inadvertently stifle local technological development. Singapore’s market logic leads to a loss of national bio-sovereignty through data commodification, and Russia extends its security apparatus transnationally. Collectively, these models signify a fundamental reconfiguration of state power, where sovereignty is increasingly exercised not over physical territory but through the management of datafied life, challenging the very foundations of the Westphalian nation-state system.ConclusionThis study demonstrates that digital governance represents a fundamental transformation in the nature of political power, where the management of the datafied body has become the new frontier of sovereignty. The comparative analysis of China, Germany, Singapore, and Russia reveals that identical technologies are molded into radically different instruments of power by the dominant ideological and political logic of each system. There is no singular "digital state," but rather competing paradigms: the techno-security totalitarian model, the rights-based democratic model, the neoliberal efficiency model, and the securitized authoritarian model.The core finding is that the crisis of the modern nation-state is amplified, not resolved, by digitalization. Sovereignty is fragmented, distributed among transnational corporations and algorithmic systems, and exercised through the continuous extraction and analysis of biological and behavioral data. The resulting reconfiguration—from sovereignty over territory to sovereignty through data—poses profound challenges to foundational concepts of legitimacy, autonomy, and collective rights. Ultimately, navigating this new terrain requires moving beyond simplistic views of technology as either a neutral tool or an unstoppable force, and toward a critical, context-sensitive understanding of its embeddedness in perpetual struggles for power and freedom.
Development and Security
Amir Behzad Sadeqi; Davoud Gharayagh-Zandi
Abstract
IntroductionThe Islamic Republic of Iran entered its fifth decade in 2020, with its first four decades marked by numerous destabilizing incidents that challenged its stability both domestically and internationally. Social changes have rooted in those destabilizing incidents. Current crisis management ...
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IntroductionThe Islamic Republic of Iran entered its fifth decade in 2020, with its first four decades marked by numerous destabilizing incidents that challenged its stability both domestically and internationally. Social changes have rooted in those destabilizing incidents. Current crisis management agencies have proven ineffective in preventing overlapping crises. Those policies have addressed social changes; recurring destabilizing challenges suggest limited effectiveness. Some Islamic Republic discourse’s principles, such as (Independence, Islamic Revolution Export, Velayat-e-Faqih, Islamic Ideal Society, Usury-free Banking, and Jihadi Management, etc)) In accordance with relevant constitution principles have been crystallizing as; revisionist foreign policy, Axis of Resistance reinforcement and Iranian-Islamic Progress Idle have been some policies implemented for more than the past 45 years. In the aftermath of the twelve-day war and amid the increasingly frequent recurrence of closely spaced episode large-scale unrest in recent years, a systematic analysis of the underlying causes of instability and the role of political-social crises have become imperative. However, studies conducted to date do not adequately illustrate the process through which stability or instability in the political system has been formed. As outlining a future outlook requires an understanding of the past and the trends embedded within it, examining the process of stability and instability formation over the past four decades gains particular importance.Materials and MethodsResearch methodology was a combination of post-event research and future studies. Perspective of a regime’s stability ought to be based on possible futures and present a holistic view. That’s why each holistic view about the future must contain three levels of analysis, which include internal, regional, and international. This research employs future studies, whether in trend surveys or in scenario writing, to highlight the necessity of a comprehensive approach. Data were collected through library research and internet sources using an inductive method, then analyzed to identify patterns of social changes over four decades. The study also examines regime responses to challenges across four decades, analyzing them in ten-year segments. This enables comparative analysis across time periods using specific variables. Ultimately, based on the four-decade trend survey, drivers, blockers and wild cards will be determined scenario writing. There are three scenarios named as optimistic, pessimistic and neutral. In this regard, the main question of the research is whether, considering the regime’s stability pattern over the past four decades, which of the optimistic, pessimistic, and neutral scenarios might occur. The hypothesis is its perspective would be based on a pessimistic scenario in which dormant crises would synergize during the fifth decade due to the degradation.Results and DiscussionThe crisis indicators have had a direct relationship with social changes and have challenged the stability status of the regime during the last decades. Among the crisis indicators that led to social changes, the followings have more important and can be mentioned here:1) Economic mismanagement and Corruption. 2) Society Islamization and Lifestyle Assimilation. 3) Ethnic demands and Regime responses. 4) Factional clashes and lack of Dispute resolution. 5) Anti-arrogance against the West’s Responses. 6) Anti-Israel doctrine and Israeli responses. 7) Islamic Revolution Export Policy and Regional Responses. 8) Environmental challenges and water scarcity. 9) Electoral Integrity Disputes. 10) Intra-factional conflict. 11) Judicial-security role in handling security cases. 12) Restrictive Press and media laws.These drivers have faced Islamic Revolution discourse and the institutions that originated from that discourse for more than 40 years, leading to destabilizing challenges that resulted in seven socio-political crises. During past four decades, Occurrence of crises such as; ((Distribution)), ((Penetration)), ((Participation)), ((Identity)), ((Legitimacy)), ((Regional)) and ((International)) have been affecting the political system's stability. The fate of these crises played a decisive role in determining the stability of the system in each particular decade.Ultimately, from following ((crisis indicators)) to ((destiny of crises)), it could result in a base to define a perspective about the political system status in the mid years of the fifth decade.Today, any crisis within administrative, financial, ideological, or judicial sub-systems threatens the regime's efficiency and legitimacy comprehensively. Since the seven socio-political crises play a prominent role in the stability of political systems, the fate of such crises is interrelated to each other significantly. After crises emerge, political systems may move toward one of three possible fates: 1) Political Stabilization and Legitimacy Improvement: In this fate, the regime is either favorable in terms of efficiency or attractive and powerful in terms of discourse and propaganda. However, most crises generally do not form or resolve by civil-martial institutions. 2) State of Dormancy: Despite the regime's lack of institutional efficiency, it retains strong ideological or propaganda tools. Crises are temporarily contained but may be reactivated upon new destabilizing challenges. 3) Crises Synergism towards Political Instability: When multiple challenges are not adequately addressed (in the context of ineffective regime responses), various crises interact and intensify, leading to system inefficiency and increasing instability.ConclusionInvestigating the crisis indicators during the last four decades of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s lifetime suggests a trend toward a pessimistic scenario named as crises synergy towards political instability in the upcoming decade. The various socio-political crises that occurred during the same time show the most important crisis indicators include: Society Islamization and Lifestyle Assimilation, Economic mismanagement and Corruption, Ethnic demands and Regime response, Anti-arrogance against the West’s Response, Anti-Israel doctrine and Israeli response, Islamic Revolution Export Policy and Regional Responses, Environmental challenges and water scarcity. Such crisis indicators might synergize predictably, so that the regime’s stability is suddenly questioned. Consequently, the hypothesis posits that the synergizing of dormant crises during the fifth decade will likely exacerbate instability, especially without significant structural reforms within the regime. Overall, the Islamic Republic’s stability perspective suggests that, due to socio-political crises during the fifth decade, a fragile stability status will likely be inevitable.However, the effectiveness of the regime’s responses in addressing destabilizing challenges has been extensive, and further research is suggested to analyze these outputs in more detail. The findings suggest that while these responses have been evaluated for their efficiency in addressing challenges, their effectiveness can vary significantly. Therefore, additional research is needed to explore these outputs.
The State
Farzad Kalateh; Faez Dinparast
Abstract
Research problem
The performance of governments in resolving individual and collective conflicts depends on their ability; in the modern era, unlike the pre-modern era, societies, affected by various developments, including the industrial revolution in the economic sphere, the Renaissance and modernization ...
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Research problem
The performance of governments in resolving individual and collective conflicts depends on their ability; in the modern era, unlike the pre-modern era, societies, affected by various developments, including the industrial revolution in the economic sphere, the Renaissance and modernization in the cultural sphere, and urbanization in the social sphere, have undergone extensive, very complex, and specialized changes, and the amount of conflicts and demands of society from the government has expanded in quantitative and qualitative terms; therefore, governments must also develop to resolve conflicts, and one of the important requirements for the development of governments is structural separation; that is, the institution of the government should deal solely with political affairs and delegate other matters to other institutions; specialization of institutions will lead to an increase in their capacity and power; increasing the capacity of the political institution of the government will make the government more efficient, and the efficiency of the government will lead to the stabilization of the prevailing political order.
The available evidence and data confirm that despite the 1979 revolution, the state of structural differentiation during the Islamic Republic of Iran has not only not improved, but has also intensified to the point that today, some researchers use terms such as state capitalism, crony capitalism, quasi-state capitalism, and khusulati to describe the Iranian economic system (see Ghaninejad, 2017, Sattari, 2010, Pesaran, 2011). In this regard, the issue of this research is to explain the state of structural differentiation during the Islamic Republic of Iran; that is, to answer why the current situation arose; in other words, what factors have caused the widespread interference and dominance of political power over economic power during the Islamic Republic of Iran?
Research Background
Researchers have conducted many studies to explain the issue of structural differentiation during the Islamic Republic of Iran; in most studies, the rentier nature of the government institution in Iran has been introduced as the main reason for the weakening of structural differentiation (see Katouzian, 2013, Karshenas, 2003, Haji Yousefi, 2000, Heshmatzadeh, 2000, Ghaffari and others, 2019). However, oil rent has played a key role in the emergence of this situation and it cannot be denied, but the available evidence shows that some countries that enjoy oil rents are in a much better position than Iran in terms of separation of powers, or even some countries that do not enjoy oil rents are in a much lower position than Iran. Therefore, this evidence shows us that the mere existence of oil rent is not sufficient to explain the situation of structural differentiation and it seems that other factors are involved in this context. In fact, in these works, the pathology of the separation of power is referred to an external and non-political factor, namely oil; but the innovative aspect of the present research is that it tries to explain the challenges of structural differentiation during the Islamic Republic of Iran from a political perspective.
Research Objective
Describing and explaining the state of structural disintegration in Iran during the Islamic Republic.
Research Method
In this study, the documentary method was used to collect data and the process tracing method was used to judge the data; process tracing is a technique that helps the researcher to examine certain mechanisms through which an independent variable is linked to a dependent variable. Causal mechanisms mean processes or intermediary variables through which an explanatory variable has a causal effect on the dependent variable (Taliban, 2008: 96). The use of this method is because the process of the emergence of institutions is contextual and time-dependent and is affected by various factors. The unit of research analysis is Iran and the time period, the Islamic Republic period (1978 to 1991), the observation unit is political events, such as the Islamic Revolution of 1978 and the establishment of the political system of the Islamic Republic, the process of drafting and approving the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the measurement unit is the state of separation of political power from economic power.
Research findings
To determine the status of the separation of political power from economic power in Iran during the Islamic Republic, global indicators were used. The scores received during the period in question were aggregated and the average was obtained by dividing it by the number of years. The results of the calculations show that the separation of political power from economic power in the Islamic Republic is in the "unfree" state overall.
Table No. (5): Status of structural differentiation (separation of political structure from economic structure) during the Islamic Republic of Iran
Index
Time period Total Scores Average Score Status
1 Economic Change from the Bertelsmann Foundation 16 years (from 2005 to 2020) 118 45.2 Unfree
2 Economic Freedom from the Heritage Foundation 26 years (from 1996 to 2021) 1104 46.42 Unfree
3 Free Economy from the Legatum Institute 14 years (from 2007 to 2020) 254 18 Unfree
4 Economic Freedom from the Fraser Institute 23 years (from 2000 to 2018 and 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995) 119 17.5 Relatively unfree
5 Government Ownership of the Economy 42 years (from 1979 to 2020) 5568 63.1 Relatively unfree
Source: Research findings
Conclusion
The Constitutional Revolution is considered the starting point of the modernization of the state in Iran, but the economic structure and structure of society and the authoritarian modernization approach of the Pahlavi government led to the expansion of the government's ownership, duties, and powers in the field of economy. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, despite the widespread opposition of political forces to the previous political order and the minor and general differences that existed between them regarding the nature of the new political order, except for a small part of the political forces, the rest of the forces, considering the prevailing institutional context, and for various reasons and with varying intensity and weakness, were in favor of the stateization of the economy; In addition, the weakness of the theoretical and empirical knowledge of political forces in the field of how to regulate economic affairs, the rentier nature of the state, and the occurrence of the Eight Years' War also contributed to the cause and were effective in weakening structural differentiation; After the establishment of the new political order, the relative increase in political and economic benefits resulting from the new way of organizing economic affairs in the political order of the Islamic Republic of Iran caused the supporters of the ruling status quo not only to oppose and resist any structural reforms in the field of improving the separation of political power from economic power, but also, due to the pattern of unequal distribution of political power among the elected and appointed parts of the political structure, the economy became more and more state-owned and the majority of economic resources were taken over by the state. In fact, the non-uniformity of the state institution and the conflict and conflict between the elected and appointed parts of the government over the issue of the distribution of political power have been very effective in opposing the separation of power and the intensification of the state-owned economy; the political power tries to manage and control the citizens' bio-politics by dominating their economic and bio-economic resources. In fact, it can be said that from the second half of the seventies onwards, the role of beliefs in the state-owned economy has become less important, and economic and political benefits have become more prominent in the continuation and intensification of the existing situation. On the other hand, given the data and the economic situation of the society, it seems that the continuation of the current situation is impossible and requires fundamental reforms. However, any policy-making to overcome the current situation requires the management of conflicts of interest and the consensus of the instrumental/political elites of the society. Otherwise, the ability and capacity of the state institution to respond to the demands of the people will decrease, and, in the same proportion, the dissatisfaction of the society with the state and the conflict between this state and the society will increase, and the continuity and strength of the political system will face challenges.
Public and International Law
Ayat Mulaee; Maedeh Soleymani Dinani
Abstract
Introduction
The constitution, by establishing the fundamental structural and procedural principles of government, defines the supreme law of a given polity (Boudreaux & Pritchard, 1993:11). Every theory of constitutionalism presupposes that a constitution must be capable of functioning over a relatively ...
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Introduction
The constitution, by establishing the fundamental structural and procedural principles of government, defines the supreme law of a given polity (Boudreaux & Pritchard, 1993:11). Every theory of constitutionalism presupposes that a constitution must be capable of functioning over a relatively long period of time. The notion of constitutional endurance is closely intertwined with key normative issues such as constitutional amendment. The very idea of constitutional amendment arises from the premise that no generation possesses the exclusive wisdom to bind future generations irreversibly or to design a constitution immune from failure. Consequently, there exists an inherent right to amend the constitution to remedy its deficiencies and to strengthen its principles when necessary (Hatchard, 2004:44–45).
Amendment provisions, as one of the essential pillars of constitutionalism, enable the constitutional text to evolve gradually, addressing the shortcomings of its initial design and responding to emerging challenges within the constitutional order (Albert, 2015: 656). The primary means of revising a constitution is the formal procedure explicitly set forth within the document itself. The more fundamental the proposed changes, the more essential recourse to formal procedures becomes (Assefa, 2012:103).
However, formal amendment rules often render constitutional change exceedingly difficult, and experience demonstrates that the politics of constitutional revision are highly contentious. Accordingly, most scholars acknowledge that constitutional change is not achieved exclusively through formal amendment procedures; in some instances, it occurs informally (Anderson, 2008: 59). Where the formal path to amendment proves arduous or obstructed, alternative routes become available to political actors to achieve its practical equivalent (Albert, 2014: 1062).
It may thus be argued that informal amendment practices play a significant role in reconstructing the constitution and reshaping its meaning in response to subsequent developments. The most accurate account of a constitution’s evolution must therefore consider not only formal amendments but also informal transformations. Only through this dual lens can one attain a deeper understanding of a state’s constitutionalism (Besso, 2005:84).
Recognizing the importance of informal constitutional change within the field of constitutional law, this paper explores the concept of constitutional amendment to clarify the nature, foundations, and legitimacy of informal constitutional transformation. Particular attention is devoted to the process of constitutional interpretation as a mechanism capable of functioning as a form of informal amendment. The central question addressed in this study is: despite the explicit provisions governing formal amendment in written constitutions, what are the functions and implications of informal amendment and constitutional interpretation? To answer this question, the paper adopts a descriptive–analytical approach—first examining the concept and dimensions of constitutional amendment, and then analyzing the interpretive role of the official constitutional interpreter and the processes through which informal constitutional change occurs.
Literature Review
Although several distinguished Iranian scholars—such as Habibzadeh and Mansourian, in their article “An Analysis of Constitutional Change Beyond the Formal Amendment Procedures Prescribed Therein,” and Morad Khani, in “Informal Constitutional Change: Foundations, Instances, and Approaches”—have addressed the possibility of constitutional change through means other than the formal amendment process enshrined in the constitutional text, the crucial role of constitutional interpretation in facilitating such informal change has not yet been seriously examined within domestic scholarship.
Research Objective
The present research seeks to understand the importance of discussions on informal constitutional change in constitutional law. It aims to examine real, yet unwritten, changes to the constitution—particularly those arising from the interpretation process, which bypasses the formal amendment procedure and cannot be justified through it—and to clarify the basis for the legitimacy of such changes.
Methodology
This research, by studying various domestic and international books and articles, has collected materials through library research and note-taking. It examines the subject using a descriptive-analytical method.
Findings and Conclusion
Although the formal amendment mechanism is a vital necessity for constitutional reform, the role of informal procedures in changing the constitution's content is so significant that they may even render formal amendment procedures irrelevant in determining the constitution's actual content. Dynamic interpretation, as a common method of adapting the constitution to contemporary developments, without formal stages or changes to the text, reveals hidden sub-textual and pre-textual layers not visible in the written document itself. This leads to informal change and amendment of the constitution. Consequently, the interpreting authority plays a crucial role in constitutionalizing procedures and institutions outside the constitution that have been created by the political branches. Interpretation is one of the informal methods of constitutional amendment, through which the interpreter links the written constitutional text to its unwritten layers. In this process, it is inevitably influenced by political practices and attempts to harmonize the text with the political realities of society. Political practices, by being reflected in the opinions and interpretations of the interpreting authority, take on a legal color and appear more justified.
In the Iranian constitutional system, the Guardian Council, with the aim of ascertaining the legislator's intent and discovering the essence of the constitution, introduces unwritten aspects of the constitutional principles that are not encompassed by the explicit text. Thus, through its official interpretations and without changing the written document, this authority, by unveiling the unwritten layers of the constitution, has paved the way for its change outside the formal process stipulated in Article 177 of the constitution—that is, informally. Since, in our constitutional system, interpretation is tantamount to the constitution and holds an effect and status similar to that of the written constitutional text, the interpreting authority, by granting constitutional status to an unwritten principle or practice without engaging in the difficulties of the formal amendment process, brings about informal constitutional change through the gateway of interpretation. Given the constitutional binding nature of interpretation in the Iranian constitution, these changes become part of the constitutional system and are treated as valid and binding.
Although changes that are the unconscious product of the constitution's dynamic system and subsequently gain the approval of political actors and the people can be considered valid, changes that are carried out by circumventing the difficult legal procedures call into question the wisdom of the original constitution-maker in dedicating a specific article to revision—aimed at preventing its arbitrary application and preserving the constitution's stability. Therefore, it is essential to distinguish organic interpretations, which arise from the complex interaction of forces among the different political branches of the government, from unreasonable interpretations that, by granting extra-legal and unlimited authority to certain institutions, disrupt the system of checks and balances and seriously conflict with the purpose of the text. Any change to the constitution must be labeled as legitimate and legal only after cautious and meticulous scrutiny, so that while allowing for the logical evolution of the constitution and its adaptation to conditions and the times, the endurance and integrity of the law are not undermined, and the path for any misuse is blocked.
Thus, although the amendment process serves an important practical purpose—namely, changing the constitutional text whose errors have been revealed over time and through experience—the prevalence of informal amendments may, in the future, nullify their usefulness. Furthermore, it is essential that the aspects of change in the constitutional system are considered sufficiently important and fundamental to determine the true scope of the constitution. Therefore, such a phenomenon must be approached with caution.
Political Thought
Ziba Shams; Zekrollah Mohammadi
Abstract
The problemFrom the very beginning of their entry into the political arena of the Islamic world, the Seljuks resorted to various tools to legitimize their political power and consolidate their rule. Gaining the approval of the Abbasid Caliphs was one of the primary and most significant of these instruments, ...
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The problemFrom the very beginning of their entry into the political arena of the Islamic world, the Seljuks resorted to various tools to legitimize their political power and consolidate their rule. Gaining the approval of the Abbasid Caliphs was one of the primary and most significant of these instruments, which can be considered the core element of the Caliphate-centered legitimacy model. Toghrul, much like his Buyid predecessor, 'Adud al-Dawla al-Daylami, appeared before the Caliph in the Dar al-Khilafa of Baghdad unarmed and prostrated himself on the ground before him. It appears that during the era of Toghrul’s rule and in the early years of Seljuk ascendancy, they were not in a position to conceive a new definition for their relationship with the Caliphate. Therefore, Toghrul, by modeling himself on the conduct of 'Adud al-Dawla al-Daylami and repeating the ceremonial presentation before the Abbasid Caliph, imitated the same legitimization system established by the Buyid Amirs.During the reigns of Alp Arslan and Malik-Shah, while maintaining this tool of legitimacy, the Seljuq Sultans, influenced by the thoughts of Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk, the Vizier, and Imam Muhammad al-Ghazali, moved toward another tool for acquiring legitimacy. Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk, in his Siyasatnama, attributes the happiness of both worlds to a monarchy that possesses divine Farrah (Royal Glory). Al-Ghazali, in his Nasihat al-Muluk (Advice to Kings), introduced the Sultan as the shadow of God on Earth.This trend persisted until the era of Sultan Sanjar (511–552 AH). However, during this time, the relationship between the Caliphate and the Sultanate entered a new phase, for which the letters and decrees of Sultan Sanjar—preserved in the Munsha’at Leningrad and later in the book Utbat al-Kataba—serve as the best documentation.BackgroundRegarding the issue of legitimacy in the Seljuq state, numerous studies and researches have been conducted, with scholars examining it from various angles. Lambton, in the seventh chapter of her book State and Government in Islam, investigates the relationship between the Sultanate and the Caliphate in Sunni thought by reviewing the views of Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni and especially Imam Muhammad al-Ghazali. The late Dr. Seyyed Javad Tabataba’i, in his works, discussed the issue of the legitimacy of the Seljuq state and its connection to the Abbasid Caliphate based on the concept of Iranshahr (Iranian-world concept) and the role of Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk. Omid Safi, in his book Politics/Knowledge in the Islamic World, examined legitimacy in the Seljuq period based on Foucault’s and Althusser’s theories, emphasizing the convergence of epistemology and ideology and underscoring the role of scientific and religious institutions in legitimization. Taghi Azad Armaki and Maryam Kamali, in their article “Political Legitimacy and Power Structure in the Government of the Seljuks,” addressed the legitimacy of the Seljuks from the beginning until the end of Malik-Shah’s reign, examining it based on Max Weber’s theory of legitimacy.As is evident, none of the cited studies have explored the Seljuq legitimacy model from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) theory. Amidst this, there are a limited number of works that analyze historical letters based on Fairclough’s model. Among these, one can mention the Master’s thesis titled “Critical Discourse Analysis of the Translation of the Letter of Imam Ali (AS) to Malik al-Ashtar,” written by Masihollah Nemati, and the Ph.D. dissertation titled “Stylistic Analysis of Imam Ghazali’s Letters with a Critical Discourse Analysis Approach,” conducted by Maryam Darpar at Ferdowsi University of Mashhad in 2011, which was recently published as a book. The significance of these theses lies in their direct application of CDA to the level of letters, which is also the subject of the current research. Although the above studies are not directly related to the topic of the present article, they have nevertheless provided useful theoretical and framework information for the authors of this paper.MethodCritical Discourse Analysis theory, known as “CDA” in specialized discourse analysis texts, was founded by the English linguist and researcher Norman Fairclough in 1989, based on the theories of Michel Foucault. Fairclough, in his book Critical Discourse Analysis, mentions three essential and primary characteristics for “CDA,” which are: Relational, Dialectical, and Trans-disciplinary. Accordingly, his three-tiered model of critical analysis consists of:1)Description: The first level of Fairclough’s critical discourse production is the description level, which examines the formalistic and superficial characteristics of the text. He describes these apparent features in three domains: Vocabulary, Grammar, and Textual Structure. At this level, every word is chosen with specific objectives; therefore, one of the initial steps in the critical analysis of texts is the recognition and identification of words and phrases that carry a specific semantic load.2)Interpretation: This focuses on the relationship between the text and its interaction with existing or prior discourses in society—specifically, which existing or prior discourses the author has utilized to produce their discourse and text, and conversely, how the researcher employs these discourses to interpret the existing text. In other words, the researcher seeks to answer the following questions: Who created the text? Who is the audience? Who is involved? And what relationships exist?3)Explanation: The third and final stage of critical analysis is explanation, where the interactions and the rationale behind the discourse production are examined in relation to social conditions. At this stage, the discourse is analyzed as part of a social process: What social conditions led to the emergence of this discourse? And is the existing discourse seeking to maintain or change the structures?The purpose of the research: The subject of discourse analysis can also be framed historically. Since discourse analysis views everything from the perspective of language and narration, considering the world as nothing more than text and narrative, historical narratives, texts, and letters can be examined and analyzed within this theoretical framework. It appears that among the numerous discourse analysis theories, Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis can be one of the best frameworks for historical investigations. One of the most authoritative historical letters is the letter of Sultan Sanjar Seljuq to the Vizier al-Mustarshid Billah al-Abbasi. Given these explanations, the research question is: From the perspective of Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis, what transformation in the discourse of legitimacy for the Seljuq state is indicated by Sultan Sanjar’s letter to the Abbasid Caliph?Findings and ConclusionsIn the analysis of this letter based on Fairclough’s CDA, the following results were obtained: At the description level and in terms of vocabulary, Sultan Sanjar, by highlighting his own Sultanate-centered discourse and marginalizing the Caliphate-centered discourse, defines the source of legitimacy for his role as inheritance, personal entitlement, and divine. At the interpretation level, Sultan Sanjar is influenced by the new view of the Sultanate propagated by al-Ghazali, which posits the Seljuq Sultan as the shadow of God on Earth. Finally, at the explanation level, within the context of the social events and historical transformations of that period, it can be argued that the confrontation between Sultan Sanjar and al-Mustarshid al-Abbasi compelled Sultan Sanjar to replace the dominant Caliphate-centered discourse with his own Sultanate-centered discourse.
Development and Security
Abbas Sarvestani; Mohammadreza Mohammadi
Abstract
Research Problem and Background
Contemporary environmental crises have precipitated unprecedented primary and secondary threats to humanity, placing these issues at the core of global politics. The devastating impact of these threats on global health, economy, security, and geopolitics—manifesting ...
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Research Problem and Background
Contemporary environmental crises have precipitated unprecedented primary and secondary threats to humanity, placing these issues at the core of global politics. The devastating impact of these threats on global health, economy, security, and geopolitics—manifesting in intensified unemployment, widening economic inequalities, and associated domestic political challenges such as the rise of populism, authoritarian regimes, the undermining of free trade, regional conflicts, forced migration, violence, organized crime, and the risks of terrorism and fundamentalism—has fundamentally transformed the traditional, military-centric, and zero-sum understanding of peace and security. This evolution has given rise to a new, comprehensive concept of environmental security that encompasses not only military and political dimensions but also economic, social, and environmental components. Given the absence of a supreme international political authority to resolve these issues and the limitations of nation-states in responding to such transnational challenges, the responsibility for ensuring environmental security is increasingly shifting towards a vast, transnational, multilateral, and multi-level network of global governance.
This article is situated within the scholarly debates on environmental security and global governance. While traditional security studies focused on state-centric military threats, the post-Cold War era expanded the security agenda to include environmental dimensions. Concurrently, the literature on global governance emerged to describe the complex systems of rule-making and implementation involving both state and non-state actors at multiple levels. This research bridges these two discourses, examining how global governance structures are being shaped to address environmental security challenges and, crucially, what role nation-states retain within this evolving framework.
Research Objective: This study aims to elucidate the meaning and conceptualization of environmental security and to analyze the phenomenon of global governance in this domain. Its primary objective is to critically examine the position and role of nation-states within this novel architecture of global politics and international relations, specifically concerning environmental security.
Research Methodology
This qualitative research employs an analytical-descriptive methodology, grounded in a critical review of existing literature. It synthesizes theories from international relations, security studies, and global environmental politics. The analysis involves conceptual investigation to define core terms like environmental security and global governance. Furthermore, it examines empirical evidence, including case studies of international environmental agreements (e.g., the Paris Agreement), statistical data trends on environmental degradation and cooperation, and comparative analysis of different countries' experiences with ecological crises. This multi-faceted approach allows for a comprehensive assessment of the dynamics between state sovereignty and transnational governance mechanisms.
Findings and Discussion: The analysis reveals that global governance, whether viewed positively as a novel mechanism to tackle globalization's problems or critically as a political project of global dominance, has instigated three fundamental shifts in world politics concerning environmental security. First, it describes global policies that are no longer the exclusive domain of national governments but are shaped by a network of transnational and sub-national non-state actors. Second, global governance policies are formulated through new forms of cooperation within networks involving both states and non-institutions, extending beyond traditional state-negotiated binding legal instruments. Finally, global governance has created diverse networks and clusters of rule-making and implementation, where authority is distributed both horizontally among various actors and vertically across transnational, national, and sub-national levels.
Regarding the future of global governance for environmental security, several scenarios emerge from the findings. Some theorists, citing the borderless nature of environmental problems and declining trust in the capacity of nation-states, posit that transnational actors will increasingly collaborate to fill the void, potentially leading to a global governance system that gradually supplants state-centric governance. The examined data, including the role of agreements like the Paris Accord in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, supports the significant positive impact that international cooperation and global governance can have on enhancing environmental security.
Conversely, the findings also highlight a countervailing trend. The rise of nationalism and geopolitical tensions threatens to erode the space that fostered transnational governance in recent decades. This shift towards nationalist and authoritarian domestic politics constrains the ability of sub-state and non-state actors to operate across borders, suggesting a potential overall contraction in civil society space and non-governmental activism within global governance for environmental security.
Conclusion
This article argues that the ultimate trajectory likely lies between these two extremes. It predicts a continued coexistence of multiple levels of global governance for environmental security. As expanding environmental threats like resource scarcity and natural disasters elevate ecological issues to high politics and increase their weight in domestic political discourse and electoral agendas internationally, the accumulation of environmental crises will likely pressure the global governance regime. This pressure may drive a shift from soft, normative laws towards harder, more binding and restrictive international environmental regulations, imposing greater constraints on nation-states. Therefore, while the state's monopoly in governing environmental security is being challenged and transformed, it is not rendered obsolete. Instead, states are compelled to navigate and negotiate their role within an increasingly complex, multi-actor global governance landscape aimed at securing a fragile planetary environment.
