Document Type : Research Paper
Author
Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and World Studies, School of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Civil disobedience in John Rawls’ theory of justice is protesting actions of citizens against some unjust laws and policy making in a democratic governments. The objective of such actions is reform and change on the basis of a constitution through rational and peaceful manners. Rawls relied on civil disobedience on the philosophical and moral foundation and, while justifying it on the basis of two principles of justice, discusses the role of this non-violent civil action. In his assessment, civil disobedience is justifiable as a legal and moral action, for this treatment confronts unjust, no efficient other lawful acts, and acceptance of some inevitable limitations. It is forming on the basis of expansion of liberties, rationality, and overlapping consensus. Hence Civil disobedience is a democratic movement and its objective is reform of some laws and structures; therefore it cannot be considered as militant actions. This research uses conceptual analysis and critical evaluation based upon analytic philosophy to explain and criticize the issue of civil disobedience in Rawls political philosophy. The outcome of this study is that Rawls’ thoughts as a means of defining and explaining the philosophical and ethical principles, as well as the precise drawing of civil disobedience boundaries from militant practices have the rational consistency and theoretical strength. Against this observation, his objective guidance and action in this regard are in some cases subject to ambiguities and shortcomings. Rawls does not follow a same method regarding such guidance.
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