Iranian Studies
Ebrahim Abbasi; Mohammad Jamiri
Abstract
Extended AbstractIntroductionThe theory of developmental state is an approach to industrial and economic development that shares certain features with the policies of Reza Shah’s regime in Iran. This perspective has often been used in Iran to explain the industrial trajectories of the Asian Tigers, ...
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Extended AbstractIntroductionThe theory of developmental state is an approach to industrial and economic development that shares certain features with the policies of Reza Shah’s regime in Iran. This perspective has often been used in Iran to explain the industrial trajectories of the Asian Tigers, as well as to analyze the efforts to adapt to the industrialization trend in the post-Islamic Revolution period. However, the core assumptions of this theory have not yet been thoroughly examined concerning the industrial and economic transformations that occurred during Reza Shah’s rule. In this respect, the present study tried to answer the question of whether Reza Shah’s industrial and financial measures can be understood within the theory of the developmental state. The objective was to evaluate the key indicators of this theory and assess how they align with the developments that took place during Reza Shah’s reign.Materials and MethodsThe current study adopted a qualitative and explanatory approach, and drew on primary sources such as memoirs, documents, and authentic analytical works from the period to address the research question. Moreover, the theory of developmental state was used as the framework of analysis. The concept of developmental state (also known as developmentalist state) offers a theoretical framework that can help evaluate the economic transformations of Reza Shah’s reign. This theory is based on the idea that government intervention can play a central role the country’s industrial development process. The term developmental state was first popularized by Chalmers Johnson, who used it to describe a theoretical model to explain a reality derived from the experiences of countries such as Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Botswana, and Taiwan. A distinguishing feature of these countries was their continuous and sustainable economic growth—averaging 4% or more over two decades—accompanied by the increased level of welfare and living standards and effective inflation control. Although these governments did not follow economically liberal models and often advocated for a maximalist system, they simultaneously provided significant support to the private sector through a highly effective and efficient bureaucracy. The theory of developmental state was later developed further by scholars such as Peter Evans and Adrian Leftwich. Leftwich defines developmental states as those whose domestic policies and foreign relations are aimed at gaining power, autonomy, independence, capability, and capacity. These goals are pursued either through the direct organization of economic growth or by fostering conditions that encourage it—or a combination of the two.Results and DiscussionThe indicators of a developmental state, as applied to the context of Reza Shah’s regime, included a centralized and comprehensive bureaucracy, developmental elites, the absence of a central development body in Iran, state independence, a favorable international environment, and the neglect of agriculture. First, a key requirement of a developmental state is a centralized and comprehensive bureaucracy that extends across the entire country. In this context, bureaucracy refers to a powerful, proficient, and corruption-free network. Prior to the Pahlavi period, Iran lacked such a unified bureaucratic system. With Reza Khan’s rise to power, the need to concentrate power in order to counter internal fragmentation and promote national unity led to the establishment of a unified and comprehensive bureaucracy. However, from the outset, Iran’s administrative system faced significant intellectual, cultural, and managerial challenges. These obstacles prevented it from evolving into an agile, dynamic, and corruption-resistant system. As a result, the bureaucratic system became a persistent obstacle to development—one that continues to affect the country to this day. The administrative system remains dependent, passive, and informal. Within such systems, managers tend to be subordinate to the decisions coming from the top of the political pyramid. The second key indicator was the role of developmental elites. Elites—both executive and intellectual—are regarded as essential to transforming society and advancing the objectives of the state. Under Reza Shah’s regime, Iran’s political elite could be broadly categorized into two groups. The first included individuals such as Davar, Hekmat, Foroughi, and Taghizadeh, who were primarily intellectuals and played a significant role in shaping the cultural and ideological foundations of the state. The second group, which exercised greater influence over political and executive affairs, comprised figures like Teimur Tash, the powerful Minister of the Court, Nosrat al-Dowleh Firouz, Seyyed Mohammad Tadayyon, and Sardar Asad. This dominant group entrenched irrational, self-centered, and anti-developmental practices within government operations, effectively limiting opportunities for capable and competent elites to emerge and advance. In addition, none of the elites during Reza Shah’s reign—including Foroughi, Hekmat, Davar, Kasravi, Taghizadeh, Bahar, and others—produced any substantial work on Iran’s industrial or economic development. Their intellectual contributions, including newspaper articles, were overwhelmingly focused on cultural, literary, political, and civilizational issues. Another important indicator was the absence of a central development body in Iran. The existence of a central organization capable of managing national development through well-designed planning is an essential component of a successful developmental state. Such an institution ensures policy coherence and helps identify and nurture talent. However, during Reza Shah’s rule, no such organization existed. While there were efforts toward industrialization and modernization, the idea of systematic, planned economic development was not operationalized until Reza Shah’s exile. According to Ebtehaj, the failure to institutionalize planning during this period stemmed from Reza Shah’s resistance to the centralization of planning. The fourth indicator was state independence, which refers to the state’s autonomy from reliance on social classes. In the case of Iran, the state was not dependent on any particular class but operated beyond class affiliations. Reza Shah, as the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, did not view his government as being indebted to any social group or class. Iran’s historical experience suggests that although his regime maintained independence from all social groups, it was also distinctly isolated from them. On the one hand, the government was entirely detached from the religious leadership and groups—who constituted the majority of the population—and there was little to no shared logic. On the other hand, ties with traditional and small merchants—who represented the backbone of Iran’s commercial sector—were also severed. A favorable international environment is another critical factor in enabling a developmental state. Without a suitable international environment is essential for the export and competitiveness of domestically produced good, developmentalist states face significant challenges. Many argue that the conditions in South Korea and Taiwan after World War II were exceptional. These included unwavering U.S. support aimed at curbing the spread of communism, as well as the broader conditions of the Cold War. In contrast, Iran faced a different set of challenges. During the same period, the competing interests of major powers—particularly Britain and the Soviet Union—acted as major obstacles to Iran’s development. Between the two world wars, Iran was exposed to the rivalry of the superpowers, and its development became subject to their pledge and distraint. The last and sixth indicator was the neglect of agriculture during the reign of Reza Shah. Agriculture was of great importance for reasons such as leveraging the value-added potential of the agricultural sector for industrial expansion, countering the influence of communism, and ensuring the production of affordable and essential food for the population in the developmental state. At the same time, attention to agriculture, along with land reforms in Iran, was necessary and essential, but these goals were not realized in practice. This neglect can be attributed to factors such as the Shah himself becoming the largest landowner in the country. ConclusionThe research findings indicate that although certain elements of the theory—such as a proficient bureaucracy, a weak civil society, a permanent army, and developmental elites—appear consistent with the political and economic approaches of Reza Shah’s reign, in practice, several critical factors undermined a true alignment. These include the absence of a development planning body, the government’s lack of engagement with social classes, an unfavorable international environment, the elimination of developmental elites and their replacement with non-developmental ones, and Reza Shah’s neglect of essential development measures, such as land reforms, which are considered foundational for national development. What was necessary for real production—across industry, agriculture, services, and especially science and technology—was not achieved, with most sectors remaining subordinate to foreign markets. Iran’s industrial expansion strategy was driven by individual preferences rather than being organization-oriented and purposeful. No organization or collective body was involved in planning economic and industrial growth. For these reasons, despite sharing some characteristics with the theory of developmental state—such as a weak civil society and a permanent army—Reza Shah’s administration cannot be classified as developmentalist.
The State
Mazaher Ziaei
Abstract
Extended AbstractIntroductionInvestigating how the Safavid state emerged and flourished in today’s Iran territory is very useful for understanding Iran's history and current situation. Interpreting states' evolution over time requires a theory that considers the dynamics of the internal relations ...
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Extended AbstractIntroductionInvestigating how the Safavid state emerged and flourished in today’s Iran territory is very useful for understanding Iran's history and current situation. Interpreting states' evolution over time requires a theory that considers the dynamics of the internal relations of individuals in the government organization and the mutual effects the society in the economic, political, and social fields over time. A look at the mass of studies about the Safavids shows that despite the many efforts made, there are still many differences of opinion about the causes of the emergence, peak, and decline of the Safavid era. It is expected that the use of more comprehensive theories in interpreting state developments will contribute to the coherence of interpretations of common understanding in this field.Recently, three experts centered on Douglas North, the joint winner of the 1993 Nobel Prize in Economics, have presented a conceptual framework for development, which they claim can be used to interpret and analyze the written history of mankind and the relationship between historical developments and development.BackgroundThe North et al. conceptual framework attracted the attention of Iranian researchers and it has been used in the research (Ziaei, 1402) to interpret the developments of the Sasanian state from the beginning to its fall, and in (Qarakhani et al. 1400) for the Pahlavi state. One research, with the same theoretical framework was conducted by (Ostad and Heydari 1400) for the Safavids, although its title seems to include the entire Safavid period, its purpose is to investigate the causes of the downfall of the Safavids. Also, in the theoretical framework of North et al., the changes in the government are the changes in the coalition, which can be analyzed by the principle of double balance, as described in the theoretical part, but in this research, this capacity is neglected and in some cases, the concepts of other theoretical frameworks are used.GoalThe aim of this is to use the conceptual framework of the "natural state" to provide a new interpretation of the progress of Safavid dynasty from the beginning to the end of Shah Abbas I's reign, which is expected to be more comprehensive and coherent than the existing interpretations.MethodologyThe period from the Safavid sect era to Abbas I is divided into seven periods.From endowment management to country government (1300-1499)From the coalition of warriors to the government of an empire (1514-1499)The containment of Qazalbashan by the break down Ismail (1514-1524)War of the elders in the presence of the child king (1524-1533)Stable and durable coalition (1576-1533)Civil war and shaky alliances (1576-1589)The perfect coalition (1629-1589)For each period, at first, the related part of the theoretical framework is presented, then state evolution is interpreted according to the combination of the coalition’s members, their relative political power, and environmental conditions.FindingsThe results show that the initial coalition of the Safavid state, which was formed by the absolute dominance of the Shah and the strong role of the Qizelbashs and Sufis, with some ups and downs reached its peak during the period of Abbas I. This coalition includes the king, wardens, governors of kingdoms and Khalsa states, pastoral and professional soldiers, jurisconsult, bureaucrats, courtiers, and on its margins were merchants, architects, doctors, and some other elites. The geographical size of the Safavid state during the last conquests of Ismail I and the time of the death of Abbas I did not differ much, and except for around the beginning of the kingdom of Abbas I, it had little fluctuations during this period.The characteristics of the Safavid coalition are: 1) The axis of this coalition was a dynasty with a long history was urban, with a religious attraction among the society and especially acceptance among the military of the alliance. It had economic, political facilities and military command experience. This family was always above all, more or less the manifestation of the hopes of the members, the arbiter and the speaker of the conflicts and the controller of all the members of the coalition. In other words, the axis of the coalition was often "people of religion", "people of the sword", "people of the pen" and "people of economic accounting" at the same time.2) Although the military force always played an important role in the coalition, it was fragmented and as a result, one of them couldn't dominate the entire coalition. They were basically the defenders of the coalition and they competed to the extent that the coalition would not fall apart.3) The composition of the members, their role and power were such that it provided various military and economic rents to the coalition and to some extent provided the growth of some economic activities. The whole coalition and especially its axis, unlike most of the great Mongol and Turkish empires, was not alien to agriculture, urban life and trade, but promoted trade and urbanization.ConclusionAccording to the theory of "natural state" by North et al. the relation of the Safavid coalition to the development of Iran It can said:- The Safavid state was not an absolute European state or a national state, but the rule of a single government over the current territory of Iran for more than two hundred years accelerated and facilitated the achievement of a centralized state in the following years.- The role of religion in this coalition has been much more complicated than in Europe, and it seems that each of the different points of view in this field has only dealt with a part of these complexities.- From an organizational point of view, no organization was formed outside the state, but the juris consults had an organization parallel to the state to some extent- In terms of the government's support for organizations outside the government, it can be said that no organization of this kind was formed, but the scholars recently had an organization that was somewhat parallel to the government.- The dominance of the militaries, especially nomads, in the coalition and the consecration of officials and individuals caused the discussion on the powers of the coalition members, especially the restrictions on the king's powers, to not lead to official and written agreements like what happened in Europe.
Political Sociology
Nejat Mohammadifar; Ehsan Kazemi
Abstract
Imagining government as a powerful and all-encompassing institution which effectively controls a geopolitical area has affected the basic role of this institution in the development discourse. Because the government is considered as the main basis of political, economic and social order, its representative ...
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Imagining government as a powerful and all-encompassing institution which effectively controls a geopolitical area has affected the basic role of this institution in the development discourse. Because the government is considered as the main basis of political, economic and social order, its representative role is significant. Today, many thinkers and international organizations believe that the government still plays an essential role in advancing the process of development and poverty reduction but the problem is that always some governments have not been able or willing to play the expected roles. Many governments, due to various social, political, economic and structural reasons do not have the ability and capacities necessary for carring out development and poverty reduction, or basically do not show much political desire and will in this regard. Since the 1990s, those states that their governments lack the necessary ability to perform normal functions and lead their society to development have been known as fragile states. This is a concept that is more related to developing countries. On the basis of this, the main question of the current research is "what are the criteria for evaluating the capacity and willingness of fragile states in planning for development and poverty reduction?" The research method used in this research is systematic review and information are collected using library tools and internet resources. The theoretical framework of the research is based on Torres and Anderson (2004). From the point of view of Torres and Anderson, the development capacities of a government include the foundations of government authority, administrative capacity and efficiency, economic efficiency and the effective exercise of political power. A government that lacks these capacities or has these features just to a limited extent will lose its capacity and ability to advance development and reduce poverty to a large extent. In addition, from thier point of view, along with these features, the political will for development and poverty reduction must exist at the top of the government. In other word there should be an explicit political statement that shows the commitment and desire of a government to advance development and poverty reduction programs. As well, in this direction, attention should be paid to the existence of strategies, tools and motivations for implementation, so that services are provided in the best possible way and has the character of inclusiveness. Finally, Torres and Anderson (2004) present a fourfold typology of governments (weak willingness and capacity governments, strong willingness and weak capacity governments, strong willingness and capacity governments, and weak willingness and strong capacity governments) that can be used to identify the criteria for evaluating the capacity of fragile states in development planning and poverty reduction. The results of the research findings show that governments in fragile states could have a proper planning in order to improve development capacities and reduce poverty by strengthening the foundations of authority, effective exercise of political power, efficiency in macroeconomic management, administrative capacity for implementation, along with the political commitment to reduce poverty and provide comprehensive services. Based on this, the governments that have weak political desire and will, even if they have the necessary capacities for development and poverty reduction, will not succeed. Similarly, those states that have a strong political desire and will but lack the necessary capacities, will not be successful. In transition countries, where governments are usually more fragile, rapid changes may lead to instability. Therefore, it should be emphasized on gradual reforms and more accountability of governments in these countries. As the Iraq experience clearly shows, dramatic changes—including a sudden move toward fully competitive elections—in countries with weak cohesion, fragile institutions, and a history of intergroup hostility can be highly explosive and undermine the entire reform agenda. So, it is better to give priority to solidarity and security and gradually carry out broader reforms in the field of development and poverty reduction so that do not explicitly threaten the status quo. Limits such as increasing transparency and carrying out budgeting methods, strengthening non-governmental organizations, creating a strong civil society, strengthening public cohesion and trust, increasing income and reducing unemployment, improving the rule of law and the government's capacity to judge and implement it can improve relations between governments and people and provide the basis for other actions. It seems that the biggest determining factors eventually are the government, its leadership, policies and institutions; This does not mean ignoring the role of the society as sustainable development requires roles of both government and society. The development-seeking government and the development-seeking society, with their desire and high capacities for development, are the key to success in the advancing development and poverty reduction.
Omid Shokraneh Arzanaghi; Masoud Akhavan Kazemi
Abstract
The present study examines and analyzes the impact of the participation crisis on the fall of the second Pahlavi regime from the perspective of crisis theory. The main question of the present study is what role did the participation crisis play in the fall of the Pahlavi regime? The research findings ...
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The present study examines and analyzes the impact of the participation crisis on the fall of the second Pahlavi regime from the perspective of crisis theory. The main question of the present study is what role did the participation crisis play in the fall of the Pahlavi regime? The research findings indicate that with the end of dictatorial rule in 1320, Iranian society entered a new phase and the provision of open political space and the activities of political parties and organizations doubled the motivation of the people for political participation. But with the coup d'état of August 28, 1943, a new era of authoritarian rule began in Iran. Political tyranny, lack of growth and inefficiency of parties, lack of free elections, suppression of freedoms and political rights of the people, severe weakness of popular organizations and lack of freedom of the press, caused the Pahlavi government to face a crisis of political participation. The continuation of the crisis of participation in the Pahlavi government and the negligence of the officials of the government to resolve the crisis, paved the way for the fall of the Pahlavi regime. The method of this research is descriptive-analytical and causal research. Data collection in this study was done through library and documentary methods.
Ruhollah Safariyan; Seyed Javad Emamjomehzadeh
Abstract
Social changes in the global approach to development at the societies level has changed. Today a different social structure is required for the comprehensive development of the organization so that all social forces can be included in this structure. A good governance pattern with a different social ...
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Social changes in the global approach to development at the societies level has changed. Today a different social structure is required for the comprehensive development of the organization so that all social forces can be included in this structure. A good governance pattern with a different social and political framework is also in line with these new conditions. Accordingly, the main question of the present article is how good governance patterns affect overall development. Our hypothesis in this study is that in the model of good governance by creating social capital in its triple structure, it leads to the development of administrative, political, economic, social and cultural levels. Thus, in this approach, the state, with its distinctive nature and character and by organizing it rationally facilitates the development of partnership and participation of other social sectors, such as civil society and non-governmental public institutions, and the private sector. And the main feature of the new age and globalization is that decentralization is expected in this structure. Therefore, this research attempts to show by using descriptive-analytical method and using library and documentary sources that the model of good governance as a new approach to development studies emphasizes the state with institutional-managerial aspects and political and legal nature, and along with it, the various social forces that are co-ordinating with the perspective and the horizontal and network structure.
Mohammad Bagher khorramshad; Majid Nejatpoor
Abstract
Purpose: After the Islamic Revolution, some intellectual and political currents discussed the concept of development. In the wake of continuing discussion on development, liberal development discourse arose from the intellectual and political currents of the 70th. In this article, we want to show how ...
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Purpose: After the Islamic Revolution, some intellectual and political currents discussed the concept of development. In the wake of continuing discussion on development, liberal development discourse arose from the intellectual and political currents of the 70th. In this article, we want to show how the concept of development appeared, why it was rejected by some groups, and what happened to its meaning. Design/Methodology/Approach: In this regard, we can pay attention to the works of Mahmud Sariolghalam & Mouse Ghaninejad for a deeper understanding of the intellectual and political content of liberalism in Iran. Development discourse tries to articulate main concepts such as small government, freedom, market economy, and human rights. This study tries to examine the development discourse by using discourse analysis. Findings: The mail question of this article is this: What is change from the perspective of liberal development discourse? In response to this question, it can be said: the change consist of the process of modernization and transition from traditional society to modern society. This means “liberal modernization”. The main element of liberal current is the optimization of liberal system, economic competition and a minimum role of state in domestic politics and international trade. The supporters of liberal current pay attention to change and modernization, and hold an optimistic view of new western civilization. They believe that in failure to reach development, determinant factors are domestic factors such as wrong thoughts and beliefs of Iranian culture. Originality/Value: In this article, we investigate liberal development discourse and try to establish a relationship between liberal current and development. This current defends a systematic liberal perspective and a competitive economy. The Adherents of this current believe that the state intervention in economic activities must become very minimal.
