نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار حقوق عمومی دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی

2 دانش آموخته کارشناسی ارشد حقوق عمومی دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی

چکیده

کار ویژه نهاد صیانت‌کننده از قانون اساسی در هر نظام حقوقی، همواره حفاظت از آرمان‌های ملت و حقوق اساسی می‌باشد. این نهاد در کشورهایی که در حال گذار به دمکراسی می‌باشند؛ می‌تواند روند حرکت مردم را تسریع یا حتی تضعیف نماید. اعتماد عمومی به این نهادها، به طور تنگاتنگی با استقلال آن‌ها در ارتباط است. عامل موثر این استقلال، مرجع تعیین قضات دادگاه‌ها می‌باشد. با توجه به نظام‌های گوناگون انتخاب قضات دادگاه‌ها، می‌توان به میزان و نحوه دخالت ارگان‌های دیگر در این امر پی برد. کشورهای عراق و ترکیه که تحولات دمکراسی‌خواهانه‌ای را در سالیان اخیر پشت سر گذارده‌اند، با پیروی از الگوهای متفاوت انتخاب قضات اساسی، میزان متفاوتی از استقلال و به تبع آن مشروعیت را تجربه نموده‌اند. کشور عراق با اعمال الگوی اجرایی، این نهاد را به شدت تحت تاثیر قوه مجریه قرار داده است که صدور احکام یک‌جانبه به سود حزب حاکم، می‌تواند این فرضیه را اثبات نماید. اما ترکیه با عدول از الگوی اجرایی و با پذیرش الگوی چند حوزه‌ای، میزان مشارکت نهادهای مدنی و دیگر قوا را در انتخاب قضات دادگاه بیشتر نموده و میزان بیشتری از مشروعیت را برای این دادگاه رقم زده است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Pattern of judges’ selection of the Constitutional Court in the States of Iraq and Turkey

نویسندگان [English]

  • Hoda Ghafari 1
  • Maziyar Khademi 2

1 Assistant Professor, Department of Public Law, Allameh Tabataba’i University

2 M.A Student of Public Law, Allameh Tabataba’i University

چکیده [English]

The function of protection institution of the constitutional in every legal system is always protecting the aspirations of the nation and fundamental rights. This institution can accelerate or even weaken the movement of people in countries that are transitioning to democracy. Public trust in these institutions is closely linked to their independence. The effective factor of this independence is the appointment of the judges of the courts. As for the various systems of selection of judges, it is possible to determine the extent and manner of the interference of other organizations in this regard. Iraq and Turkey, which have undergone democratic changes in recent years, have experienced varying degrees of independence and, consequently, legitimacy by following different patterns of selection of constitutional judges. With the implementation of administrative model, the Iraqi state has strongly influenced the executive branch, and the issuance of unilateral sentences for the benefit of the ruling party can prove this hypothesis. However, Turkey, deviating from the executive model and accepting a multi-domain pattern, has increased the participation of civil society organizations and other branches in the selection of court judges and increased the legitimacy of the court.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Constitutional Court Independence
  • Selection of Constitutional Judges
  • Administrative Model
  • Multi-domain Pattern
  • Turkey
  • Iraq

الف) فارسی

کدخدایی، عباسعلی، (1382)، «ضرورت پاسداری از قانون اساسی و حقوق شهروندان»، کتاب نقد، سال هفتم، شماره 22.
موسی زاده، ابراهیم و همکاران، (1389)، دادرسی اساسی در جمهوری اسلامی ایران (اصول قانون اساسی در پرتو نظرات شورای نگهبان 1389-1359)، چاپ اول، تهران: معاونت تدوین، تنقیح و انتشار قوانین و مقررات.

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