Ramin khochiani
Abstract
The legislature is a manifestation of national sovereignty and one of the most important issues of policy and decision making in the country. Parliamentarians not only express their views on the status of the law, opinions but rather the selection of the Cabinet of Ministers and their removal, the comment ...
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The legislature is a manifestation of national sovereignty and one of the most important issues of policy and decision making in the country. Parliamentarians not only express their views on the status of the law, opinions but rather the selection of the Cabinet of Ministers and their removal, the comment declares themselves. Therefore the power of a parliamentary member is to apply his vote through voting. But how can this voting power be changed? The purpose of this paper is to measure the voting power of the members related to major political coalitions in the Islamic parliament using the theory of games. Using Shaply-Shubik's index, voting power of the three coalitions, reformist, and independent were measured in three election periods of 2007, 2011, and 2015. The results show that in the eighth period (2007-2011), all of voting power was for the principlists and the other two coalitions were dummy coalitions. In the ninth period (2011-2015), the voting power was again restored by the principlists and the other two coalitions were dummy coalitions. In the tenth period (2015-2019), despite the difference in the seats of the principlists and reformist and independent coalitions, the voting power is equally divided among all three coalitions. This is a very interesting conclusion that the number of seats in a coalition does not always reflect the strength of that coalition. It is suggested that the Islamic parliament Research Center use this approach in measuring the voting power of the fractions in the specialized parliamentary committees.
faez dinparast; zahra Ramezani
Abstract
The present paper aims to answer the question: Why instability erupted within the political scene of Egypt in context of so called Arab spring revolutions from January 2011 up the coup in June 2013. According to Charles Tilly’s social movement theory, the present study claims that those instabilities ...
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The present paper aims to answer the question: Why instability erupted within the political scene of Egypt in context of so called Arab spring revolutions from January 2011 up the coup in June 2013. According to Charles Tilly’s social movement theory, the present study claims that those instabilities were results of weak and brittle coalitions which were formed between political groups in Egypt. The study hypothesis was analyzed through the game theory. Muslim brotherhood, Salafi forces, Liberal-Secular forces and Egyptian Army were identified as four main players within the political scene in Egypt according to Tilly’s theory. The relationships between those main political players were analyzed using the game theory concept based on two strategies of “making coalition” or “avoiding coalition”. From the total 17 resulting calculated scenarios (4 players each with two strategies), 12 acceptable scenarios were identified. The results showed that the political situation will tend to move towards stability if the military and secular forces form a coalition. This result can be linked to two after coup periods between 2013 and the present time. Also our findings based on game theory and Nash’s equilibrium theory suggests that Egypt needs a triangle of political forces to prevail the arena in order to achieve a stable situation. Since the weights of stability condition for three tier coalition of brotherhood-secular-army, or salafi-brotherhood-army or secular-brotherhood-Salafi are almost identical, it can be stated that political stability in Egypt is more depending on the number of forces which enter a coalition than the type of players which form the coalition.
